John Charles Thomas

The case involved the Russell County School Board’s decision to dismiss teacher Stephen Anderson after a fact-finding panel recommended against it, based on findings that Anderson had suggested inappropriate skits involving lynching and Nazi themes, instructed students on making a Molotov cocktail, discussed guns and bombs, used disparaging language toward colleagues, and made threatening remarks about school administrators. The trial court reversed the Board’s dismissal, but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed that ruling, holding that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court reasoned that the Board properly determined the conduct was unprofessional, inappropriate for the students’ age level, and inconsistent with a teacher’s role as a model of civil discourse, and that the trial court had improperly substituted its judgment for the Board’s. The Court emphasized school boards’ authority to protect students from unsuitable language and behavior.

labor & employment

Buchanan was tried and convicted by a jury of capital murder for killing his father, two half-brothers, and stepmother during the same transaction on September 15, 1987, along with separate first-degree murder convictions for each victim and firearm offenses, resulting in a death sentence plus multiple life terms and fourteen years imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated appeals from the capital and non-capital convictions and reviewed claims regarding the adequacy of indictments for notice, limits on voir dire, denial of second-degree murder instructions, sufficiency of verdicts, and double jeopardy. The court affirmed the capital murder conviction and death sentence while modifying and affirming the remaining convictions, concluding that the indictments and trial procedures were proper and the evidence supported the jury's findings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved grandchildren suing their grandparents' lawyers for alleged legal malpractice in preparing estate plans and wills, claiming the errors caused them to lose remainder interests in trusts, incur higher taxes, and suffer other economic losses totaling over $3 million. The trial court sustained the lawyers' demurrer, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege privity with the lawyers or that they were intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the grandparents and the firm. The court reasoned that the claims were solely for economic loss without a direct attorney-client relationship regarding the estates, that preparing answers in related probate proceedings did not create privity for the malpractice claims, and that the motion for judgment did not properly plead a contract intended to benefit the plaintiffs. Additional complaints about tax advice and distributions were rejected for the same lack of privity or contractual basis.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

This negligence case arose from a fatal collision at an intersection in New Kent County, Virginia, where a vehicle driven by Stewart failed to yield and was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by Critzer. The plaintiff, as administratrix of the decedent's estate, sued both drivers and the truck owner for concurring negligence but settled with Stewart, leaving the case against Critzer and his employer. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial court granted a motion to strike, finding insufficient proof of negligence by Critzer. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the evidence, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, could allow reasonable jurors to find that Critzer failed to maintain a proper lookout, reasonable speed, or proper control despite warning signs and the visible approaching vehicle. The court rejected the argument that Critzer's right of way excused any duty of ordinary care and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a multi-vehicle highway collision in which Koutsounadis sued England for personal injuries, alleging that England's negligence in falling asleep at the wheel, striking another car, and leaving his disabled and unlit vehicle in the left lane proximately caused the subsequent crash. The trial court granted a motion in limine that barred evidence of England's prior accident and his guilty plea to reckless driving, effectively limiting the negligence claim to England's conduct after his car had come to rest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that proximate causation presented a jury question because England's initial negligence had placed his vehicle in a dangerous position that others could foreseeably strike, and no intervening event severed the causal chain. The Court further ruled that Virginia Code § 8.01-418 required admission of the guilty plea arising from the same occurrence. The matter was remanded for a new trial consistent with these holdings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a probationary teacher could recover money damages after a school board failed to provide the statutory notice of nonrenewal required by Virginia Code § 22.1-304. The teacher had received a one-year contract with explicit notice that it was temporary, received negative evaluations, and never got the required written notice by April 15, but instead of seeking a new contract she sued for damages after being denied reemployment. The trial court awarded her approximately $15,000 in damages, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. The Court held that the statute creates both the right to notice and the exclusive remedy of entitlement to a contract for the next year, and that money damages are not available when the statute specifies only that remedy. Because the teacher never pursued a contract through litigation and sought only damages, the judgment in her favor was reversed and final judgment entered for the school board.

labor & employment

The case concerned a dispute over funds in a joint money market account that Gladys Steel opened with Jacqueline Bowdoin shortly before Steel's death; the account card designated it as a survivorship account, the bank paid the balance to Bowdoin, and executor Higgins sued on behalf of Steel's estate to recover the money for distribution under Steel's will. At trial, the court struck Higgins' evidence at the close of his case. The Supreme Court held that the evidence, viewed favorably to Higgins, was sufficient for a jury to decide whether Steel intended the account to carry survivorship rights, even under the clear-and-convincing standard, because testimony showed Steel was confused, believed the account allowed only access for paying bills, and expressed dismay upon learning of the survivorship feature. The Court therefore reversed the grant of the motion to strike, remanded for further proceedings, and affirmed the trial court's exclusion of unrelated will evidence as irrelevant.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned the interpretation of a 1983 commercial real estate lease between tenant Great Falls Hardware and landlord South Lakes, specifically two provisions on common area maintenance expenses and real estate taxes that included a typewritten clause making the tenant's obligations effective only if at least 95% of other tenants were required to comply with the terms 'as herein provided.' Great Falls sought declaratory relief arguing it was not obligated to pay unless other tenants' leases contained substantially identical terms, while South Lakes contended the clause was satisfied if 95% of tenants paid under whatever terms were in their own leases. The trial court ruled for South Lakes after considering extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the unambiguous lease language must be given its plain meaning based solely on the document's text, which requires the other tenants to comply with provisions substantially the same as those in Great Falls' lease.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case arose from an interpleader action filed by Henrico County over $128,464 in currency seized during a drug interdiction stop on an Amtrak train, with competing claims from the County, Amtrak, and arrestee George Ehlers. The trial court excluded statements Ehlers made in custody denying knowledge or ownership of the money, leading to a ruling on entitlement to the funds. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the statements were admissible and relevant because a claimant's denial of ownership can rebut the presumption of entitlement based on prior possession. The court reasoned that such statements created serious doubt about Ehlers' claim, warranting further proceedings to determine ownership among the parties. The matter was remanded for reconsideration of the claims in light of the statements.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

In Ruth v. Fletcher, Ted Fletcher sued Patty Ruth for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that she falsely convinced him he was the father of her child, encouraged him to form a bond and provide support and care, and later revealed through paternity testing that he was not the father, causing him severe distress. A jury awarded Ted $35,000, but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the judgment and entered it for Patty. The court applied the four-element test from Womack v. Eldridge, holding that the record lacked proof that Patty's conduct was intentional or reckless, as there was no evidence she deliberately fostered the relationship to inflict emotional harm later. The decision emphasized that courts must strictly limit such tort claims to avoid speculative or unwarranted recovery for emotional distress.

torts & liabilityfamily law

The case involved Old Dominion Electric Cooperative's appeal from the State Corporation Commission's refusal to reopen the record in Virginia Electric and Power Company's general rate case to consider newly discovered evidence questioning the accuracy of evidence presented by Virginia Power. The Commission had approved rates including a reallocation of capacity costs related to a settlement between the parties, and ODEC sought to introduce a post-hearing letter that allegedly showed inaccuracies. The court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in a technically complex proceeding by declining to reopen for after-acquired evidence under its rules, and that the rates were not unjustly discriminatory based on the record at the time of decision.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two potential buyers, the Landas and Davis, over contracts with an estate executor for the same 17-acre tract of land in Chesterfield County. The Landas had contracted to buy 70 acres plus a right of first refusal on the remaining tract, while Davis had a separate contract for the 17 acres; the trial court found the Landas' contract too indefinite for specific performance and awarded the land to Davis. The appeals court determined that the suits had been tried together but not consolidated into a single proceeding, so the Landas had no standing to appeal the judgment in Davis's case, which was dismissed. On the Landas' own appeal, the court held that the right of first refusal was sufficiently definite to enforce and survived the deed for the initial 70 acres, reversing the trial court and remanding for specific performance to the Landas on the terms of the Davis contract.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Rita French seeking $25,000 in accidental death and dismemberment benefits from Shenandoah Life Insurance after her husband Roy died in a 1984 work-related mining accident while employed by an insured company. The master policy provided only nonoccupational AD&D coverage that excluded work-related deaths, though a defective certificate issued to Roy omitted this limitation. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the master policy alone formed the contract of insurance under state statute, that the certificate was not part of the contract and itself stated it was subject to the policy, and that the claim was therefore properly denied; it reversed the trial court's judgment for Rita and entered final judgment for the insurer.

business & regulatory

In Shea v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, the case involved a lawyer who advanced more than $6,000 of his personal funds to cover a client's living and household expenses while representing the client in a pending personal injury suit, in violation of Disciplinary Rule 5-103(B) prohibiting such financial assistance during litigation. The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board found a violation and imposed a 90-day suspension, which the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that neither ignorance of the rule nor the existence of a common practice among other lawyers excuses a violation, that the rule protects the lawyer's independent professional judgment by avoiding financial conflicts, and that the lawyer's prior disciplinary record constituted aggravating circumstances justifying the suspension over a lesser sanction such as a public reprimand.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether provisions in an uninsured motorist insurance policy requiring the insurer's consent to any settlement with potentially liable parties and preserving the insurer's subrogation rights were valid under Virginia law. The insured settled with one alleged tortfeasor for $35,000 without the insurer's consent, then sought to recover from the insurer on a verdict against an uninsured motorist. The trial court voided the consent-to-settlement and subrogation clauses as impermissible restrictions on recovery beyond what the uninsured motorist statute required. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the clauses validly protect the insurer's statutory subrogation rights under Code § 38.1-381(f), do not conflict with the requirement to prove only legal liability, and are unaffected by the general policy favoring tort settlements since the insurer is not a tortfeasor.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Ronald Bennett's convictions in a jury trial for capital murder of Anne Keller Vaden during the commission of armed robbery, robbery, and breaking and entering her dwelling at night with intent to commit larceny. Bennett received a death sentence for the capital murder based on the vileness predicate, life imprisonment for robbery, and ten years for breaking and entering. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated and reviewed the appeals, including automatic review of the death sentence, and affirmed all convictions and sentences. The court found the evidence, including testimony from Bennett's wife and physical evidence linking him to the scene, sufficient to support the verdicts, identified no trial errors such as in the admission of photographs, and concluded after statutory review that the death sentence was not the result of passion or prejudice and was not excessive or disproportionate to penalties in similar Virginia cases.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Associated Tax Services, Inc. (ATS), a company that assists mortgage lenders with real estate tax payments, requested a computer file containing Norfolk's 1985 real estate tax records (the Master Record) from the city treasurer under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act. The treasurer failed to respond within the required timeframe, did not cite specific exemptions, and denied the request, claiming the records were not covered by the Act, were confidential tax information, or were otherwise exempt; the trial court upheld the denial. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the treasurer violated the Act's procedural requirements and that no statutory exemption applied because the requested data consisted of public assessment information, such as property values, ownership, and tax amounts, that must be disclosed. The court ordered production of the records and remanded the case for consideration of attorneys' fees and costs.

proceduretaxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a mother suing Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church and its pastor after their employee, who had a prior conviction for aggravated sexual assault on a child and was on probation barring contact with minors, repeatedly raped and assaulted her ten-year-old daughter at and away from the church; the suit alleged negligent hiring, supervision, and failure to warn. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer on grounds that no actionable duty or cause of action existed in Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed only as to the negligent hiring count, holding that Virginia recognizes an independent tort of negligent hiring based on precedents such as Davis v. Merrill, under which an employer may be liable for placing an unfit person in a role posing unreasonable risk of harm to others, without requiring the misconduct to fall within the scope of employment as in respondeat superior. The court noted that the plaintiff had abandoned the other counts by failing to brief or argue them.

criminal lawtorts & liability

This case involved Harry Alward, who operated a trash collection business from his property at 5635 Leesburg Pike and sought a permit from Fairfax County, which was denied due to zoning violations for maintaining a junk yard and storing vehicles. The county's Board of Supervisors and zoning administrator filed a cross-bill seeking an injunction to stop these uses, while Alward's suit to compel the permit was denied by the trial court, which also refused the full injunction. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the zoning administrator could enforce violations discovered through the permit application via a cross-bill in the existing suit, as statutes grant broad authority to remedy zoning breaches without requiring separate actions or prior formal determinations beyond the notices given.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Joyce Grubbs sued gastroenterologist Dr. Marion Rice and surgeon Dr. John Rawls, alleging that negligent surgery on June 16, 1982, and subsequent post-operative care through November 1982 for Rice and July 1982 for Rawls caused her condition to worsen, requiring corrective surgery in May 1983. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers and statute of limitations pleas, dismissing the action. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that under the continuing treatment doctrine the two-year personal injury limitations period began to run at the end of each doctor's treatment, making the June 1984 notices timely, and that the notices reasonably described the claims, including post-operative negligence, as required by Code § 8.01-581.2(A).

torts & liabilityprocedure