Barbara Durham

This case consolidated appeals from workers' compensation claimants who argued that defense counsel's ex parte contacts with treating physicians before Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals hearings violated the rule from Loudon v. Mhyre prohibiting such contacts in personal injury actions. The court held that the Loudon prohibition does not extend to proceedings under Washington's industrial insurance act, RCW Title 51. The decision rested on statutory provisions, including RCW 51.04.070, that expressly permit physicians to disclose relevant medical information in these administrative proceedings without patient consent or liability, distinguishing them from civil tort actions where the physician-patient privilege applies more strictly. The court found that the policy concerns underlying Loudon, such as risks of unauthorized disclosure, did not outweigh the legislative framework designed for efficient claims handling at any stage of the process.

labor & employmentprocedure

In State v. Curry, three defendants convicted of crimes including second-degree burglary, cocaine possession, and first-degree robbery appealed only the monetary portions of their sentences, which included court costs, victim assessments, and recoupment of counsel fees under former RCW 10.01.160. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the sentences, holding that the statute does not require trial courts to enter specific formal findings on the record about a defendant's ability to pay before imposing costs. The court reasoned that the statute already incorporates constitutional safeguards from Fuller v. Oregon and State v. Barklind by mandating consideration of financial resources, allowing petitions for remission, and prohibiting imprisonment for non-willful failure to pay, with additional protections under RCW 9.94A.200 and contempt statutes. It concluded that the victim penalty assessment is constitutional both facially and as applied to indigent defendants.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved three unrelated personal restraint petitions filed by Washington prisoners challenging convictions or sentences, each contesting the validity of a 1989 statute (RCW 10.73.090 et seq.) that generally imposes a one-year deadline for filing such collateral attacks after a conviction becomes final. The petitioners argued that the time limit unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus under the state constitution and violates equal protection, and alternatively that they had not received the required statutory notice of the deadline. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the statute's constitutionality, ruling that it does not suspend habeas corpus rights and satisfies equal protection standards, while also finding that the Department of Corrections' postings of notices in prisons and parole offices provided sufficient notice to the petitioners. The court therefore dismissed the petitions as untimely. Core reasoning centered on the statute's limited exceptions preserving access to relief, the lack of any fundamental right to unlimited collateral review, and affidavits confirming the adequacy of posted notices.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved neighboring property owners in Washington where the Currenses sued Sleek after clear-cutting and grading on Sleek's land increased surface water flow, causing flooding and tree damage on the Currenses' property. The trial court and Court of Appeals dismissed the claim under the common enemy doctrine, which generally allows landowners to develop property without liability for surface water effects. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine only protects landowners who exercise due care to avoid unnecessary harm to neighbors, and a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Sleek took such care by failing to install mitigation measures like dry wells or revegetation.

propertytorts & liabilityenvironment

In State v. West, the defendant was convicted of second degree assault after an incident involving his friend, and he challenged the conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. His attorney had not filed a motion in limine to exclude his prior convictions for murder and assault, which deterred him from testifying in his own defense. On remand after an initial appeal, the trial court assessed the defendant's proposed testimony against the prosecution's evidence and concluded there was no reasonable probability it would have changed the jury's verdict. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the trial court's determination that the attorney's error did not undermine the outcome. The decision focused on the application of the ineffective assistance standard and the Alexis balancing test for prior convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Timothy Dolson challenging his conviction for driving with a suspended license in the first degree after the Department of Licensing revoked his license in 1990 for being a habitual traffic offender. Dolson argued that the revocation was invalid because DOL sent the required notice of revocation and hearing rights to an incorrect address rather than his official address of record, depriving him of due process. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the failure to follow the statutory notice requirements at the address of record violated Dolson's constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before revocation. The court reasoned that a revocation not compliant with due process is void and cannot support a later conviction for driving with a revoked license, even if the defendant later learned of the revocation. The decision emphasized that the State bears the burden of proving compliance with due process in such prosecutions.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Robinson, the defendant was convicted of second-degree rape and unlawful imprisonment after his attorney, who had been held in contempt during trial, refused his request to reopen the case so he could testify, despite the attorney's earlier statements that the defendant would take the stand to support a consent defense. Robinson sought a new trial, arguing that his attorney had prevented him from exercising his constitutional right to testify, which constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that Robinson had presented sufficient evidence to warrant further proceedings on whether his waiver of the right to testify was knowing and voluntary. At the hearing, Robinson must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his attorney actually prevented him from testifying and that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance; if both are shown, he is entitled to a new trial. The court evaluated the claim under the ineffective assistance framework rather than a direct constitutional violation analysis.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case concerned whether a trial court could admit evidence that a defendant charged with drunk driving had refused to perform voluntary field sobriety tests, specifically whether doing so violated the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Washington Supreme Court held that admitting the refusal evidence was constitutionally permissible and affirmed the defendant's conviction. The court reasoned that a refusal to perform field sobriety tests constitutes nontestimonial evidence and is not compelled by the state, so it falls outside the protections of the Fifth Amendment. The decision focused solely on the constitutional question and did not address evidentiary relevance under court rules.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved challenges by citizen groups to King County's designation of undeveloped land as an Urban Growth Area in its Growth Management Plan under the state's Growth Management Act, as well as the county's issuance of related development permits. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the permit challenges but reversed the approval of the Bear Creek Urban Growth Area designation. The court remanded the case to the Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board for a determination on whether the designation complies with the Growth Management Act, reasoning that county-wide planning policies must meet substantive GMA requirements and that prior review had been limited to procedural issues.

environmentproperty

In this attorney disciplinary case, John C. Huddleston was accused of using deceptive practices in his magazine subscription telemarketing businesses, including lying to publishers to obtain subscriber lists and misleading consumers. The Washington State Bar Association's Disciplinary Board recommended disbarment for multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the disbarment, finding that while the evidence did not support a conclusion of perjury, Huddleston's conduct involved dishonesty and violated the attorney's oath by failing to abide by the law.

criminal lawprocedure

In this personal injury case, Diana Wilson sued Gary Horsley for damages from a 1992 assault that caused her emotional harm and a permanent hand injury. After Wilson prevailed in mandatory arbitration, Horsley sought a trial de novo and moved to amend his pro se answer to add affirmative defenses like contributory negligence and self-defense plus a counterclaim for assault; the trial court denied the motion as untimely and prejudicial because it came after arbitration and would complicate attorney fee assessments under the mandatory arbitration rules. The court also denied Horsley's requests for a jury trial after Wilson withdrew her demand and the parties initially agreed to a bench trial, proceeding instead with a bench trial that awarded Wilson over $25,000 following a mistrial. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the amendment motion due to the late timing and impact on arbitration procedures but reversed on the jury trial issue, holding that Horsley was entitled to a jury trial.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether a police officer's disciplinary suspension could be challenged through both a civil service commission appeal and arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, or if a commission decision would bar the arbitration. After the City of Kelso suspended Officer Darrell Stair for negligence in a high-speed chase, the civil service commission increased the suspension to 10 days, while an arbitrator later found insufficient just cause and reduced it to a reprimand. The superior court and court of appeals held that res judicata from the commission's ruling precluded arbitration, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that the legal standards differed—the commission assessed whether discipline was imposed in good faith and for cause under civil service rules, while the arbitrator evaluated just cause under the collective bargaining agreement—so the doctrines of res judicata and priority of action did not apply. The court concluded that Stair could pursue both remedies concurrently.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Perkins v. CTX Mortgage Co., homeowners sued their mortgage lender for charging a $250 document preparation fee, claiming it constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the class action, holding that CTX's preparation of loan documents did not amount to unauthorized practice. The court reasoned that while selecting and completing legal instruments like promissory notes and deeds of trust constitutes the practice of law, CTX's process was authorized because its attorneys handled all tasks requiring legal judgment, lay employees performed only data entry without discretion, and the charging of a fee did not render the activity unauthorized.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned the State of Washington's effort to condemn private property in Seattle for a north-side expansion of the Washington State Convention and Trade Center, a project that would include leasing or selling surplus ground-level space to private developers to meet a legislative funding requirement. Property owners challenged the condemnation proceedings, arguing that the anticipated private use of part of the land violated the state constitution's limits on eminent domain. The superior court entered an order of public use and necessity, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the State could exercise eminent domain because it sought fee title only to the amount of land necessary for the public exhibit-space component of the project and would not condemn any excess property solely for private benefit. The decision rested on findings that the north alternative was selected after weighing public factors and that the private development would occupy only space unavoidably created by the public structure's engineering requirements.

property

This case involved two recall petitions filed by Mark Bennett against Pierce County Auditor Cathy Pearsall-Stipek. The first petition repeated identical charges from earlier unsuccessful petitions by another voter and was dismissed on grounds of res judicata, as the charges shared the same subject matter, facts, and parties' interests. The second petition alleged that the auditor violated candidates' free speech rights by initially refusing to print certain statements in a voters' pamphlet; the court dismissed it as moot after the statements were published with a disclaimer. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both dismissals but reversed the award of attorney fees against Bennett, finding insufficient basis for deeming the petition frivolous.

electionsfree speechprocedure

In these consolidated cases, family members of accident victims sought damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress after discovering their injured relatives at the scenes shortly after the incidents occurred, but their claims were dismissed by lower courts because they had not witnessed the accidents themselves. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the dismissals, holding that a plaintiff may recover for emotional trauma from observing a family member's suffering at the accident scene if they arrive shortly afterward and before any substantial change in the victim's condition or location. The court reasoned that Washington precedent on bystander claims, which already limits recovery to those present at the scene and requires objective symptoms of distress provable by medical evidence, does not strictly require witnessing the precise moment of injury. The cases were remanded for further proceedings on whether the plaintiffs' symptoms met the objective-symptom requirement.

torts & liability

In State v. Kells, a juvenile defendant challenged the dismissal of his late appeal from a declination order that transferred his second-degree murder case from juvenile to superior court after he pleaded guilty. The Washington Supreme Court held that Criminal Rule 7.2(b) does not require the State to advise the defendant of his right to appeal the declination order at sentencing, but that an untimely appeal cannot be dismissed unless the State first proves the defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of that right. The court reasoned that a constitutional right to appeal exists in criminal cases and that prior precedent, including State v. Sweet, places the burden on the State to demonstrate waiver rather than allowing automatic dismissal under appellate rules like RAP 18.8(b). The case was remanded for a hearing to determine whether such a waiver occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

Eduardo Sanchez, a farm laborer at Double D Hop Ranch who worked most of the year but was laid off for a few winter months, was injured on the job and challenged the calculation of his time-loss workers' compensation benefits. The Department of Labor and Industries classified his employment as exclusively seasonal under RCW 51.08.178(2), basing benefits on average wages over a prior 12-month period rather than his wages at the time of injury under the general rule in RCW 51.08.178(1). The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals and Board decisions below, holding that Sanchez's work as a general laborer was not exclusively seasonal because it spanned multiple seasons and involved tasks not limited to one season of the year. The court reasoned that the statute must be construed to reflect lost earning capacity and liberally interpreted in favor of the worker, remanding the matter to the Department for reclassification of his employment.

labor & employment

The case involved three defendants charged with driving while license revoked after being designated habitual traffic offenders by the Department of Licensing. Each received (or was sent) a revocation notice that incorrectly stated a 10-day deadline to request a formal hearing instead of the 15 days provided by RCW 46.65.065(1). The Washington Supreme Court held that the incorrect notices did not violate procedural due process and did not bar prosecution in the absence of actual prejudice to the defendants. The court reasoned that due process requires only notice and an opportunity to be heard, which the notices satisfied by citing the relevant statute containing the correct deadline, and that the defendants never alleged they were prejudiced by the error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Michele Williams, who was charged with first-degree theft for welfare fraud after failing to report her partner's income and presence in the household to DSHS while receiving public assistance. An earlier administrative proceeding had determined that the overpayments were unintentional due to domestic abuse, leading Williams to argue that collateral estoppel barred her criminal prosecution. The trial court rejected this argument, convicted Williams, and declined to instruct the jury on duress, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on collateral estoppel grounds. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that collateral estoppel does not apply to prevent the criminal case and that the trial court should have given a duress instruction.

criminal lawprocedure