John C. Sherburne

In this case, plaintiff Joyce Chamberlain, a guest passenger in defendant Delphia's car, sought damages for injuries sustained in a collision with another vehicle on a steep, narrow hill in Vermont. Under the applicable statute, recovery required proof of gross negligence by the defendant driver. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, could support a jury finding of gross negligence based on the defendant's driving in the center of the road at 30-40 mph on a dangerous hill while distracted and failing to watch for oncoming traffic until it was too late, despite prior knowledge of the road's hazards. The court also held that the sudden emergency doctrine did not apply because the defendant had created the dangerous situation through his own conduct, and other claims of error were not properly preserved.

torts & liability

This case is a contract action by a real estate broker against a bank to recover a $20,000 commission for producing a buyer for the Strong Building Property and for the subsequent sale of that property. The plaintiff alleged he secured Mrs. Peter Handy as a ready, willing, and able purchaser on the listed terms, though the defendants sold instead to Cody; the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on both counts. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for a directed verdict, to set aside the verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the court affirmed, ruling that evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff sufficiently supported the jury's finding on the first count and that the special verdict showed no prejudicial error regarding the second count.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus by landowners seeking to compel the Town of Tunbridge and its selectmen to construct and maintain a bridge on a former town road spur that had been washed out by flooding in 1942 and repeatedly damaged thereafter. After the selectmen discontinued the original road in 1951, an appeal led to a county court ruling that discontinuation was improper without providing adequate alternative access; the town then laid out a new road with a ford and later a pent road, followed by another discontinuation of the old site, with appeals from those actions still pending. The court dismissed the petition, holding that mandamus requires both a clear legal right to the relief sought and no adequate alternative remedy, neither of which was shown here because the town had discretion to provide substitute access and the adequacy of the new arrangements was already under review in the pending county court proceedings. The opinion rejected the petitioners' statutory arguments under highway maintenance laws as leading to absurd results that would prevent any relocation or alternative after a bridge failure.

propertyprocedure

This case is a tort action for personal injuries from an automobile collision on a snowy Vermont road in 1952, where the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by Davis that collided head-on with the defendant's wrecker. The defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Davis was negligent as a matter of law and that his negligence should be imputed to the plaintiff because Davis was acting as the plaintiff's agent or servant on the trip. The trial court denied the motion, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the judgment after reviewing the defendant's exceptions. The court held that no master-servant relationship existed because Davis, as the car owner, retained the right of control over its operation, so his negligence was not imputable to the plaintiff; it also rejected claims of contributory negligence and procedural errors regarding a jury view of the scene. The core reasoning focused on the test for agency being the right to control the manner of driving, which remained with Davis, and that any issues with the windshield or the view did not require a directed verdict for the defendant.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a beneficiary's lawsuit against an insurer to recover double indemnity benefits under a life insurance policy's accidental death provision, which required proof that death resulted solely from external, violent, and accidental means like drowning, independent of other causes. The insured was found dead in shallow marsh water with water in his lungs and no external injuries, though a death certificate noted a possible coronary occlusion as an antecedent factor. After a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence that drowning was the exclusive cause and challenging the admissibility of expert testimony and waiver of proof requirements. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the jury's finding of death by drowning alone, that the insurer had waived strict compliance with proof-of-loss forms through its agents' actions, and that any procedural issues with expert testimony did not prejudice the defendant.

business & regulatory

This case involved a contract dispute in which plaintiff Raymond S. Roberts, Inc. sought payment for car parts and vehicle servicing provided to defendants Enos R. White and Annette J. White from 1947 through 1951. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings supported liability for Annette as well as Enos. Those findings established that the couple jointly operated farming, cattle, and market businesses using a joint bank account, shared profits and losses through their joint estate, and registered all relevant vehicles in Annette's name, allowing the court to infer a partnership or agency relationship. The court also addressed procedural issues regarding the timing of motions and exceptions but concluded they did not affect the outcome under the findings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a contract dispute in which the plaintiff, surviving husband of the testatrix, sued her grandchildren (the defendants and sole heirs) for allegedly breaching an agreement under which he would forgo filing a waiver of the will in exchange for one-third of the proceeds from the sale of the family home. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against both defendants. The court affirmed the judgment against defendant Gruenig, finding that evidence supported the existence of an express promise by her and the plaintiff's justifiable reliance, but reversed the judgment against defendant Whaley. The reversal rested on the limited scope of the power of attorney granted to Gruenig, which authorized her only to handle settlement of the estate and did not extend to binding Whaley to the claimed side agreement with the plaintiff.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The Town of Bennington petitioned the Public Service Commission under V.S. 47, chap. 171 to condemn air rights and easements over the Vails' land to maintain clear approach zones for its municipal airport. The Vails challenged the Commission's jurisdiction, arguing that the more specific Airport Zoning Act in chap. 177 governed acquisition of such rights. The court held that chap. 177, being the later and more specific statute on airport hazards, controls, and the town must proceed under § 3951(c) by condemnation in the manner provided there (or adopt zoning) rather than under the general provisions of chap. 171. Accordingly, the Commission lacked jurisdiction, the exception was sustained, and the petition was dismissed.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted in municipal court of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. After the guilty verdict, the defendant moved to arrest judgment, arguing that the municipal court judge had improperly drawn the jury after disqualifying himself due to a prior attorney-client relationship, that the jury was not selected according to statute, and that the venire was improperly directed to and served by a special deputy sheriff. The trial court overruled the motion and entered judgment on the verdict. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant had waived any objections by failing to raise them promptly before or during trial, that the claimed defects were not apparent on the record or prejudicial, and that no mandatory statutory requirements had been violated in a way that rendered the proceedings void.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a suit in equity by the executor of an estate seeking specific performance of a contract to sell a building and its contents to the defendant for $25,000. The defendant argued that the written receipt she signed, which included the term 'attest' above her name, failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds for the sale of land because it lacked a proper signature and did not contain an explicit promise to sell. The court held that the defendant's signature authenticated the document as a party to the transaction, that the writing constituted a sufficient memorandum of her offer (which was accepted), and that the plaintiff could convey marketable title, thereby upholding the chancellor's decree for specific performance.

property

This case was a contract action brought by Whitman Lumber Co. against Van Buren Lumber Co. to recover for lumber shipped to the defendant for kiln drying and milling. The trial court, after a hearing without a jury, entered judgment for the plaintiff based on findings that the lumber had been delivered. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting two findings of fact. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that correspondence between the parties, including the defendant's admissions and offers to resolve the matter, provided legitimate evidence fairly tending to support the findings of delivery.

business & regulatory

The case was a trespass action brought by a landowner against an electric utility company for erecting and maintaining transmission poles and wires on his property without permission, plus related damages from cutting brush and line fences. The court held that the defendant possessed a continuing right of way for the electric line, which originated in a 1902 railroad condemnation that encompassed statutory rights for electric transmission, and that this right survived the later abandonment of railroad operations on the land. The core reasoning was that Vermont statutes (V.S. 47, §§ 9710 and 9711) permitted electric lines on railroad land as an independent, permanent property interest of the electric company that did not terminate with the end of railroad use, so the plaintiff’s predecessor had already been compensated for the full range of possible uses in the original condemnation proceeding. The order overruling the demurrer to the defendant’s answer was affirmed, though the separate fence-cutting claim proceeds to trial on the general denial.

propertytorts & liability

This case concerns a petition by the Town of Starksboro for a new trial following an earlier ruling that its selectmen had authority under a 1947 town meeting vote to purchase a snow plow unit. The town sought retrial on grounds that the meeting minutes were amended in 1950 to reflect a vote authorizing purchase of a four-wheel-drive truck but not a Marmon Herrington model, claiming the original record was inaccurate and the amendment constituted newly discovered evidence. The court treated the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss as a demurrer and held the petition insufficient, as the affidavits failed to demonstrate that the town's lack of knowledge of the correct vote was not due to negligence or lack of diligence by town officials or counsel, and did not show that the amended record would likely produce a different result. The court allowed the town until February 13, 1951, to file an amended petition and supporting affidavits or face dismissal with costs.

procedure

In State v. Ploof, the defendant was charged with intoxication, breach of the peace, and soliciting a minor female for lewd acts; he pleaded guilty to the first count and challenged the sufficiency of the other two via demurrer. After the trial court overruled the demurrer and amendments were made, the defendant was convicted on counts 2 and 3. The Vermont Supreme Court held that count 2 sufficiently alleged a breach of the peace under the statute through loud profane language and threats that constituted tumultuous and offensive carriage, so the conviction on that count was affirmed. However, count 3 was reversed and remanded because the information failed to describe the specific lewd acts with the required particularity to show they fell within the statute. The court also noted it lacked authority to review the length of the sentences imposed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a trespass action for wrongful timber cutting in which the plaintiffs sought treble damages under Vermont statute. The jury initially returned a $5,000 verdict for the plaintiffs but, after being recalled days later following reports of a calculation error, amended it to $500 based on a decimal-point mistake in multiplying the timber volume by its value. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motions and entered judgment on the reduced verdict. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that although the jurors' statements corrected rather than impeached the verdict, the proper remedy after the jury had separated was to set aside the verdict and order a new trial rather than permit resubmission to avoid risks of external influence.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned disputes over ownership and leasehold interests in commercial property in Rutland, Vermont, following the 1944 death of Perry E. Bove, who had operated a beverage business there. The property had been acquired by Louis Ricci, who in 1937 executed a recorded lease to Perry allowing use of a newly built warehouse for rent that would decrease after the Riccis' deaths, along with a separate option to purchase; later deeds purported to transfer title, including one in 1943 to Perry's widow Marie H. Bove. The probate and superior courts addressed claims by Perry's estate, his widow, the Riccis, and his siblings regarding whether the lease created a perpetual or life tenancy and how it interacted with the deeds and Perry's will. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the lease conveyed only a life estate to Perry that terminated at his death, after which title vested in Marie Bove under the 1943 deed, based on the instrument's language, the parties' ages and conduct, and surrounding circumstances showing no intent to convey a fee. The decree was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings on remaining issues.

propertyfamily law

This case involved a damages action arising from a 1946 highway accident in which the plaintiff's intestate was crowded off the road by a tractor-trailer while attempting to pass it. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, which consisted solely of the company's name painted on the truck. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the name on the truck constituted prima facie evidence of the defendant's ownership and control, which in turn created a rebuttable presumption that the driver was acting as the defendant's agent within the scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The court adopted the majority rule from other jurisdictions that proof of ownership is sufficient to shift the burden of going forward with evidence to the defendant, overruling its prior contrary precedent, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor under Vermont law. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding on cross-examination a question to the arresting officer about prior difficulties with the defendant's brother, which was offered to demonstrate bias. The court affirmed the conviction and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. It reasoned that the offer relied on speculation by inferring bias toward the defendant solely from a family relationship and an unrelated landlord-tenant dispute, without showing any basis to connect that to prejudice against the defendant himself. The matter was remanded for sentencing.

criminal law

The case involved a claim by the State of Vermont against the estate of William Taranovich for the costs of his confinement and support at the state hospital for the insane from 1939 until his death in 1946. Taranovich, who owned a farm and had a wife and ten children, had been committed by a probate court under P.L. 5552-5554 after it was determined that his income and family earnings were insufficient to support both him and his dependents, with the commitment ordered at state expense. After his death the State sought recovery under P.L. 3999-4002, which apply to insane paupers and permit collection from estates exceeding $300 when funds become available. The court held that those recovery provisions did not apply to commitments under the family-relief statutes, because applying them would contradict the legislative purpose of preventing the family from becoming paupers, as shown by statutory history, titles, chapter arrangement, and the specific subheading for non-pauper insane persons. Judgment for the State was reversed and entered for the estate.

family lawhealthcareproperty

The case concerned whether a house purchased by Troy Conference Academy (now Green Mountain Junior College) in 1945 to serve as faculty housing qualified for tax exemption under the school's 1834 charter, which exempted necessary buildings and lands used for the institution. The lower court ruled the property exempt as reasonably necessary, but on appeal the Vermont Supreme Court reversed and held the property taxable. The court reasoned that later general statutes, particularly No. 12 of the Acts of 1941, apply to all colleges including those with special charters reserving legislative amendment rights; these statutes limit exemptions for property acquired after their passage unless the town votes otherwise and thus repeal conflicting charter provisions. The Humphrey House was therefore subject to taxation at its pre-acquisition appraised value.

taxesproperty