
In Re Allen
Texas Supreme Court · 2012-05-18 · cited 112×
The case involved Billy Frederick Allen's petition for a writ of mandamus against the Texas Comptroller, seeking compensation under the Tim Cole Act for nearly 26 years of wrongful imprisonment after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted him habeas relief. The Texas Supreme Court decided that Allen was entitled to compensation and conditionally granted the mandamus to compel payment. The court reasoned that the habeas relief was granted on a Schlup-type claim, which requires a finding of actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence to pass the procedural gateway, and that the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion on its face clearly indicated this basis as required by the Act's documentation rules.
criminal lawprocedure
Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook
Texas Supreme Court · 2011-12-16 · cited 159×
The case involved whether a noncompete agreement signed by employee Rex Cook in exchange for stock options from his employer Marsh USA Inc. was enforceable under Texas law. The trial court and court of appeals held the agreement unenforceable, relying on prior precedent that stock options did not create an interest in restraining competition. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, ruling that under the Covenants Not to Compete Act the stock options served as valid consideration because they were reasonably related to protecting the company's goodwill, a business interest the statute recognizes. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the breach of contract claims.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory
FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C.
Texas Supreme Court · 2011-08-26 · cited 16×
The case involved associate professor Melody Yarbrough, who alleged that Texas A&M University-Kingsville's grievance procedures violated Government Code section 617.005 by preventing her from formally contesting a performance narrative she viewed as prejudicial to her tenure application. After the university granted her tenure, it moved for summary judgment on grounds that the dispute was moot. The trial court granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, finding the issue capable of repetition. The Texas Supreme Court held that the case presented no live controversy because tenure had been awarded, the capable-of-repetition exception did not apply absent evidence that review would be impossible before mootness or that the same events would recur, and potential collateral effects from the narrative lacked the immediacy needed for declaratory relief, leading to reversal and dismissal.
labor & employmentprocedure
CMH HOMES v. Perez
Texas Supreme Court · 2011-05-27 · cited 499×
In this case, a consumer sued a manufactured home seller and related parties for fraud and debt collection violations, leading to an agreement to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act but a dispute over selecting an arbitrator. The trial court appointed an arbitrator after the parties reached an impasse, and the seller sought an interlocutory appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.016, alternatively requesting treatment as a mandamus petition. The court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that section 51.016 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal of an order appointing an arbitrator because the statute permits appeals only for orders hostile to arbitration. However, the Court held that the appeal could be considered as a petition for writ of mandamus under the circumstances and remanded for the court of appeals to address it on that basis, noting the limited scope of interlocutory appeal statutes and the need for judicial intervention in arbitrator selection.
procedure
Iliff v. Iliff
Texas Supreme Court · 2011-04-15 · cited 464×
In Iliff v. Iliff, a divorce proceeding, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a trial court may calculate child support based on an obligor's earning potential rather than actual earnings when the obligor is intentionally unemployed or underemployed, without evidence that the unemployment was intended to avoid child support payments. The court held that Texas Family Code section 154.066 does not require proof of intent to avoid child support and affirmed the trial court's order setting support at $1,295.19 per month based on the father's earning potential of at least $5,000 monthly. The reasoning focused on the statute's plain language, which permits use of earning potential in cases of intentional unemployment or underemployment, while allowing intent to avoid support as one factor among others. The court resolved a split among appellate courts on this issue.
family law
Jose Carreras, M.D., P.A. v. Marroquin
Texas Supreme Court · 2011-04-01 · cited 88×
In this case, parents sued a physician for the wrongful death of their adult daughter, alleging inadequate post-surgical care led to her death from embolisms and cardiac arrest. Two days before the two-year statute of limitations expired, the parents sent the required pre-suit notice under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74 but omitted the mandatory authorization form for release of the patient's medical information. The trial court and court of appeals held that the notice alone tolled the limitations period, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, ruling that both the notice and the authorization form must be provided together for tolling to occur. Because the compliant authorization was not sent until months after the original deadline, the claims were time-barred, and judgment was rendered for the physician.
healthcareproceduretorts & liability
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., LC
Texas Supreme Court · 2011-04-01 · cited 513×
This case involves an oil and gas dispute in which royalty owners and a subsequent lessee alleged that Exxon, the prior lessee, failed to fully develop mineral tracts under leases in Refugio, Texas, sabotaged wells before abandoning them, committed waste, breached lease covenants requiring full development, and made fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions about well data and profitability. The trial court directed a verdict against most claims and the jury found for the royalty owners on remaining waste and breach claims; the court of appeals reversed the directed verdict and affirmed the jury verdict. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lease terms defined development obligations specifically and that no evidence supported the royalty owners' breach of lease or related tort claims such as fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and it remanded the case to the court of appeals.
propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., LC
Texas Supreme Court · 2010-12-17 · cited 64×
In this oil and gas dispute, Emerald Oil & Gas obtained leases for a portion of a field previously operated and abandoned by Exxon and sued Exxon for allegedly improper well plugging and sabotage that caused re-entry difficulties, asserting claims including breach of statutory duties under the Texas Natural Resources Code. The trial court granted Exxon partial summary judgment on the statutory claims, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court held that section 85.321 creates a private cause of action for damages but does not extend to subsequent lessees who held no interest at the time of the alleged harm, so Emerald lacked standing. The Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment that Emerald take nothing, reasoning from common law standing principles and legislative intent to avoid indefinite liability for prior lessees that would discourage resource development.
business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability
Solar Applications Engineering, Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp.
Texas Supreme Court · 2010-12-03 · cited 118×
In this case, a general contractor (Solar) and property owner (TA) disputed final payment and performance under a construction contract for a truck stop after the project was substantially completed, with disagreements over remaining work, subcontractor liens, contract termination, and counterclaims for delays and defects. The trial court entered judgment favoring Solar based on a jury verdict awarding net damages, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment, holding that the contract's lien-release affidavit requirement was a condition precedent that Solar had not satisfied. The Texas Supreme Court held that the lien-release provision was a covenant rather than a condition precedent to recovery on the contract and that its breach did not bar Solar's claim for the contract balance under substantial performance. It reversed the appeals court, reinstated the trial court's judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.
business & regulatoryproperty
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold Inc.
Texas Supreme Court · 2010-02-19 · cited 94×
The case concerned a class action suit filed by Marketing on Hold Inc. (doing business as Southwest Tariff Analyst, or STA) against Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, alleging improper assessment of municipal fees on certain business telephone services from 1991 to 1998. STA, which had obtained assignments of claims from five customers in exchange for a share of any recovery, sought to represent a statewide class of approximately 6,900 customers. The trial court certified the class, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding the requirements for class certification satisfied. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the assignments were valid and conferred standing, that STA's claims were typical of the class, and that common questions predominated, but held that STA failed to show it could adequately represent the class due to conflicts created by its fee-splitting arrangement and differing incentives among class members. The court therefore reversed and decertified the class.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
D.R. Horton-Texas Ltd. v. Markel International Insurance Co.
Texas Supreme Court · 2009-12-11 · cited 238×
The case involved a general contractor seeking a defense and indemnification from a subcontractor's commercial general liability insurer for underlying claims of construction defects that caused mold damage in a home. The lower courts granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because the homeowners' petition did not implicate the subcontractor's work under the eight-corners doctrine. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the ruling on the duty to defend, as the argument for an exception allowing extrinsic evidence had not been preserved below, but reversed on the duty to indemnify, reasoning that the two duties are distinct and the duty to indemnify turns on the actual facts of the injury-causing event, which may be established by evidence in the coverage action.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Ingram v. Deere
Texas Supreme Court · 2009-07-03 · cited 207×
The case concerned whether Jesse Ingram and Louis Deere formed a partnership under the Texas Revised Partnership Act when they orally agreed that Deere would serve as medical director of a pain clinic and receive one-third of revenues. A jury found a partnership existed and Ingram breached it and his fiduciary duties, but the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment; the court of appeals reinstated the verdict. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding the evidence legally insufficient to establish a partnership. It explained that partnership formation is determined by the totality of circumstances under the five statutory factors, none of which is necessary or sufficient, and that Deere contributed no capital, exercised no control over the business, and had no right to profits or losses beyond a revenue share. Because no partnership existed, the Court did not reach the fiduciary-duty issue and reinstated the trial court's judgment.
business & regulatory
Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue
Texas Supreme Court · 2008-08-29 · cited 382×
This case is a medical malpractice action brought by the family of Bob Hogue against Columbia Medical Center after the hospital's treatment of his pneumonia resulted in his death from heart-related complications. The jury found the hospital negligent and grossly negligent and awarded over $30 million in damages, which the trial court reduced under statutory caps; the court of appeals largely affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that legally sufficient clear and convincing evidence supported the gross negligence finding, that no evidence supported the award of loss-of-inheritance damages, and that the pre-2003 versions of the prejudgment and postjudgment interest statutes applied, leading it to reverse the inheritance damages and affirm the remainder of the judgment.
healthcaretorts & liability
City of Waco v. Lopez
Texas Supreme Court · 2008-07-11 · cited 230×
The case involved former City of Waco employee Robert Lopez, who sued the city under the Texas Whistleblower Act alleging retaliatory discharge after he filed an internal grievance reporting age and race discrimination in violation of the city's EEO policy. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (CHRA) provided the exclusive remedy for such claims and that Lopez had failed to meet its requirements. The trial court denied the plea, and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that because Lopez was a covered employee under the CHRA and his retaliation claim fell within its scope, the CHRA was his exclusive state statutory remedy; since he had not filed a CHRA complaint or satisfied its administrative prerequisites, the Whistleblower Act claim could not proceed and the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure
Igal v. Brightstar Information Technology Group, Inc.
Texas Supreme Court · 2008-05-02 · cited 208×
The case concerned whether a final decision by the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) denying a wage claim under the Texas Payday Law prevents the same claimant from later suing in court for the same unpaid wages. Saleh Igal filed a wage claim with TWC after his employment was terminated, but TWC dismissed it on the merits and for untimely filing; instead of seeking rehearing or judicial review, Igal sued his former employers in district court for breach of contract. The trial court and court of appeals held that res judicata barred the suit, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that TWC's final adjudication on the wage claim has preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. The Court reasoned that the Payday Law provides an administrative process with adversarial procedures that results in final decisions equivalent to a court judgment for res judicata purposes, even though the 180-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional.
labor & employmentprocedure
Villafani v. Trejo
Texas Supreme Court · 2008-04-18 · cited 170×
In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Adela Trejo sued Dr. Juan Mario Villafani and others, but after the trial court denied Villafani's motion for sanctions and dismissal under the Medical Liability Insurance Improvement Act for an inadequate expert report, Trejo filed a nonsuit. The trial court severed and dismissed the claims without prejudice, making the sanctions denial part of a final judgment, yet the court of appeals dismissed Villafani's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court held that the appeal was permissible because the nonsuit rendered the prior interlocutory order final and because the sanctions motion survived the nonsuit. The core reasoning was that the MLIIA's sanctions provisions aim to deter meritless claims, and permitting a nonsuit to block appellate review would undermine that purpose by allowing plaintiffs to refile without consequence. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
healthcareproceduretorts & liability
Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Elchehimi
Texas Supreme Court · 2008-03-28 · cited 8×
This case involved a breach of contract claim by Mohamad Elchehimi against Nationwide Insurance Company after the insurer denied uninsured motorist benefits for injuries and damage from a collision with a detached axle-wheel assembly from an unidentified semi-trailer truck on a Texas highway. The trial court granted summary judgment to Nationwide, but the court of appeals reversed, finding a fact issue on whether contact with the assembly satisfied the policy and statutory requirements. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated summary judgment for the insurer. The Court held that the Texas Insurance Code's uninsured motorist provision requires actual physical contact with an unknown motor vehicle, and the axle-wheel assembly did not qualify as a motor vehicle because it lacked self-propulsion or other statutory characteristics of one.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co.
Texas Supreme Court · 2008-02-15 · cited 142×
This case concerns an interlocutory appeal from the certification of three subclasses of Texas royalty owners who leased property to Phillips Petroleum Company for oil and gas production and alleged that Phillips underpaid royalties through self-dealing inter-affiliate transactions. The trial court certified the subclasses for breach of lease claims, but the court of appeals reversed the certification order. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decertification of Subclasses 1 and 3 on grounds that individual issues would predominate and that the representatives failed to assert all potential claims that could later be barred by res judicata, while reversing the decertification of Subclass 2 because its representatives satisfied the requirements for typicality and adequacy and remanding for further proceedings.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Fairfield Insurance Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP
Texas Supreme Court · 2008-02-15 · cited 162×
The case involved Fairfield Insurance Company seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, Stephens Martin Paving, against a claim for exemplary damages based on gross negligence in the death of an employee. The Texas Supreme Court, answering a certified question from the Fifth Circuit, held that Texas public policy does not prohibit coverage for such punitive damages under the workers' compensation and employer's liability insurance policy at issue. The court first examined the policy language and determined it provided coverage, then found no express legislative prohibition on insuring exemplary damages for gross negligence and considered broader public policies, including the compensatory function of such damages and distinctions from intentional misconduct.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability
Mid-Continent Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
Texas Supreme Court · 2007-10-12 · cited 143×
This case involved a dispute between two insurance companies, Mid-Continent and Liberty Mutual, both of which provided $1 million in primary liability coverage to the same insured under standard policies, with Liberty Mutual also issuing a $10 million excess policy. After a car accident led to a lawsuit against the insured, the insurers cooperatively defended the case but disagreed on its value; Liberty Mutual funded most of a $1.5 million settlement after Mid-Continent paid only $150,000 based on its lower valuation. Liberty Mutual sought reimbursement for its excess payment, raising certified questions about whether Mid-Continent owed any duty, directly or through subrogation, to contribute its proportionate share. The Texas Supreme Court answered that no such actionable duty existed, as the insurers lacked any contract between them, the insured had no complaint against Mid-Continent, and the scenario did not trigger duties recognized in other insurance contexts like primary-excess relationships or coverage denials.
business & regulatorytorts & liability