Archibald C. Buchanan

The case involved Allen Carroll Pruitt, who had prior convictions for robbery and murder committed as a juvenile voided in habeas corpus proceedings due to the absence of his parents or a guardian ad litem at the original juvenile hearing. Pruitt petitioned for a writ of prohibition to bar his retrial as an adult in the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, claiming it would violate his statutory and constitutional rights. The court denied the writ, reasoning that Pruitt had reached the age of majority and could no longer be tried as a juvenile, so the Commonwealth could proceed against him on new indictments using adult criminal procedures, consistent with prior Virginia precedents and Kent v. United States.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a parent, as administrator of a stillborn child's estate, could recover damages under Virginia's wrongful death statute for injuries from a car accident allegedly caused by the defendants' negligence, which resulted in the viable fetus being born dead. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers and dismissed the action, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that the wrongful death statute requires the death of a "person" and that an unborn child does not qualify as a person under the statute's ordinary meaning, so no independent right of action existed that could be transmitted to the personal representative. It further noted that the statute's language, modeled on Lord Campbell's Act, had historically been interpreted not to cover stillborn children absent legislative change.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Billy Joe Barrett, who was indicted for the rape of his twelve-year-old daughter but had the rape charge struck by the court; a jury then convicted him of attempt to rape and sentenced him to five years in prison. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction and remanded for a possible new trial, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the crime of attempt. The court reasoned that an attempt requires both intent and a direct act toward commission, that intent may be inferred from circumstances but all proved facts must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and here the evidence—including the defendant's plausible explanation that he mistook the girl for his young son and intended only to play with him—failed to meet that standard, as his lack of erection and other details were consistent with innocence.

criminal law

This case involved a 1966 automobile collision at an uncontrolled intersection in Portsmouth, Virginia, where plaintiff Eccles sued defendant King for personal injury damages after their vehicles collided; Eccles recovered a $3,750 verdict and judgment at trial. King appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing his jury instructions on right-of-way and that Eccles was contributorily negligent. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that under Code § 46.1-221, King (the driver on the right) had the statutory right-of-way because the vehicles approached the intersection at approximately the same time, making Eccles negligent per se for failing to yield. The court rejected the trial court's rationale that a major artery like Portsmouth Boulevard should be treated differently without stop or yield signs, noting that any such exception must come from the legislature, not judicial interpretation, and that King's compliance with stopping did not forfeit his right-of-way.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned whether a county zoning ordinance barred Blue Ridge Stone Corporation from resuming quarrying on the Thomas tract after operations there had paused for over a year. The Board of Zoning Appeals had split on the issue, leading to court review under the ordinance's provision that prohibited resuming quarries, crushing plants, or asphalt plants in M-2 districts if discontinued for more than a year. The circuit court ruled that the prohibition did not apply, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the three adjoining tracts (Thomas, Todd, and France) formed a single operational area under one contract, with continuous use of the combined property for quarrying and related activities that had not been discontinued for the requisite period.

business & regulatoryproperty

Lewis v. Commonwealth involved Delbert Lewis, who was charged under Virginia Code § 18.1-212 with crimes against nature (oral sodomy) against two brothers, ages 14 and 16, after allegedly forcing them at gunpoint into his car on March 4, 1967, driving them to isolated areas, and compelling the acts before releasing them. A jury convicted Lewis on both counts and fixed punishment at one year in prison each, which the trial court imposed after denying a motion for a new trial. Lewis appealed, arguing insufficient evidence to support the convictions and that after-discovered evidence warranted a retrial. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgments, holding that the victims' identifications, detailed descriptions of the car and events, and corroborating timeline evidence were sufficient for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the motion for a new trial failed to meet the legal requirements for after-discovered evidence, particularly the showing of due diligence. The court found no reversible error in the trial proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by Evelyn Hicks, widow of Louis Hicks, against Julia L. Hagan and her employee Marvin Bryant after Hicks died when his sedan collided with the rear of Hagan's stopped tractor-trailer loaded with logs on Warwick Boulevard in Newport News. A jury awarded the plaintiff $40,000, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict after denying post-trial motions. On appeal, the defendants argued insufficient evidence of their negligence, that Hicks was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and errors in the jury instructions. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that evidence from witnesses showed the defendants' vehicle was inadequately lit and stopped in the roadway, creating a hazard; that contributory negligence was not established as a matter of law; and that the instructions contained no reversible error.

torts & liability

The case involved Hydelia Cotman suing Nannie Lee Jones, the driver of the car in which Cotman was a passenger, and Winfred Whitehead, the driver of a truck involved in a collision, for personal injuries. Cotman had accepted $35 from Jones' insurer and signed a broad release form shortly after the accident, when her injuries appeared minor. The trial court sustained pleas of release and dismissed the action against both defendants, finding no mutual mistake of fact as to the extent of injuries that would invalidate the release. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence failed to show such a mistake and adhering to the common-law rule that release of one joint tort-feasor releases all others.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned Arey's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1965 convictions for armed robberies and attempted murder, based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a defense of alcoholism and involuntary intoxication, along with allegations about illegally obtained statements. The lower court reviewed the existing trial records, allowed limited testimony from psychiatrists regarding mental competency, and dismissed the petition without a full evidentiary hearing. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial transcripts conclusively showed Arey had entered knowing and voluntary guilty pleas after proper advice and inquiry, that voluntary intoxication was not a valid defense under state law, and that no further evidence was needed to refute the petition's allegations. The court reasoned that habeas proceedings do not require plenary hearings when records of prior proceedings fully address the claims.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Wilson Ralph Price, who was convicted under a Virginia statute for burning a cross on a city sidewalk in Richmond. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction, holding that the statute, which prohibited placing a burning cross on the "property of another" without permission, did not apply to public sidewalks. The court reasoned that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and not extended by implication, and the statute's language and history indicated it was intended to protect private property, not public places, which were addressed in a separate section. A later amendment extended the law to public property.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved Fred W. Johnson, who was convicted by a jury of attempted robbery of a taxicab driver after an incident where he pointed what appeared to be a firearm at the driver and demanded he not get excited, leading the driver to escape. Johnson appealed, arguing the indictment failed to allege intent to rob, the evidence was insufficient to prove intent, and the court erred in refusing an instruction requiring the weapon to be a functional firearm. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the indictment sufficiently charged attempted robbery by alleging assault with firearms and an attempt to steal by putting the victim in fear, that the jury could reasonably infer intent from the facts including the defendant's actions and later apology, and that a victim is not required to know if the gun is real or functional as they act on appearances.

criminal law

The case concerned whether Virginia's long-arm statutes (§§ 8-81.1 through 8-81.5), enacted in 1964, could be applied retroactively to serve process on an out-of-state defendant in a personal injury action arising from events in November 1963. The plaintiff had filed suit in 1965 alleging negligence by Dallas, Inc., in loading furniture that injured him in Virginia; after initial service attempts failed, the trial court quashed service under the new statutes on retroactivity grounds, effectively barring the suit in Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the statutes apply to causes of action arising before their enactment. The core reasoning was that the long-arm provisions are purely remedial and procedural, supplying a mechanism to enforce preexisting rights without creating new obligations or disturbing vested rights, consistent with precedents allowing retroactive application of changes to remedies or jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liability

In Green v. Burkholder, plaintiffs granted defendants the right to remove gravel from their land for highway construction in exchange for payment per cubic yard and performance of specified smoothing, leveling, topsoil replacement, and other restoration duties under the contract. Plaintiffs sued for breach after defendants failed to make full payment and complete the restoration work, but the trial court awarded only partial damages for unpaid materials and denied any recovery for the incomplete restoration on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving damages. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the proper measure of damages for breach of a contract to change the condition of real property is the reasonable cost of completing the work, which both parties had addressed through cost estimates at trial, rather than any difference in the property's market value, and remanded the case for the trial court to assess damages based on the evidence presented.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a suit in equity by buyer Marye Hubbard against seller Mary Helen Cranford seeking specific performance of a July 1963 contract for the sale of about 7 acres of real property in Fairfax County, Virginia, at $3,100 per acre, with a 90-day closing deadline. The buyer missed the deadline by 48 days after delaying the required survey, prompting the seller to refuse conveyance, and the trial court granted specific performance despite the seller's nonresident status and service by publication. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, ruling that the contract made time of the essence, the buyer had not been diligent in performing, and specific performance was unavailable as an equitable remedy; it further held that any relief should be accomplished through an in rem decree appointing a commissioner rather than an in personam order. The court remanded with directions to release the recorded contract.

property

This case involved a lawsuit by Brenda Bulluck, a minor passenger in a car driven by her brother Harold Saunders, against Saunders and Carol Rittenhouse for injuries from a collision on a Virginia highway in 1962. The jury awarded $5,000 in damages against both defendants jointly and severally. The court affirmed the judgments, holding that evidence supported a finding of gross negligence by Saunders (who was driving at 55-60 mph and failed to stop in time) sufficient to submit to the jury under the guest statute, and that Rittenhouse's act of stopping or slowing her car in the travel lane opposite a partially parked vehicle violated traffic statutes and contributed to the accident. The court also rejected challenges to the admission of photographs and certain jury instructions as non-prejudicial.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether Mrs. Mary J. Hosey’s knee injury, sustained while ascending unusually high rock steps during a door-to-door insurance survey for Reserve Life Insurance Company, qualified as a compensable “injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment” under Virginia’s Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Industrial Commission awarded benefits after finding the injury resulted from work activity, and the employer appealed. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the uncontradicted medical evidence established a causal link between the employment conditions and the traumatic synovitis, and that the unexpected snap and pain while performing required duties met the statutory definition of an accident. The court further concluded that the risk was incidental to the employment because it occurred while the claimant was fulfilling her job duties on the employer’s behalf.

labor & employment

In Johnson v. Commonwealth, Barry Clinton Johnson was indicted, tried by jury, and convicted of first-degree murder for shooting and killing Mrs. Shirley Hall Healy during a carjacking at a Gloucester intersection on November 15, 1965, with the jury fixing punishment at death. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding the evidence—including a matching palm print on the car, identifications by multiple witnesses and the victim's ten-year-old son, and the defendant's proximity to the scene—sufficient to prove identity beyond reasonable doubt. The court rejected the claim that a deputy sheriff's entry into the defendant's motel room violated the Fourth Amendment, as the defendant had invited the officer inside after being shown his badge. It also upheld Virginia's single-verdict procedure for guilt and punishment in capital cases, concluding that it does not burden the privilege against self-incrimination or deny due process and that any shift to a bifurcated system is a matter for the legislature.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by Charles G. Young against Paul Brinser for damages to Young's parked car after Brinser's vehicle struck it on a Richmond street. After a bench trial, the lower court awarded Young $866.64 in damages, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed that judgment and entered final judgment for Brinser. The court reasoned that to recover, Young had to prove negligence, but the only evidence of how the collision occurred came from Brinser's uncontradicted testimony as an adverse witness, which showed he was suddenly stricken by an unforeseen illness causing immediate vomiting and loss of consciousness with no prior warning or reason to anticipate it. Under established precedent, a driver so afflicted is not chargeable with negligence when the loss of control is unforeseeable.

torts & liability

The case involved Luther Durham Jr., who was indicted and convicted by a jury in Dinwiddie County of second-degree murder for the 1963 killing of a service station operator during a robbery, and sentenced to twenty years in prison. The defendant challenged the admission of a signed written statement he gave to police in March 1964, arguing it violated the procedural safeguards established in Miranda v. Arizona. The court held that Miranda applied because the trial began with arraignment on July 21, 1966, after the June 13, 1966 Miranda decision, and that the statement was inadmissible because it was obtained during custodial interrogation without the required warnings about the right to remain silent and to counsel. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case, while rejecting the defendant's separate claim regarding an accessory-after-the-fact instruction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the theft of a cigarette vending machine from a motel in Lynchburg, Virginia, on January 17, 1966. City police officers pursued and arrested the defendant in a nearby county after observing a matching vehicle, and the defendant later confessed to the crime after initially denying involvement. He was convicted of grand larceny by a jury and sentenced to five years in prison. The court held that the arrest was lawful under statutes authorizing close pursuit and extended jurisdiction for felonies, and that the confession was voluntary and admissible. It further found that objections to certain testimony were not properly preserved and that the evidence supported the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure