
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. State
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-03-09 · cited 39×
The case concerned a 1993 Washington statute that amended the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act to allow the Supreme Court to designate the Washington State Bar Association as a public employer subject to collective bargaining, after the Court had declined to amend its General Rule 12 to require such bargaining. The Bar Association challenged the statute's constitutionality. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, ruling that it violated the separation of powers doctrine by encroaching on the judiciary's exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law and control the Bar Association through court rules. The Court explained that the Bar Association functions as an arm of the judiciary under GR 12, and the Legislature could not directly override or conflict with the Court's rulemaking power in this area, even while acknowledging the statute's encouragement of collective bargaining.
labor & employmentprocedure
State v. Lough
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-02-23 · cited 287×
The case involved defendant Lynn Roderick Lough, a paramedic convicted by jury of attempted second degree rape, indecent liberties, and first degree burglary after an incident in which complainant P.A. alleged he drugged her drink during a date and sexually assaulted her while she was incapacitated. Lough denied the allegations, claiming the encounter was consensual, and appealed his convictions on the ground that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from four other women who described similar prior incidents in which he had allegedly surreptitiously drugged and sexually assaulted them. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that evidence of the other incidents was admissible under the common scheme or plan exception to show that the charged acts were manifestations of a larger design rather than to prove propensity, and that the trial court properly weighed relevance against prejudice while instructing the jury on the limited purpose of the evidence.
criminal law
State v. Vangerpen
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-02-09 · cited 277×
This case concerns the validity of amending a criminal charging document after the state has rested its case. The defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder arising from an incident with a police officer, but the information omitted the essential element of premeditation; after the state rested, the trial court allowed an amendment to add that element over defense objection, resulting in a conviction. The court held that the state may not amend a charging document post-rest to charge a different or greater crime unless the amendment is to a lesser degree or lesser included offense, because the federal and state constitutions require that the accused be informed of all essential elements of the charged crime to prepare a defense. The conviction was reversed and the charge dismissed without prejudice to refiling, based on the essential elements rule and precedent prohibiting such amendments.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Gentry
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-01-25 · cited 498×
This case involved the conviction and death sentence of defendant Jonathan Lee Gentry for the 1988 murder of a 12-year-old girl in Kitsap County, Washington, after she was found beaten to death with evidence including blood on the defendant's shoes and hairs consistent with his family. Gentry appealed on multiple grounds, including challenges to the admission of forensic evidence, jury instructions, the use of victim impact evidence, and constitutional claims under state and federal due process and cruel punishment provisions. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, holding that the trial court properly admitted scientific testing results linking the bloodstains to the victim, that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, and that sentencing procedures complied with statutory and constitutional requirements for capital cases. The court reasoned that prior precedents allowed rebuttal evidence in mitigation phases and that victims' rights amendments did not violate the defendant's due process protections.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
State v. Maxfield
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-12-08 · cited 108×
The case concerned defendants Mark and Pamela Maxfield's convictions in Clallam and Jefferson Counties for manufacturing a controlled substance and possessing it with intent to deliver, based on evidence from two marijuana grow operations discovered after a public utility district employee reported unusually high electricity usage at one residence. The defendants moved to suppress evidence obtained from PUD records and an on-site investigation, arguing violations of RCW 42.17.314, which restricts law enforcement requests for utility records without a written statement of suspected crime, and also challenged their multiple convictions under double jeopardy principles. The court held that the PUD employee's voluntary disclosure and subsequent record inspection complied with the statute because no improper request preceded the information, the private investigator's observations were lawful, and the search warrant was valid. On the sentencing issue, the court applied the Blockburger test to conclude that the manufacture and possession-with-intent convictions punished distinct offenses with separate criminal intents, allowing multiple punishments in a single proceeding without violating double jeopardy.
criminal lawprocedure
Buechel v. Department of Ecology
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-11-10 · cited 95×
This case concerned a landowner's application for a shoreline substantial development permit and variance to construct a residence on an undersized waterfront lot on Hood Canal that was mostly underwater and failed to meet minimum lot size and setback requirements under the Mason County Shoreline Master Program. The Department of Ecology denied the variance, the Shorelines Hearings Board upheld the denial, the superior court reversed, and the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Board's decision. The court held that the Board's denial was neither clearly erroneous under the Shoreline Management Act nor arbitrary or capricious, because the lot did not satisfy the threshold variance criteria, the owner had purchased the property with knowledge of the restrictions, and granting relief would undermine the Act's policies protecting shorelines of statewide significance. The decision turned on administrative review standards under the former APA and the self-created nature of any hardship.
environmentproperty