Tom Chambers

The case involved a civil lawsuit between Business Services of America II, Inc. and WaferTech LLC stemming from a 1998 construction contract dispute, in which most claims were dismissed but one lien foreclosure claim was remanded for trial in 2004. After the case remained largely inactive for years, BSA noted it for trial in June 2009, prompting WaferTech to move for dismissal for want of prosecution under CR 41(b)(1). The trial court granted dismissal, but the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court held that CR 41(b)(1) mandates that an action shall not be dismissed if noted for trial before the dismissal hearing, with the rule's plain language limiting the trial court's discretion except in cases of other unacceptable litigation practices beyond mere inaction.

procedure

The case concerned whether the city of Auburn could prosecute Dustin Gauntt in municipal court for violating state statutes on marijuana possession and drug paraphernalia when the city had not adopted those statutes by reference into its municipal code. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the charges, holding that municipalities lack authority to enforce state criminal laws without first incorporating them into local ordinances. The court's reasoning centered on the limited jurisdiction of municipal courts, which is confined to violations of local penal ordinances or properly adopted state laws, and on statutory provisions such as RCW 35.21.180 and RCW 39.34.180 that require explicit adoption or interlocal agreements for cities to handle such prosecutions. The opinion reviewed the historical division of authority between counties and municipalities and rejected arguments that cities could directly charge under state law without these steps.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether plaintiffs in a personal injury lawsuit arising from a car collision could recover attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250-.300 by making settlement offers of under $10,000 before a trial de novo after losing in mandatory arbitration. The Washington Supreme Court held that the statute requires such offers to be made at least 10 days before the initial hearing—whether that is an arbitration or a trial—and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to fees because their offers came after the arbitration decision. The court reasoned that the two attorney fee schemes must be harmonized, with RCW 4.84.250-.300 designed to encourage prompt settlement of small claims before the original proceeding begins, while RCW 7.06.050-.060 separately penalizes unsuccessful appeals from arbitration. The Court of Appeals decision denying fees was affirmed.

procedure

This case concerned a personal restraint petition filed by Joshua Dean Scott challenging his 2004 sentence, which included firearm enhancements based on a jury's deadly weapon special verdict rather than an explicit firearm finding, following the U.S. Supreme Court's Blakely decision and subsequent Washington rulings. The court addressed two issues: whether verdict forms could be consulted to assess if a judgment and sentence is valid on its face (thus subject to the one-year limit on collateral attacks under RCW 10.73.090) and whether the rule from State v. Recuenco III applies retroactively to final cases. It concluded that courts may review verdict forms to determine facial validity but that Recuenco III established a new rule that does not apply retroactively, rendering the petition time-barred. The core reasoning rested on the statutory time bar for collateral challenges and precedents limiting retroactivity of sentencing rule changes, leading the court to reverse the Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition.

criminal lawprocedureguns

This case involved a class action by Kevin Dolan and other employees of nonprofit public defender organizations contracted by King County to provide indigent criminal defense services. The plaintiffs sought enrollment in the state's Public Employees Retirement System (PERS), arguing that the organizations had become so controlled by the county that their workers qualified as county employees under RCW 41.40.010(12). The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in favor of the class, holding that the employees were entitled to PERS benefits. The court reasoned that decades of evolving contractual requirements, budgetary oversight, operational directives, and termination provisions had transformed the organizations into agencies of the county rather than independent contractors. It applied both statutory definitions and common law principles of control and dependence to reach this conclusion.

labor & employmentcriminal law

In State v. Robinson, the defendant entered a guilty plea to reduced charges after plea negotiations that focused on his offender score and sentencing range, based on his reasonable but mistaken belief that his pre-1994 juvenile convictions had washed out and would not be included. After learning that changes in Washington sentencing law meant those convictions would increase his offender score and sentencing range, Robinson moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Robinson's misunderstanding rendered the plea unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court's decision was within its sound discretion under the circumstances and reinstated the order allowing withdrawal of the plea. The core reasoning centered on the defendant's reasonable reliance on prior advice about his criminal history and the focus of negotiations on sentencing consequences.

criminal lawprocedure