Edward M. Connelly

The case involved a pedestrian, Mrs. Ferguson, who was struck by a city bus at an intersection in Seattle and brought a personal injury action against the city. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict in her favor, but the majority of the state supreme court reversed. The dissenting opinion contended that the evidence, including the husband's testimony as interpreted by the trial judge showing she was in the marked crosswalk, medical evidence of memory loss supporting a presumption of due care, and circumstantial evidence from the condition of her shoes and stockings, indicated she had the right of way under traffic statutes and that negligence questions were properly for the jury to resolve in her favor.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a widow seeking industrial compensation benefits after her husband was injured on November 12, 1942, in an extrahazardous job and died on December 4, 1942. The Department of Labor and Industries applied the compensation schedule from the law in effect at the time of the injury rather than a later amendment effective December 3, 1942, which provided higher payments. The superior court initially entered a default judgment for the plaintiff using the new rates but later vacated it and ruled in favor of the department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendment applies only prospectively to injuries occurring after its effective date, consistent with prior precedent, and that vacating the default was proper given the department's meritorious defense.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned the constitutionality under the state constitution of a statute creating an interstate cooperation commission to allow state officials to work with counterparts in other states on matters of shared governmental interest. The court held the statute invalid. In this opinion concurring in the dissent, the justice noted that twenty-eight other states had established similar commissions, stressed that the legislation served a beneficial purpose of promoting efficient interstate cooperation without regard to salary or staffing details, and explained that judges may not invalidate an act unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of its unconstitutionality.

federal power

This case concerns Colonel Robert V. Laughlin's petition for a writ of certiorari seeking admission to the Washington State Bar without examination, based on his U.S. Army legal experience including work in the Judge Advocate division. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the Board of Governors of the State Bar Association has no power to admit applicants to practice, as that authority is an inherent judicial function belonging exclusively to the court. The court denied the application, holding that Laughlin's military service did not meet the requirements of the court's rules for admission on motion, which demand active and actual practice as a member of the bar of the highest court in another jurisdiction. The decision rested on precedents establishing that while statutes may regulate bar admissions, they cannot remove the court's inherent power to control who may practice law.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Brown, two defendants convicted of first-degree murder and robbery in Washington state court and sentenced to death appealed their convictions after their appointed counsel failed to pay the required five-dollar filing fees or perfect the appeals within the ninety-day period set by court Rule 12. The appeals had been dismissed for these procedural defaults, which occurred despite the defendants proceeding in forma pauperis and delays in receiving the statement of facts from the court reporter. The court reinstated the appeals, holding that Rule 12's strict filing-fee and timeliness requirements do not apply to capital cases or in forma pauperis appeals, and that the rule-making power could be exercised to suspend the rule in death-penalty matters to allow the appeals to proceed. The decision emphasized that the rule's jurisdictional language conditioning appeals on fee payment has no application in pauper cases and that capital cases warrant an exception to avoid barring review.

criminal lawprocedure

State v. Hart was a criminal case in which the prosecution introduced testimony from a husband repeating out-of-court statements made by his deceased wife. The dissenting justice argued that this evidence exceeded the limits of the hearsay exception recognized in State v. Power and that the trial judge improperly commented on the evidence by sarcastically describing the autopsy surgeon’s testimony as an “organ recital” before the jury. The majority implicitly rejected these objections by allowing the evidence and the trial to stand, and a subsequent petition for rehearing was denied.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over title to real property in Clark County, Washington, where plaintiffs E. R. Turpen and wife sought to quiet title based on a 1944 deed from their grantor, arguing that a 1937 tax foreclosure judgment obtained by the county (and a subsequent 1943 purchase contract to defendants Johnson) was invalid due to a clerical error in the metes and bounds description referencing the wrong section corner. Defendants raised the three-year statute of limitations for actions to challenge county tax deeds. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of defendants after reopening the case to admit evidence on the date of the treasurer's deed. The core reasoning was that the limitations period had run more than seven years after the foreclosure decree, making the action untimely regardless of the description error, which the court noted was mitigated by the reference to the specific tax lot number.

propertytaxesprocedure

This case involved a dispute over coverage under a group prepaid medical and hospital service contract between the Seattle Chamber of Commerce and the King County Medical Service Corporation, under which employees like plaintiff Rose McCarty were beneficiaries. McCarty sued the service corporation and its medical director for reimbursement of special nurses' fees after her off-duty injury, and sought a declaratory judgment against the hospital to avoid liability for her hospital bill; the hospital cross-claimed for payment. The court affirmed judgments in favor of the plaintiffs, holding the service corporation and hospital jointly and severally liable. The reasoning centered on the contract terms obligating coverage for accidental injuries outside employment, the parties' status as coprincipals under the agreements, and the absence of any valid exclusion or good-faith determination by the medical director that removed the claims from the contract's scope.

healthcarelabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned claims for accidental death benefits under life insurance policies following the death of Mr. Evans, who had a preexisting heart condition involving arteriosclerosis and myocarditis and collapsed immediately after straining to push his stalled automobile. The policies at issue excluded coverage if death resulted from or was contributed to directly or indirectly by disease or bodily infirmity. The court decided that the benefits were not payable, holding that the preexisting diseased heart condition contributed to the death and thus fell within the policy exclusions. The core reasoning was that, unlike in the earlier Pierce case involving fright from a near-collision, the strain here did not operate independently of the disease as the sole cause.

business & regulatory

The case involved three plaintiffs suing a local operating engineers union and its officers for damages after they were discharged from closed-shop jobs at a wartime shipyard due to expulsion from or denial of membership in the union, allegedly for soliciting membership in a rival union. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs could not pursue their suits because they failed to exhaust internal remedies provided by the union's constitution and bylaws, even while finding the expulsions and denial wrongful. On appeal, the dissenting opinion agrees with the trial court, holding that union members must first pursue all available internal appeals before seeking court relief for such claims. The dissent relies on precedents requiring exhaustion of organizational remedies as a condition precedent to litigation and distinguishes cases where members had completed internal processes.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerns a lawsuit over a daytime automobile collision at the intersection of Dexter Avenue, an arterial highway, and Roy Street, where plaintiff Mildred Whisler, traveling on the arterial, collided with defendant John Weiss, who entered the intersection from the left. The majority ruled against the Whislers, apparently concluding that Weiss was negligent but that Whisler's momentary swerve created an impression she would turn, excusing or mitigating Weiss's liability. The dissent, relying on undisputed physical evidence including vehicle damage patterns (front-end damage to Weiss's car only, side damage to Whisler's), skid marks showing Weiss's car struck and pushed Whisler's sideways across her lane, and testimony from disinterested police officers, concludes that Weiss violated arterial right-of-way statutes by failing to stop and yield, making his negligence the proximate cause and entitling the Whislers to damages.

torts & liability

The case concerns whether a state legislator is barred by Art. II, § 13 of the Washington Constitution from being elected to the office of county auditor after the legislature increased the salary of that office during her term. The majority held that the constitutional prohibition applies and disqualifies the legislator. The dissent argues that the provision restricts eligibility only during the legislator's own term and does not extend to offices whose increased emoluments take effect after that term ends, citing the provision's plain language and precedents from Washington and Wisconsin that limit the disqualification to the period of legislative service.

elections

This case concerned whether Boeing Aircraft Company could recover attorneys' fees after successfully appealing a Department of Labor & Industries order that had assigned all compensation costs from a 1940s airplane crash—killing and injuring workers from both Boeing and a meat-packing plant—to the aircraft manufacturing class alone. The court held that no attorneys' fees were payable from the administrative fund. The statute authorizing fees applies only when an appeal affects the accident fund or involves a dispute over an award to a worker or dependents; here the total awards were fixed before the appeal, and the dispute concerned only the allocation of cost experience between two different employer classes. Because the accident fund was unaffected by the litigation, the lower court's award of fees was reversed.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a divorced husband's petition to modify an existing decree by terminating his obligation to pay $100 per month in alimony to his former wife. The trial court denied relief, and the majority of the court apparently affirmed that ruling. The dissent contends that the wife, who earns $245 per month, has no equitable claim to continued support from her ex-husband's $450 monthly earnings after more than eight years of separation, as her own income adequately covers her needs.

family law

The case concerned a dispute over an alleged oral contract in which the deceased Tonjum promised to leave all his real and personal property to Jennings upon Tonjum's death in exchange for Jennings providing ongoing household services, nursing care, and property maintenance. The trial court found that the contract existed, that Jennings had performed the services in reliance on the agreement, and that the terms had been satisfied, but the majority opinion apparently reversed that determination. This dissenting opinion concludes that multiple witness accounts established the contract's existence, terms, and performance through evidence that was conclusive, definite, and beyond legitimate controversy, satisfying the evidentiary requirements set forth in Blodgett v. Lowe for enforcement of such oral agreements to convey property after death, and therefore the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.

property

The case concerned a criminal prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor, in which the state introduced a sealed bottle bearing a whisky label and revenue stamps as evidence of the offense. The majority upheld the conviction, relying in part on an Oklahoma precedent to find the evidence sufficient. The dissent argued that no competent proof existed because the bottle's contents were never tasted, smelled, tested, or otherwise examined by any witness or the court, and the unbroken seals meant the liquid's identity remained unproven. The dissent concluded that the exhibit should have been excluded for lack of proper identification, which would have resulted in a failure of proof on the corpus delicti and a directed verdict of not guilty.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a criminal prosecution against a physician accused of performing an illegal abortion that caused the death of a young woman. The majority opinion permitted the deceased's mother to testify about a conversation in which her daughter described an appointment with the doctor to have the procedure performed, applying the verbal acts rule to admit the statements as explanatory of the circumstances surrounding the death. The dissent contends that the testimony is pure hearsay that falls outside the proper scope of the verbal acts exception and cannot be effectively rebutted by the accused.

criminal lawprocedureabortion

This case involved a dispute over which state court could decide child custody after a California divorce decree awarded custody to the father, with restrictions on removing the children from the state. The mother, residing in Washington with the children, filed an action there seeking custody, prompting the father to petition for a writ of prohibition to stop the Washington superior court from proceeding. The Washington Supreme Court held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because the children's legal domicile remained in California under the prior California orders, which both parents had participated in litigating. The court reasoned that the children's physical presence in Washington did not establish domicile when they had been removed in violation of the California decree, and that the full faith and credit clause required recognizing the California custody determination absent fraud or lack of jurisdiction there.

family lawprocedure