Paul A. Chase

The case involved a tort action for conversion of two cows, where the plaintiff held a chattel mortgage on several cows described by sex, color, and location on a specific farm. The defendant purchased the cows from a third party who had acquired them from the mortgagors, and the defendant had no actual notice of the mortgage. The trial court refused the defendant's request to charge the jury that the mortgage description was too indefinite to bind a third party and entered judgment for the plaintiff after a jury verdict. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that a description by sex, color, and location is prima facie sufficient to allow a third party to identify the property with the aid of such investigation as the description suggests, consistent with prior precedents on chattel mortgage descriptions.

propertytorts & liability

This case involved a quo warranto action challenging the mayoral election in Burlington, where the defendant was initially declared the winner by a narrow margin over the relator. The court reviewed evidence of illegal votes in categories such as unauthorized additions to the grand list, delinquent taxpayers, and non-compliant absent voter ballots, adjusting the totals accordingly after subtracting those proven to have been cast for each candidate. It also examined claims of bribery through the use of money and liquor but found insufficient reliable evidence linking the defendant to any unlawful conduct. After these adjustments, the court determined that the relator had not met the burden of proving he received more legal votes than the defendant, whose incumbency carried a presumption of validity. The complaint was therefore dismissed.

elections

This case involved a negligence claim arising from an automobile collision on a snowy, rutted highway in Vermont, where the defendant's car struck the rear left side of the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff moved for a directed verdict and later sought to set aside a jury verdict in the defendant's favor, claiming the evidence and the last clear chance doctrine required a finding of liability. The trial court denied both motions after submitting the case to the jury under instructions that included the last clear chance rule. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the evidence on road conditions, speeds, ruts, and the parties' actions was sufficiently conflicting that reasonable people could differ, making it a proper jury question, and that nothing showed the jury failed to apply the doctrine or that the plaintiff had met his burden of proof.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The Village of Brattleboro sued defendant Yauvey in municipal court for unpaid water rents after she continued using water from the village-owned system following its purchase of the Crowell water company. The defendant claimed a perpetual right to free water based on historical shares in the earlier Hines Aqueduct System, which had been connected to and later replaced by the Crowell system supplying her property. Both parties sought directed verdicts; the trial court granted the village's motion and awarded it recovery. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction because the case required determining title to real estate—the water system and associated rights—which municipal courts may adjudicate only in limited trespass actions involving sums under twenty dollars. The court noted that the village's proof of ownership free of the defendant's claimed encumbrance directly put land title at issue.

propertyprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs suing their auto insurer for damages after the insurer's attorneys allegedly acted negligently in defending a third-party lawsuit arising from a covered accident. The first trial produced a modest verdict that was set aside, but the attorneys failed to timely appeal that ruling; a retrial then resulted in a much larger judgment exceeding policy limits, which the plaintiffs had to pay. The complaint contained two counts—one for failing to secure review of the first verdict and one concerning a settlement offer—but after the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the first count and entered judgment on it, the jury hung on the second count. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded, holding that entry of judgment was premature while unresolved issues remained on the second count and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a new trial on the remaining claim.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over a lease agreement for quarrying slate on a farm spanning New York and Vermont, where the written description of the leased land was vague and did not specify boundaries or exact location. The plaintiff, as assignee of the lease, operated the quarry for years until the defendant sought to terminate the lease and restrict access, prompting a lawsuit in which the plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction. The court decided that the lease was valid and enforceable only for the specific land actually occupied and worked by the plaintiff, as the defendant's acceptance of payments had effectively marked those boundaries on the ground. It affirmed the decree restraining the defendant from interfering with operations on that occupied land while preventing the plaintiff from expanding beyond it without consent, reasoning that the indefinite description in the lease provided no basis for constructive possession of additional areas.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a plaintiff who sold an automobile under a conditional sale contract and entrusted the lien note to a deputy sheriff, instructing him to take possession of the car; instead, another deputy collected payment from the buyer but failed to remit it to the plaintiff, resulting in loss due to the first deputy's negligence in handling the note. The plaintiff sued the sheriff under a statute making the sheriff liable for a deputy's official misfeasance or neglect. The court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and entered judgment for the defendant sheriff. It reasoned that the deputies were not acting in their official capacities, as the instructions involved a private arrangement rather than duties legally required of an officer (noting that under current law, an officer's involvement was needed only for sale of the property, not taking possession), and sheriffs are not liable for deputies' breaches of private contracts.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a six-year-old boy injured when he contacted a loose wire hanging over a 44,000-volt transmission line on a former street railway right of way that had been conveyed between companies. The plaintiff sued Rutland Railway, Light & Power Co., which owned unused signal wires on the poles, and Vermont Hydro-Electric Corporation, which owned the transmission line. The trial court directed a verdict for both defendants. The court affirmed the directed verdict for Rutland Railway because it had no interest in the transmission line or the escaping electricity, but reversed as to Vermont Hydro-Electric, ruling that proof the electricity escaped established a prima facie case under res ipsa loquitur that required submission to the jury regardless of the plaintiff's status on the land.

torts & liability

In Wing v. Martin, the plaintiff sued the defendant market owner after being injured while riding in the defendant's delivery truck, which was driven by an employee who had been expressly forbidden to allow passengers and who had deviated from the business route to accommodate the plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant was not liable because the employee's act of giving the ride was outside the scope of employment. The court reasoned that the deviation neither furthered the defendant's business nor was authorized or ratified by the defendant, making the employee solely responsible for the accommodation. It therefore directed judgment for the defendant on costs. The case falls under principles of vicarious liability and respondeat superior.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case concerned the conviction of the respondent for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor to Benjamin in December 1926. The court noted an error in admitting evidence of a prior March search and seizure of alcohol on the respondent's premises, though this was cured by the respondent's own testimony on cross-examination regarding his prior conviction for illegal possession. During closing argument and in the jury instructions, the prosecution and trial court improperly permitted the jury to convict based on a separate alleged sale of a pint of alcohol at Blake's home, for which the evidence amounted only to conjecture and did not connect the respondent to the transaction. Because the instructions allowed a guilty verdict on an unsupported claim, the judgment and sentence were reversed and the case remanded.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a 1926 order by the Vermont state fire marshal directing that a fire-damaged building on Main Street in Bennington be razed, issued after a hearing held under 1921 Acts No. 155. Plaintiff Nichols Electric Co., the lessee in possession of the ground-floor store, sued to enjoin enforcement of the order, arguing it received no adequate notice of the hearing or opportunity to be heard. The chancellor dismissed the bill and granted relief on the owner's cross-bill, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute's requirement of reasonable notice to protect property interests extended to the lessee and that the casual pre-hearing conversation with the company's treasurer did not constitute reasonable notice or a waiver. Because the order was therefore invalid, the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief staying its enforcement.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a negligence claim by a passenger injured when the car in which she was riding struck a wagon, allegedly due to faulty brakes on the vehicle driven by the defendant. The trial court instructed the jury that violating the statute requiring an adequate brake on automobiles on public highways constituted negligence per se, resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case, holding that breach of such a safety statute creates only a prima facie presumption of negligence that can be rebutted by evidence of the circumstances. The court reasoned that the proper standard remains whether the defendant acted as a prudent person would under the specific conditions, and it was for the jury to apply that test rather than treating the statutory violation as conclusive. The evidence regarding the defendant's actions after discovering the brake issue was not so one-sided as to render the instructional error harmless.

torts & liability

The case involved a petition by the Town of Bennington seeking a writ of mandamus to compel its town clerk to cease using the photostatic process for recording documents and to recopy all existing photostatic records, on the grounds that this method failed to comply with statutory requirements for recording instruments in books. The court dismissed the petition, holding that the photostatic records satisfied the legal standards because they were legible, bound into volumes, and met the requirements of perpetuity and publicity without any specific statutory method being mandated. The court reasoned that the town clerk has independent authority over record-keeping methods, the selectmen lacked power to dictate a different approach or require recopying, and no per-record certificate was required by law. It further noted that the town had funded the photostatic materials and that alternative remedies like suits on the clerk's bond were inadequate.

procedure

The case concerned a defendant charged under a 1919 Vermont statute with aiding and abetting lewdness and transporting a person for lewd purposes after he and companions drove a woman to a fairgrounds where another man attempted private sexual intercourse with her on a grandstand. The trial court convicted the defendant, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the conviction and discharged him. The court held that the statute applies only to "open and gross" lewdness, whereas the conduct here was concealed and private between willing participants, so no violation occurred. The court further noted that the evidence did not support the transportation charge once the lewdness claim failed. The ruling turned on statutory interpretation and the insufficiency of evidence for a directed verdict.

criminal law