State Ex Rel. Public Disclosure Comm. v. Wea
Washington Supreme Court · 2006-03-16 · cited 11×
The consolidated cases involved challenges to RCW 42.17.760, a Washington statute that prohibits labor unions from using agency shop fees paid by nonmember public employees for political or ideological purposes without obtaining the nonmembers' affirmative authorization. The Public Disclosure Commission and individual nonmembers alleged that the Washington Education Association violated the statute by transferring nonobjecting nonmembers' fees to its general fund and using them for such expenditures after providing Hudson notices and rebates only to those who objected. The trial court imposed penalties, but the Court of Appeals held the statute unconstitutional; the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the statute's opt-in requirement burdens the union's speech and associational rights in a manner not permitted under First Amendment precedents that allow unions to use fees from nonobjectors while providing an opt-out mechanism. The court also affirmed dismissal of the private right of action claims because they depended on the invalid statute.
labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights
Grundy v. Thurston County
Washington Supreme Court · 2005-07-28 · cited 46×
This case involved Evelyne Grundy suing Thurston County and her neighbors, the Bracks, claiming that the neighbors' raising of their seawall created a private nuisance by diverting seawater onto her property, causing flooding and damage. The trial court dismissed the claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, applying the common enemy doctrine to allow property owners to protect against water intrusion. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the common enemy doctrine does not apply to seawater and thus does not bar the private nuisance claim.
propertyenvironmenttorts & liability
State v. Woods
Washington Supreme Court · 2005-07-27
In State v. Woods, the defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree child molestation involving his daughters. The trial court ruled that the children were competent to testify and admitted their out-of-court statements to their foster mother and a child interview specialist under the child hearsay statute. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in these determinations. The court explained that competency findings rest within the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse, which was not shown here. Because the children were found competent to testify, the court did not address issues of hearsay corroboration.
criminal lawfamily law
State v. Davis
Washington Supreme Court · 2005-05-31
The case concerned whether a 911 call reporting a domestic assault could be admitted at trial without the caller's testimony after Crawford v. Washington, and whether jury instructions properly handled the element elevating a no-contact order violation to a felony. The Washington Supreme Court held that emergency 911 calls must be assessed case-by-case to determine if statements are testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. It ruled that any error in admitting the call was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of other evidence of the defendant's guilt. The court also concluded that placing the assault element in a special verdict form rather than the main "to convict" instruction was constitutionally permissible under the statutory framework establishing base crimes and enhanced penalties. The conviction for felony violation of a domestic no-contact order was affirmed.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Mills
Washington Supreme Court · 2005-04-07 · cited 130×
In State v. Mills, the defendant was charged with felony harassment based on a threatening phone message left for the victim, and the trial court used a bifurcated jury instruction that placed the "threat to kill" element on a special verdict form rather than in the main "to convict" instruction. The Washington Supreme Court held that such bifurcation is constitutionally permissible when the legislature has established a base crime with elevated penalties for an additional fact and that fact is found beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury. However, the court determined that the instructions given in this case did not clearly require the jury to find that the victim was placed in reasonable fear that the threat to kill would be carried out. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
criminal lawprocedure
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Christopher
Washington Supreme Court · 2005-03-25 · cited 37×
This case involved a disciplinary proceeding against attorney Margaret Diamond Christopher for falsifying documents in a civil arbitration matter, including backdating an offer of judgment, forging her secretary's signature on a declaration of mailing, creating a false billing entry, and submitting false statements to the arbitrator and court to conceal a potential error in her handling of the case. The Washington Supreme Court imposed an 18-month suspension followed by three years of probation, rejecting both the Bar Association's request for disbarment and Christopher's request for a reprimand. The court determined that the presumptive sanction under the applicable standards was disbarment due to intentional dishonesty and multiple offenses but found that mitigating factors such as inexperience, personal problems, and rehabilitation, along with a proportionality review of similar cases, justified a lesser sanction. The decision balanced aggravating factors like dishonest motive against these mitigators and adopted the Disciplinary Board's recommendation without specific grounds to depart from it.
criminal lawprocedure