This case involved claims by John and Eileen Gentry against Credit Plan Corporation of Houston, Joe Assad, and later-joined defendants Colonial Finance Corporation and Kelcor Corporation for unreasonable collection efforts arising from events in February 1969. The trial court found Credit Plan to be the alter ego of Colonial as a matter of law, entered judgment for the plaintiffs against all defendants jointly and severally for actual and exemplary damages, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed as to Credit Plan and Assad but held the claims against Colonial and Kelcor barred by the statute of limitations. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, holding that Credit Plan and Colonial were identical for limitations purposes because Colonial conducted its business through Credit Plan as its alter ego, with shared ownership, management, offices, and operations, and that filing suit against Credit Plan tolled the limitations period for Colonial. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment in full, noting that the alter ego doctrine applies in tort cases to allocate losses without requiring proof of fraud and that the corporate entities could not be treated separately to bar the claims.
The case involved a lawsuit by Arkla Equipment Company against Woods Exploration and Producing Company, Eastern Pipeline Company, and Stanley C. Woods to recover on two promissory notes partially guaranteed by Woods. The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the notes and guaranty, but the Court of Civil Appeals held that only one defendant had perfected an appeal via a cash deposit in lieu of bond and remanded the attorney's fees issue. The Supreme Court held that the district clerk's certificate could be amended more than a year later to show the deposit was made for the benefit of all three defendants, allowing all to perfect their appeal under the liberal amendment rules for bonds and the policy against dismissing appeals for procedural defects. On the merits, the court affirmed that no proof supported the amount of reasonable attorney's fees and that the summary judgment affidavit was sufficient without objection, modifying the judgment only to sever and remand the fees claim for all defendants.
This case is an original habeas corpus proceeding in which Vernon Douglas Sutherland challenged a contempt order for failing to pay his ex-wife half of his U.S. Naval Fleet Reserve retainer pay as required by their 1971 divorce judgment. The divorce court had classified the right to future retainer pay as community property and awarded the wife a one-half interest, with Sutherland ordered to remit her share to the court registry. Sutherland argued that the award was a void attempt to impose alimony on his separate earnings and that his imprisonment violated the Texas Constitution's ban on imprisonment for debt. The court held that the divorce judgment was not subject to collateral attack because the question of whether the retainer-pay interest was vested community property had been decided in the divorce proceeding, and Sutherland should have pursued a direct appeal instead. It further concluded that compelling payment of the wife's share did not constitute imprisonment for debt, as Sutherland was acting as a court-appointed trustee, and therefore remanded him to custody.
The case involved Gateway National Bank suing Claude C. Coward and David Don Spell on four promissory notes to recover the unpaid principal balance plus interest and attorney’s fees, where each note provided for reasonable attorney’s fees. The trial court granted summary judgment awarding $2,000 in attorney’s fees based on an attorney’s affidavit, and the Court of Civil Appeals adjusted the amount slightly by taking judicial notice of the State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule under the 1971 amendment to Article 2226. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the amendment’s provisions allowing the fee schedule to serve as prima facie evidence of reasonable attorney’s fees apply only to the specific categories of claims listed in Article 2226, such as suits for services rendered or on sworn accounts, and not to actions founded on promissory notes. The court further reasoned that the schedule is not conclusive even where the statute applies, because the trial court must still determine the fee amount as trier of fact rather than in a summary judgment proceeding, leading to reversal and remand.
This case involves a workers' compensation claim by J.C. Scott, who was injured on the premises of his employer, Bloch Metals, Inc. The trial court awarded benefits based on a jury finding that the injury occurred in the course of employment, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding no evidence to support that conclusion. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that circumstantial evidence, including Scott's presence on the employer's premises during working hours and his duties there, supported the jury's finding despite the lack of direct evidence and some indications of intoxication. The court remanded the case for consideration of other points raised by the insurance carrier.
The case concerned a dispute between the City of San Marcos, a home-rule municipality, and the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA), a state-created conservation district, over the city's claimed authority to regulate LCRA's retail electricity rates inside city limits and the validity of certain rate resolutions and ordinances. The trial court held that San Marcos lacked regulatory jurisdiction and voided the city's ordinance along with two LCRA rate increases. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed on the jurisdiction question, declaring the city had exclusive rate-making power after notice and hearing. The Texas Supreme Court modified the judgment to declare that the city has no power to regulate LCRA rates, that the 1973 LCRA increase was valid, and that the LCRA Act's grant of rate authority to the district superseded any conflicting home-rule powers.