Harold Fleming Snead

In this eminent domain case, Appalachian Power Company sought a right-of-way easement across unimproved land owned by the Andersons, who operated a trailer park on part of their 31-acre parcel, and commissioners awarded the landowners $20,000 in compensation and damages, which the trial court confirmed. Appalachian appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting a map showing the owners' planned future expansion into additional trailer sites and by allowing valuation based on the capitalization of income method while excluding evidence of a public auction sale of adjacent comparable property. The court held that the map inaccurately depicted nonexistent future conditions and should not have been admitted, and that the trial court improperly barred evidence of the Minnick property sale without allowing Appalachian to establish its voluntariness and comparability. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, with concurring justices agreeing on the result but clarifying limits on using such maps even if accurate.

propertyprocedure

This case involved Shell Oil Company's petitions for refunds of motor fuel taxes paid on sales of "Shell 640 Kerosene" jet fuel to airlines in Virginia between 1956 and 1960, totaling over $79,000, under statutes requiring dealers to collect a per-gallon tax on motor fuel. The trial court assumed jurisdiction and awarded Shell partial refunds, finding the fuel did not meet the statutory definition of taxable motor fuel. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the tax imposed by Code § 58-711 is an excise tax rather than a State license tax. Because Code § 58-1130 permits refund suits only for certain taxes including license taxes, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims. The court reasoned that the tax applies equally to licensed and unlicensed dealers and that license cancellation for nonpayment is discretionary rather than a strict condition of the license.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Nichols v. Brizendine, a guest passenger sued the driver for personal injuries sustained in a single-car accident, alleging gross negligence in the operation of the vehicle. The trial court overruled the defendant's motion to strike the evidence and entered judgment on a $25,000 jury verdict for the plaintiff; the Supreme Court of Virginia granted a writ of error and affirmed. The evidence showed that the 17-year-old defendant, familiar with the narrow secondary road, deliberately accelerated to 60-70 mph on a straight downgrade leading into a sharp curve at night, struck a dip, lost control, crossed the road, and collided with a tree after skidding 46 feet. The court held that whether this conduct constituted gross negligence was a jury question because reasonable persons could differ on whether the speed, inattention, and failure to slow down despite knowledge of the dangerous curve amounted to an utter disregard of the passengers' safety. The judgment was therefore affirmed.

torts & liability

The case was a divorce proceeding in which Malcolm Rosenberg filed a bill seeking divorce a vinculo matrimonii from his wife Ruthe on grounds of constructive desertion, after which she filed a cross-bill alleging desertion and seeking a divorce a mensa et thoro (to be merged into a vinculo), custody of their three children, alimony, and child support. The commissioner recommended granting the wife relief, and the trial court denied Rosenberg's motion to file an amended and supplemental bill alleging adultery by the wife that occurred after the original filings, then entered a decree awarding the wife a final divorce, custody, and support. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court should have permitted the amendment because a supplemental bill may introduce new facts arising after the original bill that affect rights and interests already at issue, and leave to amend must be liberally granted under Code § 8-119 and Rule 2:12 to further justice.

family lawprocedure

In Florance v. Friedlander, the makers of a deed of trust note and deed of trust sought to reform the instruments' date and enjoin foreclosure after the noteholder attempted to accelerate the full indebtedness following a disputed interest payment. The lower court ruled that the payment was untimely, allowing acceleration, but the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, holding that the mailed interest check constituted a valid tender received on the same day as the acceleration notice. The court reasoned that, absent a specific contractual provision, simultaneous receipt of tender and notice meant the tender cut off the noteholder's option to accelerate, requiring a permanent injunction against foreclosure based on that default. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

property

In Caudill v. Peyton, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming his 1960 murder conviction was void because his non-jury trial occurred in the judge's chambers rather than the open courtroom, allegedly violating his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The trial court denied the writ after a hearing, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that the chambers door remained open during the trial, allowing the public in the adjacent courtroom to hear and observe the proceedings, with no evidence that anyone was excluded or prevented from attending. It distinguished the case from Jones v. Peyton, where the door was closed and family members were turned away, holding that freedom of access was preserved here so the constitutional right was not violated.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a divorce action in which the father sought custody of the couple's young son after the mother committed multiple acts of adultery and gave birth to an illegitimate child. The trial court awarded custody to the mother, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed that decision. The court held that the mother's conduct made her an unfit custodian and that the child's best interests required placement with the father, who was of good moral character and could rely on assistance from his parents. The opinion emphasized that the evidence was largely undisputed and that the chancellor's conclusion on custody was reviewable as a matter of law.

family law

In Lesoine v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted murder after the victim, Edward Woodley, was shot multiple times during an attack by several men who blocked his car. The court considered challenges to the admission of testimony regarding the victim's identification of the defendant from police photographs shown at the hospital and a subsequent one-on-one confrontation at the hospital without defense counsel present. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the photo identification was properly admitted and that the absence of counsel at the confrontation did not violate the defendant's rights because the event occurred before the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Wade and Gilbert, which established a right to counsel at such post-indictment lineups. The court further reasoned that the hospital identification procedure did not deny due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, drawing on the similar facts and holding in Stovall v. Denno.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Bernard Rieves Foster's conviction for statutory burglary after he was found guilty by a jury of breaking into a Virginia ABC store with intent to commit larceny, resulting in a ten-year prison sentence. Foster appealed on multiple grounds, including denial of a proper preliminary hearing due to restrictions on calling witnesses, refusal of funds for expert assistance, denial of a change of venue, erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence such as hearsay statements and speculative expert testimony, and refusal of a jury instruction on insufficient time to commit the crime. The court held that the preliminary hearing satisfied statutory requirements for determining probable cause, as the defendant was not entitled to a full adversarial proceeding, and found no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings or refusal of the unsupported instruction. It therefore affirmed the conviction, relying on prior precedent like Williams v. Commonwealth for the scope of preliminary hearings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a wrongful death action by the administrator of Barbara Major's estate against Phillip Hoppe, seeking damages for her death as a guest passenger in a car collision allegedly caused by Hoppe's gross negligence. The trial court struck the plaintiff's evidence and entered summary judgment for the defendant on grounds of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded, holding that assumption of risk was inapplicable because Barbara had no prior notice of Hoppe's negligent driving on the wrong side of the road, and evidence regarding alcohol consumption or the crowded seating arrangement was irrelevant since it did not establish interference with driving or assumption of the specific risk at issue.

torts & liability

This case involved a lawsuit by Brockman Chevrolet against Virginia Stage Lines and its bus driver for $422 in damages to a car that collided with a northbound Trailways bus after striking another vehicle on Route 29 near Amherst. The trial court denied the defendants' motions to strike the evidence and set aside the jury verdict, entering judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment for the defendants. The court assumed the northbound bus driver's stop on the highway may have violated Code § 46.1-248(a) and constituted negligence, but held that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, citing insufficient testimony from key drivers, incomplete visibility tests, and missing details on speeds, distances, and lookouts.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two insurance companies over coverage for damages from a vehicle accident in which an employee of Wedgewood Garden Center collided with another car while driving a truck loaned by Cavalier Ford. Celina Mutual, which had issued an automobile liability policy to Wedgewood, sought a declaratory judgment that Hardware Mutual's garage liability policy to Cavalier Ford provided primary coverage, entitling Celina to recover amounts it had paid in settlements and judgments. The trial court held that Hardware's policy was primary and Celina's secondary, rendering Hardware liable for the losses including attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, following its decision in a companion case and concluding that an escape clause in Hardware's policy violated Virginia Code § 38.1-381(a).

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case was a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of Linda Taylor's estate against George Edward Jordan (and initially another defendant who was later nonsuited), alleging that Taylor was killed in a head-on car collision on U.S. Route 17 due to the gross negligence of both drivers. After a jury trial, the court entered a $35,000 verdict for the plaintiff, which the trial judge refused to set aside. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict despite conflicts in testimony about the vehicles' positions and speeds, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rulings on a continuance motion, admission of witness testimony, striking evidence, or allocation of closing argument time for damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Warehouse Distributors, Inc. and Prudential Storage & Van Corp. over a commercial lease of warehouse property in Norfolk, where the plaintiff sought recovery for unpaid rent after September 1965 and for extensive damage to the premises after the defendant vacated in November 1965. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence and entered summary judgment for the defendant. The appellate court reversed, holding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, showed the defendant remained in possession until delivering the keys and that the lease terms, including clauses requiring the tenant to keep the premises in good condition and to be responsible for all glass breakage, imposed liability on the defendant. The court further noted that under Virginia law the burden was on the tenant to prove lack of fault or negligence for the damage, which the defendant had not met, and that summary judgment was improper where material facts were in dispute. The case was remanded for a new trial on all issues.

propertybusiness & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a plaintiff who sued a drug store for personal injuries after it allegedly filled his prescription incorrectly in July 1963, filing suit in August 1965 on theories of negligence, breach of warranty, and breach of contract. The trial court sustained the defendant's plea of the statute of limitations and dismissed the action. The plaintiff conceded the two-year limit barred the tort claim but argued the contract and warranty counts were subject to a three-year limit under a different code section. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the two-year limitation for personal injury actions applies regardless of whether the claim is framed in tort or contract because the object of the suit, not its form, controls which statute governs.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether David N. Rust, Jr. made valid inter vivos gifts of negotiable notes totaling $100,000 to his children shortly before his death. The executors of his estate filed suit seeking a determination that the gifts were complete, while some heirs contested them on grounds that delivery had not occurred. The trial court ruled the gifts valid after hearing evidence that Rust signed letters enclosing the notes and had them placed in his safe deposit box. The appellate court reversed, holding that no valid delivery took place because Rust retained dominion and control over the notes by instructing his secretary-agent to return the sealed envelopes to his box without fixed instructions for mailing or delivery to the recipients, and the children received no notice or possession before his death.

property

Dorothy Ann Causey sued L. Mae Lanigan to establish a prescriptive easement over the portion of a shared driveway on Lanigan's adjoining property and to require removal of a fence Lanigan erected along the boundary line that blocked the driveway. The trial court found no easement, concluding that the use of the driveway had been permissive based on circumstantial evidence of an implied agreement between the parties' predecessors. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the undisputed evidence of continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and notorious use for more than twenty years with the owners' knowledge raised a rebuttable presumption of use under a claim of right. Because Lanigan presented no evidence to rebut the presumption and there was no positive proof of any permissive agreement, Causey acquired an easement by prescription as a matter of law. The case was remanded for entry of a decree consistent with that holding.

property

The case involved a dispute among siblings over an alleged oral agreement for profit-sharing in a family-owned wood and metal products business, where complainant John Pittman claimed that his brother Clarence and the other defendants conspired to conceal profits from him, defraud him of his share, and cause him tax liability. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers on grounds including failure to state a cause for equitable relief, dismissed the bill, and denied leave to amend. On appeal, the court held that laches was not established as a matter of law from the face of the bill alone and that the rules require liberal allowance of amendments in furtherance of justice, so it affirmed the demurrer ruling in part but reversed the denial of amendment and remanded the case to permit the filing of an amended bill.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatorytaxes

The case involved Robert Thomas Burnley, who was convicted of rape in Charlottesville Corporation Court and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Burnley appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting his oral and written confessions to police and the Commonwealth's attorney, and by refusing to allow him to question the victim about her prior sexual activity with men other than her husband, either on cross-examination or as his own witness. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the confessions were properly admitted after Burnley was advised of his rights and that evidence of the victim's prior unchastity could only be introduced through proof of her general reputation, not through specific questioning of the victim herself. The court reasoned that consent was a defense but that particular acts of unchastity could not be elicited directly from the prosecutrix, and the record lacked any proffer of her expected answers or reputation evidence.

criminal law

The case involved Mary L. White's suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to recover $10,000 under an accidental death indemnity rider in her late husband's family automobile policy after he was killed by a dump truck at a highway construction site. The insurer admitted the policy was in force but denied coverage based on an exclusion for bodily injury or death sustained in the course of occupation while engaged in duties incident to the operation, loading, or unloading of commercial automobiles. The trial court, sitting without a jury, granted judgment for the defendant after finding the exclusion applicable. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the dump truck qualified as a commercial automobile and was unloading at the time, but that the insured had no duty or obligation to trip the lever and was instead performing an act of favor, so the exclusion did not bar recovery, and entered final judgment for the plaintiff.

business & regulatory