This case involved a plaintiff's attempt to collect on a witnessed promissory note from 1936, secured by a chattel mortgage on livestock and hay, from the estate of the deceased maker who died in 1942. The estate's commissioners disallowed the claim, leading to a jury trial where the defendant pleaded payment and obtained a verdict after the court admitted evidence of demands for payment and a later mortgage discharge executed as an accommodation. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that execution and delivery of the note were factual issues for their determination when the evidence of those elements was uncontradicted, and that the charge improperly shifted the burden of proof on payment. The court also addressed the admissibility of evidence regarding the decedent's insolvency and financial condition as relevant to the improbability of payment, but found no abuse of discretion in allowing rebuttal evidence after the plaintiff rested.
The case involved a dispute over the unpaid balance for skim milk and cream sold and delivered by the plaintiff cooperative to the defendant company between April and August 1945. The trial court awarded the plaintiff a reduced judgment of $529.67 plus interest, accepting the defendant's claimed lower prices based on a misunderstanding and allowing certain credits. On appeal, the court held that the attorneys' post-suit letters constituted a binding stipulation fixing the price at the Milk Market Administrator's Boston-area rates plus hauling, eliminating a disputed credit of $3,863.08, and supported by uncontradicted testimony on the correct prices. It reversed the judgment and entered one for the plaintiff in the full claimed amount of $2,249.99 plus interest from September 30, 1945.
The case involved dairy farm owners suing their former farm manager for damages caused by his alleged negligent care and feeding of the cattle, which introduced mastitis to the herd. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed, claiming error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on contributory negligence. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant's request sought only an abstract statement of contributory negligence law without any application to the case facts. Such abstract instructions are improper because they risk confusing rather than clarifying the issues for the jury. The defendant had expressly disclaimed any need for an instruction tailored to the evidence presented.
This case involves adjoining property owners in a Vermont village disputing a claimed right of way over a driveway space between their buildings on Main Street, where the plaintiffs sought an injunction to stop the defendant from obstructing access based on alleged long-term use by themselves, predecessors, tenants, and the public. After a hearing, the chancellor made findings that the evidence of use on the defendant's portion of the land was too uncertain and indefinite to establish open, continuous, adverse, and claim-of-right use for fifteen years, while the defendant had used his property adversely since acquiring it in 1927. The court affirmed the decree denying relief, holding that no easement was created or preserved and that the plaintiffs' requested findings on prior acquiescence or consent were unsupported by the facts found. Exceptions to findings, refusals to find, and the decree itself were overruled as no reversible error appeared.
This case involved a 1945 car accident in Vermont where the plaintiff's intestate, riding as a guest passenger, was injured when the defendant's vehicle skidded off a sharp curve on a highway and plunged down a bank toward the Castleton River after the defendant drove at 40-45 mph. The defendant moved for a directed verdict and to set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, arguing lack of gross negligence under the applicable guest statute and that the passenger was contributorily negligent or assumed the risk due to the defendant's prior drinking. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence of speed on a familiar road with hazardous features, extensive skid marks, and damage to obstacles was sufficient for the jury to find gross negligence, while no conclusive proof showed the passenger was aware of intoxication or obvious danger.
In Cenate v. Hunter, the plaintiff sued after his horse-drawn vehicle collided with the defendant's motor truck, seeking damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, lost earnings, and property loss. The jury awarded $376, but the plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict as grossly inadequate and contrary to the court's instructions on damages; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the court held that the verdict could not stand because it failed to include any compensation for the plaintiff's undisputed pain and suffering from his head injury and cracked ribs during at least the six-week healing period, despite evidence supporting that element and instructions requiring the jury to consider it. The ruling turned on the distinction that motions based on disregard of jury instructions are reviewable without deference to the trial court's discretion, unlike pure inadequacy claims, leading to reversal of the denial and denial of the defendant's later motion for re-argument.
