Henry H. Whiting

The case concerned the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that shortened the tolling period for medical malpractice tort claims brought by minors compared to other infant tort claims. Plaintiff Taylor Willis, injured at age 15 by alleged malpractice in 1995, sued after reaching majority more than two years later; defendants raised the statute of limitations, and Willis argued the special rule violated due process, equal protection, and the ban on special laws. The trial court sustained the pleas, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that rational-basis review applied because no fundamental right was implicated. The court reasoned that the classification bore a reasonable relation to legitimate purposes of relieving an insurance availability crisis and eliminating stale infant malpractice claims.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

This case concerned a widow's claims against her late husband's estate for an elective share of the estate, a family allowance, and exempt property under Virginia statutes, which the executor opposed based on an antenuptial agreement executed before the marriage. The trial court granted summary judgment to the executor, ruling that the agreement waived the wife's rights to these claims, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court applied standard contract interpretation rules to the agreement's provisions stating that each party's separately owned or acquired property would remain individual and that their rights to each other's property acquired by operation of law would be fixed solely by the agreement. It concluded that the unambiguous language covered the statutory spousal rights at issue, which arise by operation of law upon death, without needing additional express references to death or estates.

family lawproperty

This case involved a lawsuit by Deborah L. Bean against her former attorney Marjorie A. O'Connell alleging professional negligence, actual and constructive fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty stemming from O'Connell's representation of Bean in a Virginia divorce action. Bean served process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth under the long-arm statute but obtained a default judgment on liability when O'Connell did not respond, followed by a jury award of compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment, ruling that the service was invalid because the affidavit failed to include O'Connell's last known address as required by Code § 8.01-329, so the court lacked personal jurisdiction and the default orders were void. The court further held that punitive damages could not be awarded because the fiduciary breach and constructive fraud claims arose from the implied terms of the parties' contract rather than an independent willful tort.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Livingston Pritchett, III, who was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and related firearm offenses after confessing to killing Estel Darnell Singleton, Sr. Pritchett challenged the trial court's exclusion of expert psychological testimony regarding his mental retardation (IQ of 69), limited communication skills, and susceptibility to suggestive police questioning, arguing it affected the reliability of his confession. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that while one portion of the expert testimony improperly commented on the veracity of the confession and was correctly excluded, the balance of the testimony on the defendant's mental disorder and its hypothetical effects should have been admitted as it did not invade the jury's role. The court reversed in part, finding the error was not harmless, and remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Barrett v. Commonwealth, the defendant appealed his convictions for operating a vehicle as a habitual offender and assaulting a police officer, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike a prospective juror for cause. The juror was the brother of a police officer who testified for the Commonwealth, and during voir dire the juror gave equivocal answers about whether he would give greater weight to his brother's testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion because the family relationship and the circumstances made it unlikely that the public would have confidence in the integrity of the jury selection process. The judgments were reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved consolidated personal injury suits brought by two children who were scalded by hot tea served at a religious ceremony hosted by a Hindu organization known as Rajdhani Mandir. The plaintiffs sued the catering restaurant Mehak, Inc. and its co-owners, who had provided the food and service without charge as a donation; the defendants raised pleas in bar asserting charitable immunity. The trial court sustained the pleas after finding that the defendants were engaged in the charity's work without compensation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the restaurant and its owners were not entitled to the charity's immunity because they were acting on behalf of the restaurant in making its donation rather than as agents or servants directly performing the charity's work, consistent with precedents in Moore v. Warren and Mooring v. Virginia Wesleyan College.

torts & liabilityreligious liberty

The case involved Linda K. Avery appealing the Virginia Retirement System's denial of disability benefits to the circuit court under the Administrative Process Act after VRS issued a final decision. VRS contended that the appeal was not properly perfected and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Avery did not request or achieve formal service of her petition for appeal on the agency secretary within the 30-day period specified by Rule 2A:4. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the rulings of the Court of Appeals and circuit court, holding that timely filing of the notice of appeal and petition perfected the appeal and conferred subject matter jurisdiction, while any service defects were cured by Code § 8.01-288. The court reasoned that the APA rules do not treat proper service as a jurisdictional prerequisite or condition precedent, unlike certain statutory limits, and that Rule 2:4's one-year period for service applies via Rule 2A:5.

procedure

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit brought by Bruce Ray Pfeifer, an employee of a subcontractor on a condominium construction project, against Krauss Construction Company, another subcontractor, after Pfeifer was injured when a gas cap blew off a line being tested by Krauss. Pfeifer sued at common law, but Krauss argued that the claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act because Krauss was Pfeifer's statutory co-employee. The trial court agreed with Krauss and dismissed the action. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Krauss was engaged in work that was part of the owner's trade, business, or occupation of constructing the condominiums, making it a statutory employer under Code § 65.2-302, and thus the workers' compensation remedy was exclusive.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved eminent domain proceedings in which the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner sought to acquire a parcel of land owned by the Russells in Lee County. At trial, the court permitted the Commonwealth to cross-examine the Russells' expert appraiser about his firm's prior tax assessment valuation of the same property at a much lower per-acre amount, allowing it as impeachment evidence. The Virginia Supreme Court held that this was error, ruling that tax assessment valuations are generally inadmissible to impeach an expert's condemnation appraisal. The core reasoning was that tax valuations incorporate uniformity and equality considerations under the Virginia Constitution, whereas condemnation valuations are based solely on fair market value without regard to those factors, so the two do not present inconsistent statements bearing on credibility.

propertyproceduretaxes

This case concerned whether Warner Athey's daily 'Adventure Cruises' boat operation in the Chesapeake Bay and Atlantic Ocean, which allowed passengers to observe wildlife, fish, boats, and navigational markers, required him to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity as a 'sight-seeing carrier by boat' under Code §§ 46.2-2600 through -2610. The trial court ruled in Athey's favor in a declaratory judgment action, finding that his cruises did not qualify because they did not involve pointing out historical sites or following fixed regular routes. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the plain meaning of 'sight-seeing' encompasses observation of moving objects on or in the water and that the statutory requirement for regular routes applies only to the contents of a certificate, not to the definition of the regulated activity. The court therefore declared that Athey's business is subject to the regulatory provisions, which carry misdemeanor penalties for violations.

business & regulatory

This case concerned whether delays in Wayne Lenardo Heath's trial for first-degree murder violated Virginia's speedy trial statute, Code § 19.2-243, which requires discharge from prosecution if an incarcerated defendant is not tried within five months after a probable cause finding. Heath was held continuously from his March 20, 1997 preliminary hearing until his October 15, 1997 trial, exceeding the five-month period by 56 days, and he moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The circuit court denied the motion, convicted Heath, and sentenced him to 69 years and five months; the Court of Appeals affirmed en banc. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that two periods were tolled under Code § 19.2-243(4): 40 days from Heath's August 1 motion for a competency examination, which implicitly requested a continuance, and 27 days from the September 18 trial date setting to which he did not object, constituting acquiescence in a continuance. Subtracting these 67 chargeable days from the total custody period showed that Heath was tried within the statutory limit.

criminal lawprocedure

In Waterman v. Halverson, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit in Virginia circuit court, obtained a nonsuit more than a year after filing without serving process on the defendants, and then refiled the identical action within six months of the nonsuit. The trial court dismissed the refiled case as time-barred, construing Code § 8.01-275.1 to restrict the original court's jurisdiction to only determining due diligence for service and to preclude entry of a nonsuit. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded, holding that the statute merely codified Rule 3:3(c) without altering prior case law such as Clark v. Butler Aviation, which permitted a nonsuit even absent service and allowed the refiled action to benefit from tolling provisions.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

In Coleman v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted in a single trial of malicious wounding, attempted murder, robbery, and related firearm offenses arising from an armed robbery and multiple shootings of the same victim, and he received consecutive sentences totaling 46 years. The defendant argued on appeal that the convictions for malicious wounding and attempted murder violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because his actions formed a single continuous course of conduct and because attempted murder is a lesser-included offense of malicious wounding. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, applying the Blockburger test to conclude that the two offenses are distinct because malicious wounding does not require proof of specific intent to kill, an element necessary for attempted murder, and therefore multiple punishments were permissible even assuming a continuous act.

criminal law

The case involved Jon Douglas Alexander, who was convicted of brandishing a firearm under Virginia Code § 18.2-282 after he retrieved and held an unloaded rifle during a confrontation with a lienholder's agent attempting to repossess his vehicle. Alexander argued that he brandished the weapon in reasonable defense of his personal property, but the trial court refused jury instructions on that defense while allowing one for self-defense. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, but the Virginia Supreme Court reinstated it, holding that an owner of personal property has no right to assert or defend possessory rights by the use or threat of deadly force. The court reasoned that brandishing a deadly weapon constitutes an assault, and longstanding precedent prohibits the use of such force to protect property, as it risks escalating to harm over a comparatively slight wrong.

criminal lawpropertyguns

The case involved Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Roanoke challenging Botetourt County's local tangible personal property tax assessment on its vending machines, coolers, and fountain equipment. The taxpayer argued that the items were used in its manufacturing business and thus classified as intangible personal property taxable only by the state under Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2). The trial court ruled against the taxpayer, finding the equipment was used in a separate sales business subject to local taxation, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that the company's sales activities constituted a distinct business from manufacturing, and the plain language of the statute did not extend the manufacturing classification to equipment used merely to sell finished products. The decision turned on the distinction between manufacturing and sales functions under Virginia tax statutes.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved an appeal from a sanctions award against attorney Robert H. Smallenberg and his firm Ayers & Stolte, P.C., for filing a legal malpractice action against John F. Deal and his firm. The underlying suit, assigned to Cardinal Holding Company by the Jarrett estate, claimed over $24 million in damages for Deal's prior representation of Alvin Jarrett and his executors, but the assignment violated Virginia law prohibiting assignment of legal malpractice claims, and the pleadings were filed without the Jarretts' consent and with other procedural defects including delayed service. The trial court imposed sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1 after finding the claims unwarranted, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the statute permits recovery of fees and expenses incurred both in defending the claim and in pursuing sanctions, that the award was not punitive damages requiring proof of malice, and that the evidence supported the sanctions for violating the requirement that pleadings be well-grounded in fact and law.

proceduretorts & liability

In Bray v. Brown, the Virginia Supreme Court considered whether a Prince William County deputy sheriff could simultaneously hold an appointed seat on the Town Council of Dumfries, given Article VII, § 6 of the Virginia Constitution and Code § 15.2-1534, both of which restrict multiple public officeholding. The circuit court ruled against the deputy sheriff, but the Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment declaring that he could serve in both roles. The court held that the constitutional language is unambiguous and applies only to the specific offices expressly named (such as sheriff and town council member), without extending to deputies; it further concluded that the statute, enacted pursuant to that provision, could not validly impose broader disqualifications.

elections

The case involved a high school student who sued a school board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after a teacher secretly videotaped her and other female track team members in various stages of undress in the locker room. A jury awarded the student compensatory damages against the board, but the board appealed the judgment. The court reversed the judgment against the school board and entered final judgment in its favor, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the board's prior actions reflected deliberate indifference to the risk of a constitutional violation, as required to show the board caused the deprivation of the student's federal rights under precedents like Bryan County v. Brown. The court noted that while the board might have been negligent, that alone does not meet the stringent standard for municipal liability under § 1983.

civil rightstorts & liability

The case concerned whether the City of Alexandria's charter authorized a zoning ordinance amendment requiring special use permits for any intensification or change in grandfathered restaurant uses that had been operating without permits since before 1979. The trial court declared the relevant provisions void under Dillon's Rule as exceeding the city's authority. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the city had the power to enact the amendments. The court reasoned that the charter's grant of authority to regulate and terminate nonconforming uses necessarily included the lesser power to regulate grandfathered uses by requiring permits for expansions or intensifications, and that property owners had no vested right in the continuation of their prior zoning status.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved disciplinary proceedings by the Virginia State Bar against attorney Sa'ad El-Amin, alleging multiple violations of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility in his handling of matters for three clients, including failures to communicate, promptly refund unearned fees, maintain proper records, and avoid conflicts. A three-judge circuit court found 15 violations across nine rules and suspended El-Amin's law license for four years. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia conducted an independent review of the full record, treating the lower court's factual findings as prima facie correct, and concluded that the evidence supported the violations and established a pattern of misconduct. The court also rejected El-Amin's arguments regarding mitigating factors and affirmed the four-year suspension as within the trial court's discretion.

procedurebusiness & regulatory