The case involved a challenge by Houston Natural Gas Corporation to an order by the Railroad Commission of Texas setting new domestic gas rates for the City of Alvin after the city denied a requested increase. The Commission had determined a fair value rate base largely based on book cost and set rates yielding about 6.12% return, which the utility argued was inadequate and confiscatory under statutory standards requiring a fair return on fair value. The trial court granted summary judgment to the utility and enjoined the rates, but the Supreme Court of Texas reversed and remanded, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the fair value of the utility's property and the lowest rate of return needed to attract capital. The court emphasized that utility rate-setting is a legislative function and that the trial court must make its own factual findings on admissible evidence to assess whether the rates meet constitutional and statutory requirements.
This case involves a Texas suit to enforce a South Dakota judgment arising from foreclosure proceedings on a house trailer. The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding a fact issue on whether the defendant had been properly served with process in South Dakota. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that questions of service were immaterial because the defendant's presence in the South Dakota courtroom during trial, along with participation through counsel asserting defenses and seeking relief, constituted a voluntary appearance under South Dakota law equivalent to personal service. The court reasoned that the defendant's affidavit denying an "appearance" stated only a legal conclusion and did not create a fact issue contradicting the plaintiff's evidence of her physical presence and the attorney's actions on her behalf. The judgment was affirmed on April 18, 1956.
In McElhenny v. Thielepape, a patient who was a business invitee in a pediatrician's waiting room sued the doctor for personal injuries after she tripped over a moving children's glider swing while walking to the examination room in response to a nurse's signal. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for an instructed verdict, finding no liability, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed that judgment. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the appellate decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment for the defendant, holding as a matter of law that the glider was not an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the plaintiff had observed its limited movement for nearly an hour and could have avoided the path by moving a small chair, and the premises owner had no duty to warn of or protect against such obvious conditions or to act as an insurer of invitees' safety.
The case was an original habeas corpus proceeding challenging whether a county court had jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of a bawdy house as a nuisance under Art. 4666. The court held that the county court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction, rendering the contempt commitment void and ordering the relator discharged. The core reasoning was that precedent, including De-Witt County v. Wischkemper, requires a fixed amount in controversy between $200 and $1,000 for county court injunction jurisdiction, and no such value was alleged here despite the misdemeanor nature of the underlying conduct.
This case concerned a dispute over whether intrastate or interstate rail freight rates applied to 31,852 tank carloads of crude oil shipped from Midland, Texas, to coastal points. Humble Oil had paid the interstate rate but sought a refund, arguing that some of the oil originated in Texas and should have qualified for the lower intrastate rate. The oil from Texas and New Mexico fields was commingled at a pipeline tank farm, making it impossible to identify the origin of oil in any specific carload. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the railway, holding that Humble failed to meet its burden of proving the intrastate rate applied because no tariff existed for mixed interstate-intrastate loads and the commingling prevented tracing specific shipments.
The case involved railroads and out-of-state sugar refineries challenging a Texas Railroad Commission order that reduced certain intrastate freight rates on sugar shipments. The Commission had issued the reduction after an in-state refinery complained that existing rates were too high and discriminatory compared to interstate rates. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the order could not stand, reasoning that Texas statutes did not authorize the Commission to adjust intrastate rates based on their relationship to interstate rates or to address discrimination involving out-of-state shippers.
