James R. Norvell

The case involved a declaratory judgment action filed by Firemen's Insurance Company against Jesse and Dorothy Burch concerning an auto liability policy issued to Larry Buttler. The underlying tort suit by the Burches against Larry and Sarah Buttler for injuries from a car accident caused by Sarah remained pending and undecided. The trial court ruled that the insurer had a duty to defend Larry and to pay any judgment against him (based on his liability for his wife's torts), but not against Sarah; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the portion addressing the duty to defend but vacated the rulings on the insurer's obligation to pay any future judgment, holding that such declarations were advisory opinions on hypothetical and contingent questions beyond the court's constitutional authority under the Declaratory Judgments Act.

proceduretorts & liability

This case arose from a construction accident in which a crane boom collapsed after a splice in an extended pendant line failed, injuring worker Samuel Emanuel and damaging property of his employer H.A. Lott, Inc. Emanuel and the employer sued Texas Sling Company, which performed the splicing, and American Powerstage Company on negligence theories. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs against Texas Sling (and jointly against both defendants for property damage), but the Texas Supreme Court reversed the personal-injury judgment against Texas Sling and remanded for a new trial while affirming the judgment against American Powerstage. The majority held that the evidence of Texas Sling’s alleged negligent failure to inspect the splice was too scanty and circumstantial to support the verdict, noting that the pleadings alleged only negligence rather than implied warranty or strict liability, and that res ipsa loquitur had not been pleaded or submitted. The Court severed the claims and left undisturbed the take-nothing judgment against the crane owner.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs who were beneficiaries under 1946 wills executed by siblings John and Margie Edwards, suing to enforce an alleged oral contract that the wills would not be changed and would dispose of the property to designated heirs. The defendants were beneficiaries under Margie Edwards' later 1959 will, which included an in terrorem clause. The jury found no such contract existed, and the trial court ruled against the plaintiffs on both the contract claim and their eligibility under the 1959 will; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial testimony from defendant Josie Latch about events after John Edwards' death, which did not bear on the existence of a 1946 agreement and likely influenced the jury's verdict.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Allied Chemical Corporation seeking payment for petroleum products sold to Mid-Tex Development Company and Apollo Oil Company, and attempting to hold Bell Oil & Gas Company jointly liable based on close corporate affiliations, shared officers, and family ownership ties among the entities. The trial court entered judgment against Bell along with the other companies, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed as to Bell and rendered judgment that Allied take nothing against it while leaving the judgments against Mid-Tex and Apollo undisturbed. The court reasoned that the separate corporate identities of the three companies were maintained, Bell made no misrepresentations about its structure or relationships, the transactions were contractual rather than tortious, and the affiliations did not establish an agency or alter-ego relationship sufficient to impose liability on Bell for the others' debts.

business & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over coverage under a builder's risk insurance policy for damage to a newly constructed house. McConnell Construction Company sought recovery after muriatic acid applied to brick floors produced fumes that corroded metal fixtures, frames, and other parts before the house was occupied. The trial court awarded damages to McConnell based on jury findings, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the loss fell within the policy's contamination exclusion. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the trial judgment, reasoning that corrosion from chemical fumes is distinct from contamination, which involves mixing substances to create impurity, and thus was not excluded from the all-risk coverage.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case arose from a plane crash in Colorado that killed four Texas residents and one Illinois resident on a business trip; the plaintiffs sued the Texas-based defendant aviation company in Texas court for wrongful death. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals applied Colorado law, which caps damages at $25,000 per death, rather than Texas law, which has no cap. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Colorado law governs because the state's wrongful death statute (Article 4671 et seq.) has no extraterritorial effect under longstanding precedent interpreting Article 4678, and the court was bound by stare decisis despite arguments for a "most significant contacts" approach favoring Texas law. The opinion emphasizes that the decision rests on prior judgments rather than policy preferences about the facts, which involved Texas parties and a trip originating in Texas.

torts & liabilityprocedure