Samuel H. Blackmer

In this contract action, the plaintiff furniture manufacturer sought to recover the purchase price of two bedroom suites from the defendant retailer, who raised the statute of frauds as a defense. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff based on an invoice and a letter from the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling there was no evidence that the letter's signer was an authorized agent of the defendant corporation. The court remanded the case to permit proof of agency and explained that, if agency were established, the documents together would form a sufficient memorandum satisfying the statute of frauds and the letter would qualify as an acceptance of the goods.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a replevin action in which plaintiff Stanley Patch sought return of tables and chairs allegedly taken and detained without justification by defendant Chauncey Lathrop, a deputy sheriff who held the items under an attachment for a third party. The trial court issued an order finding that the goods had been paid for in a separate lawsuit, directing no return of the property, and awarding the defendant costs, but without addressing whether the taking or detention was unlawful. The appellate court determined that the order was inadequate as a final judgment because replevin requires resolution of the statutory issues of unlawful taking and detention, and it therefore reversed while modifying the judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's writ, award costs to the defendant, and allow the plaintiff to retain the goods. The court relied on the record and concessions at argument to reach this disposition without remand.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a post-nuptial separation agreement between Albert and Gemma Prudenzano under which each released all property interests in the other's estate; after Gemma's death, her will left her property to others, Albert waived the will and claimed his statutory spousal share of real and personal property plus homestead, and the probate court enforced the agreement to deny him any share. The court held that a surviving spouse's statutory rights may be barred by a fair post-nuptial separation agreement but that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to construe and enforce such an agreement. Jurisdiction instead lies in the court of chancery, which may aid the probate court by specific enforcement; the probate court's decree was reversed and the matter remanded with directions to stay proceedings to allow the estate to seek chancery relief or, alternatively, to assign Albert his statutory share.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a minor plaintiff suing a company in contract through his next friend to recover payments made for trucks under a lease or purchase that he sought to disaffirm. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to allege the plaintiff's minority or a prior rescission and demand for return of consideration, but the trial court allowed amendment to add the words "a minor" and denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed, holding that while good pleading requires stating minority status, the defect does not vitiate the cause of action and is correctable by amendment that does not change the action; a minor may disaffirm by bringing suit without prior demand when the property has returned to the defendant's possession, and an executed accord and satisfaction does not bind the minor.

procedurefamily law

This case involved a contract action originally brought by Charles H. Brooks individually for labor and materials furnished, with a second count for breach of contract. During trial, after evidence suggested a partnership with his son, the trial court amended the pleadings under the amendment statute to substitute the partnership Brooks and Brooks as plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that this constituted an impermissible substitution of parties rather than a permissible joinder, as the evidence showed no joint contract and partnership liability differs from joint liability. It reversed and remanded for a new trial on the original pleadings as they stood before the amendment, limiting prior case law on party substitutions to its facts.

procedure