David M. Medina

This case concerns a divorce proceeding in which Jack and Vicki Milner executed a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) under Texas Family Code § 6.602 that assigned Jack's interests in two Thelin business entities to Vicki, subject to the partnership agreement's requirement of unanimous consent from other partners. The trial court entered a divorce decree enforcing the MSA, but the court of appeals reversed in part, concluding there was no meeting of the minds on a material term and setting aside the MSA. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the remand of the property division for further proceedings but held that the MSA itself should not have been set aside. The Court reasoned that the MSA satisfied the statutory formalities, was unambiguous on its face, and could not be revoked once executed, even though third-party consents were ultimately not obtained and the decree did not fully implement the transfer mechanics.

family lawproperty

The case involved a workers' compensation dispute in which employee Carmen Muro sought lifetime income benefits under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act after a workplace fall injured her hips, back, shoulder, and neck, impairing her ability to walk and work despite no direct injury to her feet or hands. The trial court and court of appeals upheld an award of lifetime benefits based on the total loss of use of both feet (and one hand), but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, rendering judgment that Muro was not entitled to such benefits. The court held that section 408.161 of the Labor Code limits lifetime income benefits exclusively to the specific enumerated injuries and body parts listed in the statute, such as the loss of both feet at or above the ankle, and requires evidence of an injury extending to those statutory body parts themselves rather than merely to other parts that affect their use.

labor & employment

This case concerned whether a business auto insurance policy covered claims that bus passengers contracted tuberculosis from an infected driver during a school field trip. The trial court and court of appeals held that the policy could apply and required further factual findings on where the passengers became infected. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the policy did not provide coverage. The Court reasoned that the passengers' injuries did not result from the use of the bus as a vehicle but instead from the bus company's decision to employ an unhealthy driver, so the bus was not a substantial factor in causing the harm.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involves a Texas franchise tax dispute over how TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., a Delaware corporation based in Houston, should apportion receipts from licensing seismic and geophysical data to customers in Texas. The Comptroller reclassified these receipts as revenue from the use of a license in Texas rather than from the sale of an intangible asset, which increased the company's taxable share and led to an assessment of over $1.3 million in additional taxes plus penalties. The lower courts upheld the Comptroller's classification, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the receipts are properly treated as sales of intangibles. The core reasoning is that the master license agreements show TGS retains title to the data and grants only limited, nonexclusive, nontransferable use rights, and the relevant tax statutes and rules allocate such intangible sale receipts based on the payor's legal domicile rather than the place of use.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Diane Lee Norman, a probationary employee at the Travis Central Appraisal District, who sued for retaliatory discharge under Chapter 451 of the Texas Labor Code after being terminated shortly after filing a workers’ compensation claim. The appraisal district filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that governmental immunity had not been waived for such claims under the current version of Chapter 504 of the Labor Code. The Texas Supreme Court held that Chapter 504 no longer waives immunity for retaliatory discharge claims against political subdivisions, reversing the court of appeals and dismissing the case. The core reasoning was that the 2005 amendment to Chapter 504, stating it does not waive immunity, combined with incorporation language and other provisions, fails to provide the clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity required by law, making prior precedent from City of LaPorte v. Barfield inapplicable.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this mandamus proceeding, the Rubiola defendants, who were involved in selling and financing a home to the Salmons, sought to compel arbitration of claims alleging misrepresentations and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act related to the sale and repairs. The trial court denied the motion because the Rubiolas had not signed the arbitration agreement executed during mortgage financing, but the agreement expressly defined parties to include non-signatories such as affiliates, officers, agents, and representatives of Rubiola Mortgage Company. The court held that signatories to an arbitration agreement may grant enforcement rights to designated non-signatories, that the Rubiolas qualified as such parties here, and that the agreement's broad language covering all controversies and past agreements between the parties extended to the underlying real estate transaction. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to compel arbitration and conditionally granted mandamus relief under the Federal Arbitration Act.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory