Steven Wayne Smith

Larry and Debra Fulgham sued FFE Transportation Services for products liability and negligence after a trailer separated from Larry's tractor during a delivery, causing injury. The trial court granted FFE a directed verdict, ruling that strict liability did not apply and that no evidence supported the negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the contract constituted a lease triggering strict products liability and that expert testimony was unnecessary to prove negligence. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, holding that strict products liability is inapplicable when a company provides equipment gratuitously to an independent contractor solely to fulfill the company's business, and that the standard of care for trailer inspection and maintenance requires expert testimony that was not provided here. The court remanded for consideration of the Fulghams' remaining points of error.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a written option agreement granting a developer the right to repurchase residential property for 90% of the original sale price was enforceable, even though the $10 nominal consideration recited in the contract was never actually paid to the seller. The Texas Supreme Court held that the option contract was binding and irrevocable under the common law, adopting section 87(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The court reasoned that a false recital of nominal consideration supports irrevocability of a written offer so long as the underlying exchange is fair and the offer is to be accepted within a reasonable time. It therefore reversed the lower court's ruling that lack of consideration rendered the agreement unenforceable and remanded the case.

property

The case addressed whether the holder of a child-care facility license may obtain judicial review of a state agency's decision to revoke that license under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act. Mega Child Care sued the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services after its license was revoked following an administrative hearing, seeking review in district court. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' holding that section 2001.171 of the Government Code grants an independent statutory right to judicial review of contested-case decisions when the agency's enabling statute neither specifically authorizes nor prohibits such review. The court's reasoning relied on the plain language of the provision, which states that a person aggrieved by a final agency decision in a contested case after exhausting administrative remedies is entitled to judicial review, distinguishing it from prior interpretations that treated the section as purely procedural.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a lawsuit by ratepayers against Entergy alleging breach of a 1993 Merger Agreement that was incorporated into a Public Utility Commission order approving Entergy's acquisition of another utility; the agreement required certain post-merger rate proceedings to share savings with ratepayers, but Entergy later entered a 2001 Settlement Agreement with the PUC that postponed retail competition and altered rate treatment. After the trial court denied Entergy's motions to transfer venue, dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and abate, Entergy sought mandamus relief, arguing the PUC held exclusive jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court held that the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute because the Merger Agreement was integral to the agency's regulatory approval of the merger and affected the public interest, granting the writ and directing the trial court to dismiss the suit. The core reasoning was that agreements filed with and approved by the PUC take on a regulatory character, placing disputes arising from them within the agency's adjudicative authority rather than the courts'.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Oil and gas lessors sued their lessee for breach of the implied covenant to protect the leasehold from drainage by a nearby producing well, alleging that the lessee should have drilled an offset well sooner in a better location. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded damages based solely on an expert's testimony projecting production and profits from the hypothesized well, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expert testimony was unreliable and therefore no evidence of damages because the expert provided no reliable basis for assuming the offset well would produce at the same rate as the draining well or for predicting its output amid the geological uncertainties of the formation. With no competent evidence on an essential element of the claim, the court rendered judgment that the lessors take nothing.

propertyprocedure

The case In re Kuntz involved a mandamus proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court concerning a trial court's discovery order in a divorce-related lawsuit. The trial court had ordered Hal Kuntz to produce documents from his employer that he could access but did not physically possess or control, which were owned by his employer's client and contained claimed trade secrets. The court decided that Kuntz did not have "possession, custody, or control" of the documents under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 192.3(b) and 192.7(b), which require either physical possession or a superior right to possession. The core reasoning was that mere ability to access the documents at work does not meet this standard, as the employer and client retained actual control, leading the court to grant the writ of mandamus.

procedurefamily law