In Re the Stay of Proceedings Against Johns-Manville Corp.
Washington Supreme Court · 2009-06-04 · cited 14×
This case involved approximately 400 asbestos exposure lawsuits against multiple defendants, including Johns-Manville and Unarco, which had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, triggering an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Lower courts had issued stays extending to the bankrupt defendants' codefendants, either automatically or for six months, and the Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether the bankruptcy stay applied to codefendants and whether the bankrupt entities were necessary and indispensable parties under CR 19. The court held that the automatic stay applies only to the debtor and does not extend to codefendants, and that the bankrupt defendants were not indispensable parties because joint tortfeasors can be sued separately under principles of joint and several liability. The decision relied on the text of the Bankruptcy Code, rulings from the bankruptcy courts, and CR 19(b) factors emphasizing that defendants' concerns about multiple litigation are inherent to joint and several liability. The court vacated the stay orders and remanded for further proceedings.
proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Powell
Washington Supreme Court · 2004-08-01 · cited 121×
This case involved consolidated personal restraint petitions by inmates serving pre-1984 mandatory life sentences for first-degree murder, who challenged the constitutionality of SHB 1457, a 1989 Washington statute requiring minimum terms roughly conforming to Sentencing Reform Act criteria for parole eligibility determinations. The court held that the statute did not violate the ex post facto clauses when applied to inmates not certified as parolable before its effective date, but did violate those clauses for inmates who had been so certified, and further held that requiring prosecutors to provide updated recommendations inconsistent with prior plea agreements violated due process. Petitioners' equal protection and other due process claims were not sustained. The court therefore denied Powell's petition entirely, granted Halstien's and Forsman's petitions only to remedy the plea-agreement violations, and granted Thompson's petition in full to apply pre-SHB 1457 law to his parole date. The reasoning centered on whether the statutory changes substantively disadvantaged the prisoners by altering parole criteria retroactively, with distinctions based on certification status and contractual plea terms.
criminal lawprocedure
Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-07-20 · cited 306×
This case concerned whether comprehensive general liability insurance policies covered cleanup costs for groundwater contamination caused by leaks from waste disposal pits on property owned by Queen City Farms, where hazardous materials from industrial sources like Boeing had been deposited over decades. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed that coverage existed under one insurer's policies, determined that factual issues remained regarding coverage under the other policies due to interpretations of pollution exclusion clauses, and rejected the insurers' defenses based on alleged misrepresentations by the insured. The core reasoning involved construing ambiguous terms like "sudden" in the pollution exclusions in favor of the insured, finding that the discharges were not expected, and concluding that the insurers had not proven any material misrepresentations.
environmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability
State v. Ritchie
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-05-11 · cited 160×
This case consolidated appeals from three defendants sentenced above the standard range under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) after convictions for serious offenses. The Washington Supreme Court granted review limited to the length of the exceptional sentences and affirmed each one. Defendants argued that courts should be required to state reasons for a sentence's specific length and to apply proportionality tests comparing it to similar cases, average sentences for the crime or more serious crimes, and the midpoint of the standard range. The court rejected these limits, holding that the SRA requires reasons only for imposing an exceptional sentence (not its length), directs consideration of the Act's purposes solely at the trial court level, and restricts appellate review under RCW 9.94A.210(4) to an abuse-of-discretion inquiry into whether the sentence is clearly excessive.
criminal law
State v. Hobble
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-04-13 · cited 65×
In State v. Hobble, the appellant, who had pleaded guilty to attempted burglary and agreed to testify against his co-defendant in exchange for favorable sentencing and no additional charges, refused to answer questions about his prior statement to police during the co-defendant's trial, asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination despite the court's ruling that the plea agreement provided sufficient immunity. The trial court held him in contempt and imposed a 30-day sentence. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the immunity protected the appellant from any jeopardy, making the privilege claim invalid, and that the direct contempt was properly punished summarily without a jury trial under statutory authority and the court's inherent powers.
criminal lawprocedure
Berg v. Ting
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-01-05 · cited 72×
This case involved neighboring waterfront property owners in Seattle disputing the validity of an easement across one parcel for access and utilities. The Bergs had withdrawn opposition to a short plat subdivision in exchange for the easement from the prior owners of the Ting property, but the written grant described the easement areas only by reference to a future-approved subdivision plat rather than fixed legal descriptions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Tings, ruling the grant failed to satisfy the statute of frauds and was unenforceable. The Court of Appeals reversed on part performance grounds, but the Washington Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that the easement description was too indefinite to meet the statute of frauds and that part performance could not enforce it absent clear and unequivocal evidence of the agreement's terms.
property
State v. Silva-Baltazar
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-12-15 · cited 71×
The case involved the convictions of Jose Silva-Baltazar and Antonio Mendoza for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, where the jury found the offense occurred within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop, leading to doubled sentences under RCW 69.50.435. The Washington Supreme Court addressed whether that statute defines a separate offense or a sentencing enhancement, and whether the enhancement applies to accomplices. The court held that RCW 69.50.435 is a penalty enhancement rather than a separate crime and that it applies to accomplices who are themselves present in a drug-free zone at the time of the offense. The reasoning centered on the statute's text, which ties the increased penalty to any person who commits the underlying drug violation in specified locations, and on precedent establishing that accomplice liability for enhancements requires the accomplice's own qualifying conduct.
criminal law
Inter Island Telephone Co. v. San Juan County
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-11-22 · cited 14×
The case involved Inter Island Telephone Company, a single-county regulated utility, which sued San Juan County for a refund of personal property taxes after its operating property was assessed at 100 percent of fair market value. The trial court ruled that this assessment violated the state constitution's uniformity requirement because other personal property in the county was assessed at rates 22 to 36 percent below market value, and it ordered reassessment and a refund for the years 1989-1992. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the constitutional mandate of uniform taxation on the same class of property applies regardless of whether the state Department of Revenue or the county assessor performs the valuation. The court rejected the county's argument that intra-county and inter-county utilities could be treated as separate classes based solely on differing assessment jurisdictions, emphasizing that uniformity is the paramount requirement under Const. art. 7, § 1 (amend. 81).
taxesproperty
Timberline Air Service, Inc. v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-11-22 · cited 87×
The case concerned a products liability claim arising from a 1989 helicopter crash during civilian logging operations, where the pilot lost control after failure of a gearbox component in a former military UH-1L helicopter manufactured by Bell in 1969 under government contract specifications. Timberline alleged Bell failed to provide post-manufacture warnings about risks from repetitive heavy-lift use, despite knowing of such dangers and issuing warnings for civilian equivalents. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bell on the postmanufacture failure-to-warn claim under the federal common law government contractor defense. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither RCW 7.72.050(2) nor the federal defense applied, because compliance with design specifications created no conflict with a state-law duty to warn and the claim did not implicate the government's discretionary functions.
torts & liabilityfederal power
State v. Krall
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-10-20 · cited 139×
The case concerned whether a trial court could order restitution in a criminal case more than 60 days after sentencing under a statute stating that the court 'shall' determine the restitution amount at the sentencing hearing or within sixty days. The court reversed the restitution order, holding that the trial court lacked authority to impose it after the deadline. The core reasoning was that 'shall' is presumptively mandatory, the statute distinguishes between 'shall' and 'may' to indicate different meanings, and legislative history shows the 60-day extension was added intentionally from an original requirement to set restitution at sentencing.
criminal lawprocedure
KEY TRONIC CORPORATION, INC. v. Aetna (CIGNA) Fire Underwriters Ins. Co.
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-09-09 · cited 82×
The case concerned whether insurance policies covered Key Tronic Corporation's liabilities for groundwater contamination from its disposal of hazardous chemical wastes at the Colbert landfill between 1975 and 1980, which led to third-party lawsuits and a CERCLA cleanup consent decree requiring Key Tronic to pay $4.2 million. The trial court granted summary judgment to six insurers, ruling that the policies' pollution exclusion clauses barred coverage as a matter of law for the intentional discharge of wastes. The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the pollution exclusions did not preclude coverage as a matter of law and directing further analysis under the framework from Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Co. regarding whether the polluting events were expected or intended.
environmentbusiness & regulatory
Evans v. Thompson
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-09-01 · cited 23×
This case arose after two employees of Santana Trucking & Excavating died from methane gas while inspecting a drain system on real property owned by the corporation's shareholders and officers, Robert and Amber Thompson. Their widows sued the Thompsons individually as landowners, alleging breach of duties regarding a concealed ultrahazardous condition on the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that the Industrial Insurance Act barred the claims because the Thompsons and decedents were in the same employ, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the defendants as individuals constitute a separate legal entity from the corporate employer and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the Thompsons were coemployees and whether they breached duties owed as landowners. The court reasoned that the third-party liability statute, RCW 51.24.030(1), permits such actions against those not in the same employ, and facts about the Thompsons' separate ownership, tax treatment, and lack of duties supported allowing the suit to proceed.
labor & employmenttorts & liabilityproperty
Walker v. Munro
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-08-29 · cited 175×
The case involved petitioners, including advocacy groups, legislators, and citizens, seeking a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunction against state officials to block implementation of Initiative 601, a voter-approved measure limiting state expenditures, tax revenues, and fee increases under the Washington constitution. The initiative's core provisions, including expenditure limits tied to inflation and population growth, an emergency reserve fund, supermajority legislative votes for tax increases, and voter approval requirements, were set to take effect in 1995, with only limited sections on fees and taxes effective immediately. The court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss the action. It held that challenges to the non-effective provisions were not ripe for review, while claims regarding the immediate sections failed to satisfy requirements for mandamus or justiciability, as the petitioners could not demonstrate a present duty or harm warranting extraordinary relief.
electionstaxes
Havens v. C & D PLASTICS, INC.
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-08-22 · cited 244×
This case involved an employee, LaMar Havens, who was hired by C&D Plastics under an oral agreement to set up and manage a new division and was terminated after four months amid disputes over hiring and operations decisions. Havens sued for breach of an implied one-year employment contract, promissory estoppel, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and negligent misrepresentation, among other claims. The trial court dismissed the public policy and negligent misrepresentation claims, refused a proposed jury instruction on just cause for high-ranking employees, and excluded certain diary entries; the jury awarded damages on the contract claim. On appeal, the court held there was no error in the jury instructions or evidentiary ruling, insufficient evidence supported the promissory estoppel claim, and the dismissals were proper, while affirming the contract award but remanding for recalculation of attorney fees. The Court of Appeals decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
labor & employmentprocedure
Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-07-21 · cited 52×
In Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell, three residential developers sued the City of Bothell for a refund of approximately $106,000 in park-impact mitigation fees ($400 per lot) that the City had required as a condition of preliminary plat approval in 1986 and 1987 under RCW 82.02.020. The developers filed suit in 1989, more than 30 days after plat approval. The trial court found the fees unauthorized because the agreements were not voluntary, the City had not identified any direct impacts from the developments on the park system, and no capital improvements were agreed upon to mitigate such impacts; it therefore applied the three-year statute of limitations for refund of illegal taxes or fees and ordered repayment with interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the claims barred by a 30-day limitation in the platting statute (RCW 58.17.180) and by estoppel. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court, ruling that the fees were an illegal tax or charge because they failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for voluntary mitigation agreements, so the three-year limitation period applied and the fees must be refunded.
business & regulatorypropertyproceduretaxes
Rice v. Dow Chemical Co.
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-07-07 · cited 122×
The case involved personal injury claims by a former U.S. Forest Service employee and his wife against Dow Chemical Company, alleging that exposure to herbicides manufactured by Dow in Oregon during 1959-1963 caused the plaintiff's chronic lymphocytic leukemia; the claims included failure to warn and inadequate instructions. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the failure-to-warn claims on FIFRA preemption grounds and later dismissed the entire action after determining that Oregon law governed and that Oregon's product liability statute of repose and two-year statute of limitations barred the suit. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal under Oregon law, holding that Oregon had the most significant relationship to the action given that the exposure occurred there while the plaintiff worked in Oregon, and that the repose period (eight years from purchase) and limitation period (two years from discovery) extinguished the claims, without addressing the federal preemption issue. The court rejected arguments that Washington law should apply based solely on the plaintiff's later residency and noted that foreign law could be raised with reasonable notice rather than in initial pleadings.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-05-26 · cited 68×
This case involved an appeal by Pierce County and landfill developers from a superior court ruling that invalidated a conditional use permit for a proposed municipal solid waste landfill on a 317-acre site in unincorporated Pierce County. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the hearing examiner violated Pierce County Code 2.36.090 by denying the Weyerhaeusers the right to cross-examine county staff, that the examiner's findings and conclusions were inadequate as a matter of law, and that the project's environmental impact statement was also inadequate. The court further ruled that while the project sufficiently conformed to the county's comprehensive land use plan, the record failed to establish compliance with mandatory criteria in the Tacoma-Pierce County Solid Waste Management Plan. These procedural and substantive deficiencies required reversal of the permit approval and dismissal of the environmental appeals.
environmentpropertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Lynott v. National Union Fire Insurance
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-03-31 · cited 122×
The case involved directors and officers of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company who sought coverage under a Directors and Officers Liability insurance policy issued by National Union for claims arising from the sale of company stock to 21 investors in early 1985. National Union denied coverage and refused to defend, citing an exclusion in endorsement 12 for claims arising out of any acquisition involving the insured. The trial court granted summary judgment to National Union based on the exclusion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court held that the term "acquisition" was ambiguous under the policy language and that extrinsic evidence did not demonstrate a mutual intent to exclude this specific stock transaction, requiring the exclusion to be construed strictly against the insurer.
business & regulatory
Ingersoll v. DeBartolo, Inc.
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-03-17 · cited 66×
The case involved a plaintiff who slipped and fell in the common area of a shopping mall, suing the mall owner and the janitorial service provider for failing to maintain safe premises. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, which the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to present evidence of the defendants' actual or constructive notice of the hazard, and the exception to the notice requirement for certain self-service operations did not apply to the mall's common areas. Additionally, there was insufficient evidence regarding the janitorial company's standard of care or duty owed to the plaintiff.
torts & liabilityproperty
State v. Hill
Washington Supreme Court · 1994-03-17 · cited 742×
The case concerned whether evidence of cocaine found in a defendant's sweatpants was admissible when police seized it while executing a premises search warrant for narcotics at another person's home. The defendant, found naked in the bedroom, asked for his pants, which an officer picked up from the floor, patted down, and searched, discovering the drugs; he was convicted after the trial court denied his suppression motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling the search was an impermissible search of the defendant's person rather than the premises. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding based on unchallenged findings that the sweatpants were not intimately connected to the defendant and thus were searchable as part of the premises under the warrant. The court also addressed the standard of review for factual findings in suppression hearings.
criminal lawprocedure