Charles Horowitz

This case was a medical malpractice suit brought by the family of Timothy Keogan against his family physician, an emergency room doctor, and the hospital where Keogan died of a heart attack. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the defendants. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court should have given an informed-consent instruction regarding diagnostic tests for angina and should have ruled as a matter of law that the emergency-room physician was negligent for failing to perform an EKG; the case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of proximate cause. The court reasoned that the physician had not disclosed available tests or his suspicion of angina despite symptoms that warranted them, and that the emergency-room omissions breached the standard of care.

healthcaretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over ownership of a family ranch in Washington after the death of one spouse. E.A. Norris and his wife Irene executed reciprocal wills in 1970 leaving the survivor a life estate in the ranch with remainders to their adopted son Henry and grandson Ernie, but then signed a community property agreement two months later that would have given the survivor full ownership without probate. After Irene's death, the estate was probated according to the will with E.A. acting as personal representative, and the property was distributed per the will's terms; years later E.A. sought to quiet title in himself based on the community property agreement. The trial court ruled for E.A., but the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court held that E.A. was bound by the probate proceedings and his attorney's actions in following the will, which superseded any rights under the community property agreement.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case consolidated two appeals concerning the superior court's jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals in workers' compensation matters under RCW 51.52.110. In Spokane v. Department of Labor & Indus., the City appealed a finding of total disability, and in In re Saltis, a self-insured employer appealed an award for hearing loss; both involved challenges to whether the Director of the Department of Labor and Industries had been properly served with the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court of Washington ruled that substantial compliance with the statute's service requirements suffices to confer jurisdiction if the Director actually received notice or if service was effected in a manner reasonably calculated to provide notice, rather than demanding strict compliance. It reversed the dismissal in the Spokane matter for remand to determine the adequacy of service and affirmed the upholding of jurisdiction in Saltis based on evidence of the Department's mail routing procedures.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether the Town of North Bonneville, an optional code city, could lawfully purchase land from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as part of relocating the town to accommodate a federal powerhouse project on the Columbia River, with the town intending to use some land for public purposes like streets and parks while later reselling or leasing other portions to unidentified private buyers at fair market value. The Washington Supreme Court answered the certified questions by holding that the town had authority to enter the land transactions and that the purchases did not violate article 8, section 7 of the state constitution. The court reasoned that optional code cities possess broad contractual powers, the acquisition served a public purpose of preserving the municipality's viability and ability to provide services, and no identifiable private party would receive a loan of municipal credit since sales would occur at market rates without engineered benefits to specific entities.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Turpin, the defendant was charged with negligent homicide after her car crossed the center line and collided with another vehicle, killing its driver; a state trooper directed hospital staff to draw her blood for alcohol testing after arresting her but without informing her of the arrest or her statutory right to independent testing. The trial court admitted the blood test results over the defendant's motion to suppress, leading to her conviction, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that RCW 46.20.308(1) requires officers to inform a person arrested for negligent homicide of the right to additional independent blood tests, even though the statute exempts such arrests from the consent requirement; the court reasoned that the statutory notice provision remained in effect to protect the defendant's ability to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence, and its violation required exclusion of the state's test results.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a prosecution for welfare fraud under RCW 74.08.331, where defendant Nancy Ann Ermert was convicted after not disclosing a savings account she established with funds from public assistance payments while receiving benefits, which later exceeded DSHS resource limits when used toward a car purchase. The court reversed the conviction and directed dismissal of the proceedings. The core reasoning was that the state presented no evidence the defendant failed to report any information required by law, as savings accumulated solely from assistance payments did not constitute reportable "income" or "resources" under the governing statute and regulations, and thus no elements of the crime were proven even if the facts were uncontroverted.

criminal law

This case involved a credit union seeking a deficiency judgment from a borrower after repossessing and reselling a financed car, where the sale proceeds did not cover the full loan amount. The borrower argued that Washington's RCW 62A.9-501(1) prohibited such judgments for purchase money security interests in consumer goods. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the credit union, holding that the statute's prohibition on deficiency judgments applies only to sellers who retain the security interest, not to third-party lenders like the credit union. The reasoning relied on the plain language of the statute, which specifies "taken or retained by the seller," distinguishing it from third-party financing arrangements.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerned competing claims to ownership of a clarifier, a large piece of equipment affixed to a potato processing plant, arising from a series of leases and sales involving Courtright, Dolsen, Warden Leasing, the SBA, and Cotten. The trial court ruled that Cotten owned the clarifier and awarded Courtright damages against Dolsen for failing to deliver clear title. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that Dolsen had no duty to record its interest. The Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the lease between Courtright and Dolsen created a security interest under the UCC that required perfection through a financing statement or real-property recording to prevail against a subsequent purchaser like Cotten; the case was remanded for review of the damages award.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a personal restraint petition by John Haverty challenging the administrative revocation of his parole in 1978 after a new felony conviction, without any hearing, under a Washington statute allowing such revocation based solely on the conviction. The Washington Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that Haverty was entitled to a parole revocation hearing before the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. The court reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer directly required due process protections, including an opportunity for the parolee to explain why revocation should not occur, and that this constitutional requirement applied regardless of the later state decision in In re Akridge. The opinion also addressed retroactivity factors but concluded that Morrissey alone compelled the result.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved the State's appeal of a superior court's dismissal of criminal charges against defendant Thomas Edwards for robbery, rape, and kidnapping. Edwards was arrested on July 19, 1979, but charges were not filed until November, a preliminary hearing occurred in December, and trial was set for February 1980—197 days after arrest. The trial court dismissed the case under CrR 3.3, the speedy trial rule, which requires trial within 90 days (or 100 days from arrest if no earlier hearing occurs) of the first applicable triggering event. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the time limit began running upon arrest under CrR 3.3(b)(1)(b) and could not be revived or restarted by later filing charges in district court or binding the case over to superior court; once expired, CrR 3.3(i) mandates dismissal with prejudice. The court rejected arguments that this interpretation improperly limited prosecutorial discretion or created a statute of limitations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a written indemnity agreement under which contractor Jacobson agreed to indemnify landowner Jorgensen for liability arising from work on Jorgensen's property, except for Jorgensen's own negligence or willful misconduct. After contractor's employee Redford was injured on the job and sued Jorgensen (among others), Jorgensen settled the claims and sought to enforce the indemnity against Jacobson, which denied liability citing the Washington industrial insurance act's exclusive remedy provisions and common law limits on contribution among joint tortfeasors. The trial court granted partial summary judgment enforcing the agreement except for damages attributable to Jorgensen's negligence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Washington Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the agreement was valid and enforceable because it did not violate any statute or public policy and reflected the parties' bargained-for allocation of risk. The court reasoned that indemnity contracts excluding an indemnitee's own negligence are generally permitted and that the industrial insurance act does not bar such contractual indemnity by an employer. The case was remanded for trial to determine the portion of damages caused by Jorgensen's negligence.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a tort action in which plaintiff Glenn Morgan, shot and paralyzed by Harlow-Burks corporation president Horace Burks on corporate property, obtained a $2.35 million judgment against both Burks and the corporation. Morgan then sought to hold the other two shareholders (Bessie Burks and Henry Harlow) personally liable by asking the court to disregard the corporate entity, citing evidence of post-shooting promissory notes and mortgages on corporate land that were later set aside as fraudulent conveyances in the corporation's bankruptcy. The trial court refused to pierce the veil based on pre-tort activities alone, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for consideration of post-tort conduct, and the Washington Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's judgment. The court held that the corporate entity could not be disregarded because the post-tort transfers had been voided in bankruptcy, leaving corporate assets intact and available to satisfy the judgment, and because those activities had not impaired the plaintiff's ability to collect from the corporation. The decision rested on the principle that disregard of the corporate form requires a showing that the challenged conduct caused unjustified loss to the plaintiff.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedureproperty

The case concerned a lender's action to recover on promissory notes bearing interest rates of 18 to 36 percent that the borrowers had drafted and proposed for a house-renovation business. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision allowing the borrowers to assert a usury defense, remanding the matter for trial. The court held that borrowers who suggest illegal rates, know the lender is unaware of the illegality, and occupy a position of financial advisor encouraging reliance have a duty to disclose and are estopped from later raising usury. The reasoning emphasized that the usury statute's protective purpose is not served when the borrower initiates and controls the transaction to induce the lender into charging illegal rates.

business & regulatory

The case involved a proposed class action lawsuit by the Washington Education Association, local teacher groups, female coaches, and parents against the Washington Interscholastic Athletic Association and various school districts, alleging systemic sex discrimination in salaries, working conditions for coaches, and athletic programs for girls in violation of state law. The trial court dismissed claims against certain districts for lack of standing, transferred venue for others, and denied class certification for both plaintiffs and defendants without fully analyzing the requirements of CR 23. The Washington Supreme Court reversed these rulings, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider and articulate the CR 23(a) prerequisites and CR 23(b) criteria for class actions, and by making premature decisions on standing and venue before allowing discovery on class certification issues. The court remanded the case for completion of discovery and a proper class certification determination under the civil rules.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

This case was a tort action brought by plaintiff Vernon Kitt against Yakima County for damages from a car collision at an obscured rural intersection that the county had signed on all four approaches with crossroad signs. The trial court ruled the county negligent as a matter of law for violating the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) standards, the jury apportioned one-third fault to the plaintiff and awarded damages, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the negligence ruling. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the county was negligent as a matter of law because the MUTCD required uniform use of signs only for their prescribed purposes and prohibited the crossroad sign at this type of intersection. The court relied on its prior decision in Schneider v. Yakima County and the mandatory language in the MUTCD regarding sign usage.

torts & liability

The case involved defendant Neil Calvin Herman's appeal of his first-degree rape conviction in Pierce County Superior Court. Prior to the rape trial, Herman had been found guilty by a jury of second-degree assault in an unrelated case, though judgment and sentence had not yet been entered. The trial court ruled that the assault verdict could be used to impeach Herman's credibility under RCW 10.52.030 if he testified, and it denied his motion for individual voir dire of potential jurors to avoid exposing them to prejudicial information about the prior trial. Herman chose not to testify and was convicted. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a jury verdict of guilt may be used for impeachment even without formal judgment and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in handling voir dire, as there was no significant risk of prejudice to the jury panel.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Edwin Fitzsimmons, who was convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor after being denied access to appointed counsel immediately following his arrest. The Washington Supreme Court considered whether this denial violated his rights under court rules and precedent, and what the appropriate remedy would be. The court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for dismissal, reasoning that the defendant had been illegally denied his right to counsel at the earliest opportunity as required by JCrR 2.11 and Tacoma v. Heater, and that the State could not show the error was harmless given the potential impact on evidence like sobriety tests.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a dispute over the Washington Department of Revenue's classification of American Sign & Indicator Corporation (AS&I) as a "manufacturer" rather than a "retailer" for state business and occupation tax purposes, along with its subsidiaries as "processors for hire." AS&I appealed after being assessed additional taxes, arguing it should be taxed only as a retailer with its subsidiaries as manufacturers. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling in favor of the state, holding that AS&I owns the materials used in fabrication and arranges for their processing by subsidiaries, making it the manufacturer under RCW 82.04 and related regulations, while the subsidiaries perform processing for hire on materials belonging to another.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission could charge the Railroad Regulatory Fee Account (funded by fees from intrastate railroads) for tort judgments and legal defense costs arising from four grade-crossing accidents. The superior court denied the railroads' request for a writ of mandate, but the Supreme Court of Washington reversed, holding that the charges were improper. The court reasoned that RCW 81.24 limits the account to reasonable costs of supervising and regulating railroads, that the tort expenses stemmed from the state's own alleged regulatory failures rather than direct regulatory activities, and that no hearing had determined the charges' appropriateness under applicable statutes. The court therefore issued a writ requiring repayment of approximately $60,390 to the account and restricting its future use to authorized regulatory purposes.

business & regulatory

This case concerned whether a superior court could authorize the sterilization of Edith Hayes, a 16-year-old severely mentally retarded girl, upon petition by her mother as prospective guardian. The trial court dismissed the petition on summary judgment, holding it lacked authority to order sterilization without specific statutory authorization. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that Const. art. 4, § 6 grants superior courts broad jurisdiction to entertain such petitions in the absence of controlling legislation, and that a court may authorize sterilization where it is shown to be in the best interests of the incompetent person. The court remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the petition.

family lawcivil rights