Ted Robertson

This case involved a divorce between Robert and Maria Penick, focusing on whether the community estate should be reimbursed for funds used to pay down debt on Robert's separate rental properties acquired before marriage, and if tax benefits from depreciation of those properties could offset the reimbursement. The trial court found no reimbursement was owed because the tax savings to the community exceeded the payments made. The court of appeals reversed, requiring full reimbursement without offsets. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court, reasoning that reimbursement claims are equitable in nature and thus require consideration of all facts, including offsetting benefits received by the contributing estate.

family lawproperty

The case involved claims by a business consumer against computer manufacturers under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act for breach of warranty and deceptive practices in the sale of a computer system, after consolidation of related suits. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment in a bench trial after the plaintiff's evidence, finding no support for the claims, but the court of appeals reversed on grounds that some evidence of a relationship supported potential vicarious liability. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that the Lorino rule improperly equated bench-trial judgments with directed verdicts and that trial judges may weigh evidence and decide on the merits when unpersuaded by the plaintiff's case; it also ruled that common-law vicarious liability theories like agency are required for DTPA claims and that a mere relationship does not suffice.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved the construction of attorney A.H. Lumpkin's will, which granted his wife Cornelia a life estate in most property while devising the remainder, including a homestead and other lands, to Perfect Union Lodge No. 10. The probate court ruled that the will created a testamentary trust with the executor as trustee, and it ordered the sale of certain underproductive real property under Texas Trust Code section 113.110, with proceeds to be allocated between the income beneficiary and the remainderman. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the will's language separated legal and equitable estates and conferred trustee-like powers on the executor sufficient to establish an express trust. The court reasoned that the testator's intent, ascertained from the four corners of the instrument, required giving effect to all provisions, including the broad management authority granted to the executors equivalent to that under the Texas Trust Act.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned the Davises' suit to reform a deed that, due to a title company error, conveyed their entire San Antonio lot rather than the agreed-upon west 105 feet to Grammer. Grammer raised an unclean hands defense based on unrelated fraudulent representations about a tenant's lease and an assumable loan, and the jury found those representations false and detrimental; the trial court denied reformation and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Davises had preserved the issue that any fraud was collateral to the property-description mistake and therefore could not bar equitable relief. It reasoned that appellate briefing rules are to be liberally construed and that the points of error, together with argument, sufficiently directed the court to the contention that reformation should be granted despite the fraud findings. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to reform the deed to reflect only the west 105 feet.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned a bank's attempt to recover insurance proceeds after a tractor-trailer it financed was destroyed in an accident. The bank, named as loss payee on a temporary binder issued by Southern County Mutual Insurance Co., sued the insurer on the binder and, alternatively, sued the insurance agents for strict liability under the Texas Insurance Code if the binder was invalid. A jury found against the bank on all issues, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment holding both the insurer liable on the binder and the agents strictly liable. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the judgment finding a valid Southern County Mutual binder in effect at the time of the loss but reversed the strict-liability holding against the agents, reasoning that the binder's validity meant the agents had complied with the Insurance Code and that allowing recovery on both theories would create an impermissible double recovery; the court also held the insurer had waived its cross-claim for contribution.

business & regulatory

This case involved a medical malpractice claim by James Duff against St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, alleging that hospital staff negligently failed to protect his ulnar nerve during or after surgery, causing injury. The trial court granted an instructed verdict for the hospital, which was affirmed by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas. The court reasoned that Duff presented no expert medical testimony establishing that any hospital negligence proximately caused the injury within a reasonable medical probability, relying instead on testimony about mere possibilities, which was insufficient to submit the issue to the jury.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case involved an original mandamus proceeding challenging the assignment of retired appellate Justice Preslar as a visiting judge in a district court case concerning cancellation of an oil and gas lease in which the State of Texas held mineral interests. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice lacked authority to make the assignment under Chapter 74 of the Government Code because the presiding judge of the relevant administrative judicial region was not incapacitated or otherwise unavailable, making the assignment invalid. The core reasoning focused on statutory limits distinguishing the Chief Justice's power to assign judges across regions from the presiding judge's authority to assign within a region, with concurrences addressing related issues of objections to visiting judges and constitutional reassignment provisions.

procedure

The case involved Martha Forderhause and others suing Cherokee Water Company to reform a deed provision granting Cherokee a right of first refusal on oil and gas leases, based on a claim of mutual mistake. The trial court, after a jury finding of mutual mistake, reformed the deed to exclude oil and gas leases from the right of first refusal, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that reformation requires both a prior agreement and a mutual mistake in reducing it to writing, which were not present here as the form deed constituted the entire agreement prepared months earlier. The court distinguished prior precedent and rendered judgment for Cherokee.

property

This case arose after a mobile home purchased by Noma Stephens was destroyed by fire in 1982; the insurance company issued a joint check to Stephens and the mortgage holder, National Mortgage Corporation of America, for the loss. Stephens claimed that a National employee orally agreed to return the $10,000 portion of the proceeds attributable to her personal property, but National instead applied nearly all the funds to the outstanding mortgage balance. Stephens sued for conversion, and the trial court granted her a partial summary judgment on that claim before a jury awarded exemplary damages. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the funds were not specific chattels subject to conversion and thus no independent tort supported the exemplary award. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and remanded, concluding that the summary-judgment record presented a genuine issue of material fact about whether any agreement existed, making summary judgment improper.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned whether a homeowners' association could foreclose on properties to collect unpaid subdivision assessments secured by liens in the recorded declaration of covenants, despite Texas homestead protections. The trial court awarded default judgments for the arrearages but denied foreclosure; the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that no valid vendor's lien existed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the declaration created an enforceable contractual lien on the lots because the developer had authority to impress such liens on the land and the parties' intent was clear from the recorded language. The court further concluded that this lien could be foreclosed against homestead property because homestead protections under Article XVI, § 50 of the Texas Constitution do not bar enforcement of valid contractual liens of this type.

property

This case involved Lorretta Caille, who was injured at work and filed a workers' compensation claim, after which Azar Nut Company allegedly altered reports, refused to process her claim properly, and fired her. The jury awarded Caille compensatory damages for lost wages and benefits plus $175,000 in punitive damages, finding the discharge was willful and malicious. The Texas Supreme Court held that punitive damages are recoverable under Article 8307c of the Workers' Compensation Act, which makes employers liable for "reasonable damages suffered" due to retaliatory discharge. The court reasoned that the legislature deliberately chose broad language allowing "reasonable damages" rather than limiting recovery to economic losses, consistent with the statute's purpose and the availability of punitive damages in Texas law.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved the interpretation of exception and reservation clauses in a 1950 mineral deed conveying a 44.5-acre tract from Patrick to the Barretts, following an earlier 1946 deed where the Tuers reserved a 1/16th royalty interest. The trial court held that the Tuers' royalty was chargeable against the Barretts' interest and awarded Patrick an additional 1/32nd royalty, but the court of appeals reversed and declared the Barretts 1/16th royalty owners based on a presumption of proportionate shares. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment for Patrick, reasoning that the 1950 deed expressly excepted the Tuers' 1/16th royalty from the conveyance so it never passed to the Barretts, while Patrick reserved a 1/32nd royalty for himself and conveyed only the remaining 1/32nd, overcoming the presumption through clear language; after the Tuers later conveyed their royalty to Patrick, he held the full 1/32nd. The court distinguished exceptions, which prevent title from passing, from reservations, which retain interests for the grantor.

property

This case concerned the classification of stocks acquired during a marriage in Illinois (a common-law property state) using the husband's separate funds, for purposes of distributing his estate after his death in Texas. The trial court applied the rule from Cameron v. Cameron to treat the assets as community property in probate, but the court of appeals limited that rule to divorce cases and classified most of the stocks as separate property. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed that Cameron's quasi-community characterization applies only to divorce or annulment under the Family Code and does not extend to probate proceedings, where the longstanding rule treats property as separate if it was separate in the state of acquisition. The court also held that one disputed stock (TransWorld) had been properly traced as separate property and reversed the court of appeals on that point.

family lawproperty

This case involved a workers' compensation lawsuit by Maria Gutierrez against the Dallas Independent School District for a back injury sustained at work. Gutierrez had served interrogatories requesting the names of all witnesses the district planned to call at trial, but the district failed to disclose an expert witness until after trial began. The trial court permitted the surprise expert to testify, resulting in a limited award to Gutierrez, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party answering an interrogatory must object to its form or supplement incomplete answers, and absent good cause, undisclosed witnesses should not be allowed to testify. The court remanded for a new trial, emphasizing that discovery rules prevent trials by ambush and that the burden is on the answering party to show good cause for late disclosure.

procedurelabor & employment

The case involved the Houston Federation of Teachers and individual teachers suing the Houston Independent School District to block a plan extending the high school day by up to 30 minutes for required tutorials, which the teachers claimed violated their contracts limiting the instructional day to 7.5 hours. The trial court granted a temporary injunction after finding the extension would cause teachers irreparable harm to childcare, transportation, and second jobs. The court of appeals dismissed the suit, ruling that the teachers had to exhaust administrative remedies first. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, reasoning that exhaustion is not required when irreparable harm is at stake and the agency lacks authority to grant immediate injunctive relief.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned the Texas Department of Human Resources' petition to terminate the parental rights of father William Boyd to his minor child after the mother executed an irrevocable affidavit relinquishing her rights. The trial court terminated Boyd's rights under Texas Family Code section 15.02(1)(E), finding he had engaged in conduct endangering the child's physical or emotional well-being, based on evidence of his repeated burglary convictions and imprisonments, intermittent support, and the child's resulting issues. The court of appeals reversed, holding that endangerment required proof of an actual and independent threat of injury not inferable solely from parental misconduct. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that "endanger" means to expose to loss or injury and that a course of conduct including imprisonment can support termination without the conduct being directed at the child or causing actual injury, then remanded for review of whether the evidence met the clear and convincing standard.

family law

This case involved a dispute over an oil and gas lease where Lynda Benton claimed Sun Exploration failed to pay on a draft after recording the lease, leading to claims of breach of contract and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, while Sun counterclaimed for breach of title covenants. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the award of damages to Benton and rendered judgment that she take nothing, while affirming the denial of Sun's counterclaim. The court reasoned that the draft's language created a condition precedent of title approval that was not waived by mere acceptance and recording of the lease, so no contract was formed obligating payment, and Sun suffered no damages since no consideration was paid.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a family's lawsuit against the City of Gladewater for severe mental anguish after the city could not locate their son's remains in a municipal cemetery due to inadequate record-keeping, with the jury finding gross negligence and awarding both actual and exemplary damages. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding that exemplary damages may be recovered against a municipality when it acts in a proprietary capacity, such as operating a cemetery, but reversed the award to the plaintiffs. The core reasoning was that the evidence failed to establish proximate cause, as the lack of records was not shown to be a substantial factor in the inability to locate the body, given the absence of a permanent marker, the family's search in the wrong location, and other evidence indicating the remains might not have been recoverable even at the correct site. The court emphasized that negligence requires duty, breach, and injury proximately caused by the breach, with both cause-in-fact and foreseeability elements unmet here.

torts & liabilityproperty

In Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, Inc., a mother sued under Texas's Wrongful Death Act and Survival Statute for damages arising from the death of her fetus due to alleged negligence, and alternatively claimed property damage to the fetus as chattel; the trial court granted summary judgment against her because there was no live birth. The court of appeals had allowed the wrongful death claim and an emotional distress claim, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed those holdings while affirming the denial of the survival action. The core reasoning was that the statutes authorize recovery only for the death of an "individual" or "person," which the legislature did not intend to encompass an unborn fetus, and that precedent requires a live birth before any cause of action for prenatal injury can arise, making a death claim impossible without it.

torts & liabilityfamily law

This case concerned whether Aetna Life Insurance Co. could offset payments Barnett received under the Veteran's Benefits Act from the long-term disability benefits provided under an employer-sponsored policy. The jury found that Barnett's VA disability began after the policy's effective date, that Aetna acted in good faith, and that its conduct was not unconscionable, leading the trial court to enter a take-nothing judgment that the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy language permitting offsets for benefits under acts similar to the Social Security Act or workers' compensation laws was ambiguous as applied to VA benefits. Because the policy did not specifically mention VA benefits and they are not sufficiently similar to the enumerated categories, the court construed the ambiguity against the insurer and ruled that Aetna could not make the deductions. The case was remanded for calculation of amounts owed to Barnett, including stipulated attorney's fees.

business & regulatorylabor & employment