Franklin S. Spears

Mancorp sued John Culpepper and Culpepper Properties for breach of a construction contract on the First Bank Galleria building, seeking the unpaid balance after completing the work. The defendants counterclaimed for defects in the building. The jury found that Mancorp substantially performed, that the company was Culpepper's alter ego, and awarded damages and fees after an offset for repairs, but the trial court granted judgment n.o.v. on the alter ego issue and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that more than a scintilla of evidence supported the alter ego finding, including testimony on failure to observe corporate formalities, use of personal checks for corporate debts, business cards implying indistinguishability, and statements that Culpepper personally backed the project. The court remanded for consideration of the factual insufficiency point under the proper no-evidence standard that reviews only evidence supporting the verdict.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a mandamus action by Union Carbide and other defendants in a lawsuit brought by over two thousand plaintiffs alleging harm from toxic chemical exposure near the Lone Star Steel plant in Morris County, Texas. The defendants moved to transfer venue under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 257, asserting that an impartial trial could not be had locally, but the trial court denied the motion after limiting the hearing to a written record and refusing a continuance. The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the continuance, as it had previously indicated an evidentiary hearing would occur and thereby misled the defendants about the format for presenting proof. This ruling effectively denied the defendants their right to reasonable discovery under Rule 258, including the use of depositions and other materials, and deprived them of due process notice. The court conditionally granted mandamus to vacate the denial and allow time to supplement the venue record before a ruling.

proceduretorts & liability

Matthews Construction obtained a 1982 breach-of-contract judgment against Houston Pipe & Supply but could not collect; in 1984 it sued Rosen, the company's president and sole shareholder, claiming he had stripped the corporation of assets as its alter ego to evade payment. A jury found Houston Pipe was Rosen's alter ego used to perpetrate a fraud, and the trial court entered judgment against Rosen for the amount owed. The court of appeals held the second suit barred by limitations, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp. the filing of suit against the corporation tolled limitations as to its alter ego. The court reasoned that the equitable policy against allowing the corporate form to cloak fraud or injustice extends to tolling limitations, because Rosen was not a legally separate entity and the claim was not stale. The court also rejected Rosen's res-judicata argument, noting that the second suit sought to enforce rather than attack the prior judgment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the validity of the City of Richardson’s comprehensive animal control ordinance, which regulated vicious or dangerous animals, pit bull ownership, and related matters with criminal penalties. Responsible Dog Owners sued for declaratory judgment, arguing that Texas Penal Code sections 1.08 and 42.12 preempted the ordinance because it addressed the same subject as the state’s vicious-dog provisions. The trial court upheld the ordinance, but the court of appeals held it preempted and invalid. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the ordinance is not preempted because it is broader in scope, applies to all animals rather than only dogs, and can be reasonably construed alongside the narrower state statute without conflict, consistent with home-rule cities’ authority under the Texas Constitution.

criminal law

This case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Texas's Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, where Don Docksteader Motors sought to enforce a Canadian court judgment ordering Patal Enterprises to pay over $152,000. The trial court granted summary judgment to Patal, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding the Act unconstitutional for not providing a procedure to challenge recognition, thus violating due process. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act incorporates enforcement methods from sister-state judgments, including common-law actions that afford notice and a hearing for defenses like nonrecognition. The court also addressed a reciprocity issue but ultimately remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

procedure

This case arose from the asphyxiation deaths of two workers employed by Christie, Inc., an independent contractor servicing a natural gas pipeline owned by Enserch Corporation, after a valve gasket failure released gas into a manhole. The plaintiffs sued the wrong Enserch-related entity initially, leading to a statute-of-limitations dispute over whether the amendment naming the correct defendant (Enserch d/b/a Lone Star Gas) related back; Enserch also sought contractual indemnity from Christie. The court affirmed the reversal of summary judgment on the wrongful-death claim and remanded it for trial, holding that under precedents like Continental Southern Lines v. Hilland, limitations may be tolled in misidentification cases if the proper defendant was not prejudiced. However, it reversed the court of appeals on the indemnity claim and reinstated the trial court's judgment enforcing the agreement, reasoning that the indemnity language was sufficiently conspicuous on the single-page contract to provide fair notice, unlike hidden clauses in cases such as K&S Oil Well Service.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case was a mandamus proceeding in which plaintiffs sought to videotape a defendant's deposition in an underlying civil suit, but a trial judge granted the defendant's unverified motion for a protective order limiting the deposition to stenographic recording only due to claimed distraction and stress. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus, holding that the trial judge abused his discretion. The core reasoning was that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(5), a party seeking to avoid videotaped discovery must demonstrate particular, specific, and demonstrable injury through evidence rather than conclusory allegations, and no such evidence was presented here. The court emphasized that protective orders limiting authorized discovery methods require factual support to justify restricting the use of videotape under Rule 202.

procedure

The case concerned whether an insured's prior successful contract suit against his fire insurer for denying a claim barred a subsequent suit alleging breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, a cause of action first recognized after judgment in the initial suit. The trial court and court of appeals held that res judicata barred the second suit because both claims arose from the same subject matter. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that res judicata does not apply to a claim based on rights acquired after the prior judgment, even if the underlying facts are the same. The court reasoned that a judgment is res judicata only as to present conditions and does not bar suits on subsequently arising legal rights or changed circumstances. The matter was remanded for trial on the bad faith claim.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the appointment of a temporary administrator for the estate of Eric Nelson, a California resident killed in a Texas plane crash, to allow service of process in a wrongful death lawsuit filed by Phyllis Neal and her children. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions upholding the appointment under section 131A of the Texas Probate Code. The court reasoned that the liability insurance policy constituted an asset of the estate and that the two separate wrongful death claims created the necessary debts to justify administration, even though the estate had no other Texas assets. It further held that any procedural deficiencies in the initial application made the appointment voidable rather than void, preserving its validity for serving process before the statute of limitations expired.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned wrongful death lawsuits filed by parents against a drug manufacturer after their infants died of Reye's syndrome, with the suits brought more than two years after the deaths but within two years of learning about a possible link to aspirin. The Texas Supreme Court addressed certified questions from the Fifth Circuit on whether the discovery rule applies to the statute of limitations in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.003(b) for wrongful death and survival actions, and whether that statute violates the open courts provision if the rule does not apply. The court held that the discovery rule does not apply because the statute's plain language states that the cause of action accrues on the date of death and imposes an absolute two-year limit. It further held that applying the statute as written does not violate the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution.

proceduretorts & liability

This case is a legal malpractice suit in which Carl Burns sued his former attorney Richard Wardroup for failing to oppose a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and failing to appeal an adverse judgment in an underlying contract case; Burns later added Wardroup's former partner Larriet Thomas as a defendant. Thomas moved for summary judgment, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations barred the claims against her. The trial court granted summary judgment after severing the claims, and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the discovery rule applies to legal malpractice and DTPA claims, so a defendant seeking summary judgment on limitations must conclusively negate the rule by proving when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the facts giving rise to the cause of action; Thomas's proof failed to do so. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

In Edwards v. Lone Star Gas Co., a gas producer sued a pipeline company for breaching two gas purchase contracts by failing to include monthly price adjustments in the redetermined contract price and by not reimbursing state severance taxes. The Texas Supreme Court held that the producer was entitled to the monthly escalations as part of the highest price referenced in comparable third-party contracts, but not to reimbursement for severance taxes, which the contracts required the producer to pay. The court reasoned that the unambiguous contract language incorporated price fluctuations from referenced contracts, and annual redeterminations were consistent with monthly adjustments under federal regulations, while tax reimbursement was limited by explicit contract terms excluding pre-existing taxes.

business & regulatorytaxes

Perry McClendon sued his former employer Ingersoll-Rand for wrongful discharge, alleging he was terminated after nine years and eight months of service specifically to prevent his pension benefits from vesting four months later. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer, and the court of appeals affirmed under Texas's employment-at-will doctrine. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and remanded, reasoning that public policy expressed in state and federal law creates an exception to at-will employment when a discharge is motivated by an intent to avoid pension contributions, consistent with exceptions recognized in other jurisdictions.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved consumers who bought a used car from a dealership and later discovered issues with the brakes and odometer mileage, leading the dealership to sue them for defamation after they protested; the consumers countersued under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) for misrepresentations about the car's quality and mileage. The trial court awarded damages to the consumers on their DTPA claim, but the court of appeals reversed, finding no evidence of a DTPA violation, deeming the suit groundless as a matter of law, awarding attorneys' fees to the dealership, and dismissing the consumers' cross-points for lack of a separate appeal. The Texas Supreme Court held that some evidence supported the jury's finding of misrepresentation, that the court alone determines whether to award attorneys' fees for groundless or bad-faith DTPA claims, and that cross-points seeking to preserve the judgment were properly raised without a separate appeal. It therefore reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings on unresolved points. The core reasoning focused on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence regarding the dealership's statements, the statutory allocation of decision-making authority under the DTPA, and preservation rules for appellees in appeals.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Cosgrove v. Grimes, client Frank Cosgrove sued attorneys Ed Bass and Walter Grimes for legal malpractice after Grimes filed a personal injury suit against the wrong defendant (a passenger rather than the driver) and alleged the wrong accident location, causing the statute of limitations to expire on the valid claim. The jury found Grimes negligent and awarded Cosgrove damages for lost recovery and mental anguish, but the trial court and court of appeals applied a good-faith defense based on Grimes's reliance on client-provided information and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the good-faith exception does not shield an attorney from liability for failing to exercise reasonable care and diligence, and rendered judgment for Cosgrove on the negligence findings. The court also rejected Cosgrove's DTPA claims due to improper jury submission. The decision clarifies that attorneys are held to an objective standard of ordinary care rather than subjective good faith.

torts & liability

The consolidated cases concerned whether section 26.07 of the Texas Property Tax Code, which permits qualified voters to petition for an election to roll back a county's adopted property tax rate to the rollback rate, is constitutional when applied to counties. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to counties. The core reasoning was that article VIII, sections 1-a and 9 of the Texas Constitution expressly grant commissioners courts the authority to set tax rates, and this specific constitutional delegation cannot be overridden by a statute that allows voters to alter those rates after adoption; constitutional provisions must be read together, and statutes cannot conflict with them. The court therefore affirmed one lower court ruling upholding the commissioners courts' refusal to hold rollback elections and reversed the other.

taxesproperty

This case involved a mandamus action by Jessie Loftin against a trial judge in a workers' compensation dispute, where Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company sought to set aside an Industrial Accident Board award and Loftin filed a counterclaim for total permanent incapacity benefits. Loftin requested production of expert reports and related documents, but the trial court sustained Lumbermens' objections after Loftin failed to appear at the discovery hearing. The court of appeals and the Texas Supreme Court both declined to issue mandamus, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The core reasoning was that the discovery requests were premature because no experts had been designated, no reports existed to produce, and the demands were overly broad and vague under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b, which does not require parties to create documents for opponents.

procedurelabor & employment

This case involved a dispute over whether an indemnity clause in a contract between Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) and Petroleum Personnel, Inc. (PPI) satisfied Texas's express negligence doctrine, which requires clear expression of intent for one party to indemnify the other for its own negligence. After a worker sued ARCO for injuries sustained on an ARCO platform, ARCO sought indemnity from PPI under their agreement, which stated PPI would indemnify ARCO for liability arising from the work, including any negligent act or omission of ARCO. The trial court granted summary judgment for PPI, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding the clause failed to state the intent specifically within the four corners of the contract. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the explicit reference to indemnifying for ARCO's negligence met the express negligence test, as it clearly defined the parties' intent without needing further specification of negligence types or degrees.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the death of a seven-year-old student struck by a truck after exiting a Mount Pleasant Independent School District bus, with the estate suing the district and driver for negligence in failing to ensure her safe crossing. The trial court applied an ordinary negligence standard and rejected sovereign immunity, while the court of appeals imposed a high degree of care like that owed by common carriers and found immunity waived by procedural default. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment for the plaintiffs. The core reasoning centered on the limits of the legislature's waiver of sovereign immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act and the inapplicability of a heightened common-carrier duty to school bus operations after students disembark.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Geneva McKinley suing Dr. Dennis Stripling for negligent failure to obtain informed consent before performing tendon transfer surgeries on her hand, which resulted in limited finger movement as an inherent risk. The trial court entered judgment for the McKinleys based on jury findings that the risks were inherent, could influence a reasonable person's consent decision, and actually occurred, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in a statutory informed consent claim under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i § 6.02, the plaintiff must obtain a jury finding on proximate cause—specifically whether disclosure would have caused the individual plaintiff to refuse the procedure—and that failure to request or submit such an issue waived the claim. The court reasoned that while the statute requires findings on inherent risks that could influence a reasonable person and actual occurrence of the risk, an additional causal link to the plaintiff's decision is necessary to establish the negligence cause of action.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure