Ralph O. Olson

The case involved a mother who obtained an Idaho divorce decree awarding her custody of two minor children after personal service on the father in Washington, where he defaulted; after the father took the children to Washington and refused to return them, she filed a habeas corpus petition in Washington to enforce the decree. The trial court denied the petition, concluding the Idaho decree was void for lack of jurisdiction because the mother had not established domicile in Idaho. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the evidence showed the mother had acquired a domicile of choice in Idaho sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the marital status, that any dispute over the six-week residency duration requirement was not jurisdictional and could not support a collateral attack, and that the Idaho decree was therefore valid and entitled the mother to custody of the children.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Scheeler, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder after shooting and killing a man during a nighttime disturbance at a residence, where the defendant claimed self-defense and the victim was later identified as the estranged husband of the homeowner. The jury convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The court ruled that the evidence supported submitting manslaughter to the jury, as the defendant's testimony allowed a finding that he used more force than necessary in the absence of justification. It further held that the self-defense jury instruction was proper under the facts and that the inadvertent presence of unadmitted cartridges in the jury room constituted harmless error, affirming the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hanson v. Lincoln First Federal Savings and Loan Association, the plaintiff sued for personal injury damages after slipping and falling on a waxed asphalt-tile floor in the defendant's lobby while walking from a rubber mat toward the counter. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the evidence at the close of the plaintiff's case and dismissed the action. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the dismissal, ruling that neither the slip and fall nor the presence of a waxed floor, standing alone, permits an inference of negligence. The court found no evidence that the wax was improperly applied, that any hazardous substance had accumulated, or that the floor posed an unreasonably dangerous condition that the defendant should have anticipated, concluding that any verdict for the plaintiff would rest on speculation.

torts & liability

This consolidated case involved tort actions by landowners against an irrigation district for damages allegedly caused by the district's negligent failure to provide adequate water supplies. The trial court overruled the district's demurrers and entered judgments on verdicts for the plaintiffs. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaints failed to allege compliance with a statute requiring any claim against the district to be presented to its board before suit, and that this material omission was a fatal defect that could not be cured by presumption or evidence. The court reasoned that the statutory requirement is mandatory, constitutes a condition precedent to suit, and serves important public policy purposes such as allowing investigation and possible settlement of claims.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by the executors of Elva M. MacAdams' estate to interpret her 1940 will and two later codicils. The dispute centered on a provision in the second codicil stating that the testatrix 'would like to provide for an education thru high school and music and college for Toni Gavian,' which the trial court held void. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the language was precatory rather than imperative and thus failed to create a valid trust, especially given that the testatrix had already fully disposed of her separate property in an earlier trust and used directive language elsewhere in the documents. The court emphasized that the words expressed a wish, not a command, and were inconsistent with the complete prior disposition of the estate.

property

This case is a condemnation action in which the City of Tacoma sought to acquire private land for constructing city streets and a traffic interchange connecting to state highways, with compensation to be paid from the City Street Fund. The trial court granted an order of public use and necessity, which the landowners challenged via certiorari, arguing that only the state director of highways had authority to condemn property for streets that might serve as state highways. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the order, holding that the city possessed concurrent condemnation power under RCW 8.12.030 for city street purposes and that the 1949 statute governing the City Street Fund authorized such expenditures. The court reasoned that the project was determined by the city to be necessary for its own streets, that any potential future use as a state highway did not divest the city of its authority, and that statutes granting overlapping powers to cities and the state were not inconsistent or subject to implied repeal.

property

This case involved chattel mortgagees who, after the mortgagors voluntarily returned possession of the secured property with an understanding of remaining liability on the note, conducted a private sale of the goods and fixtures and sought a deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance. The trial court granted the deficiency, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that a mortgagee may not obtain such a judgment after a private sale without the mortgagor's consent to that specific sale. The court reasoned that a chattel mortgage creates only a lien, not title, and that Washington's public policy against self-help repossession and sale requires foreclosure through statutory procedures to protect debtors from potentially unfair or collusive dispositions of the collateral. Absent compliance with foreclosure, the mortgagees forfeited any right to a deficiency.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Eddleman's suit to recover on a check drawn by defendant McGhan to Skycoach Airlines, which Skycoach transferred to plaintiff without endorsement after McGhan stopped payment. Defendants sought to offset the claim with an alleged compromise settlement from a prior lawsuit against Skycoach, arguing it created a defect in title under the negotiable instruments statute. The trial court excluded evidence of the settlement because it was not in writing or entered in court minutes as required by Superior Court Rule 10 and a related statute on attorney authority, and it entered judgment for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that disputed evidence of an unconsummated negotiation cannot be considered when the alleged agreement fails to meet the formal requirements designed to ensure certainty in settlements.

procedure

In Kingwell v. Hart, plaintiff Ella Kingwell sued defendant Lloyd Hart for injuries sustained when the car he was driving left the highway after he fell asleep at the wheel during a multi-day trip from Tacoma to California to locate her ill father; the parties had agreed she would cover expenses and she was not a guest passenger. After a bench trial, the lower court dismissed the case, concluding that Kingwell had voluntarily assumed the risk by continuing the journey despite knowing Hart was tired. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defense of assumption of risk was not established because the evidence did not prove Kingwell's voluntary consent to the specific risk after full appreciation of it; Hart's symptoms were largely subjective, she had no reasonable alternative given the circumstances and her inability to drive, and she received assurances from Hart that he was rested shortly before the accident. The court remanded for determination of damages, finding no reversible error in allowing amendment of the pleadings to assert the defense.

torts & liability

The case involved an 87-year-old pedestrian struck by a car in a marked crosswalk at a controlled Seattle intersection after the traffic signal changed in favor of vehicles while he was crossing; the plaintiff sued the driver for injuries and alleged the trial court gave improper jury instructions on right-of-way and contributory negligence. A jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the trial court denied a new trial. On appeal, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an instruction stating that a pedestrian who enters a crosswalk with the signal in his favor retains the right of way until reaching the other side, even if the signal changes, and that the given instruction on contributory negligence failed to address the plaintiff's physical infirmities. The exceptions to the jury instructions were found sufficient under procedural rules, and the failure to give the requested instruction constituted prejudicial error. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned whether a Washington corporation could lawfully conduct business under an assumed name and whether payments made to creditors by an insolvent corporation operating under such a name constituted recoverable preferences. The trial court ruled in favor of the assignee seeking to recover the payments, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that corporations may contract and operate under assumed names without abandoning their corporate status or creating partnerships by estoppel, noting that the uniform business corporation act does not alter this rule and that the filing of assumed-name certificates provides notice without prohibiting corporate use. Because the corporation did not obtain credit through deception or concealment and the assumed name did not inherently mislead creditors into believing they dealt with a partnership, the payments were preferences that had to be returned under the applicable statutes.

business & regulatory

The case was a habeas corpus proceeding brought by W.H. Buckingham, who had been convicted of incest and sentenced to life imprisonment, challenging the validity of his conviction on constitutional grounds. The Washington Supreme Court denied the writ. The majority reasoned that the trial court had jurisdiction, the judgment was regular on its face, and the petitioner's claims of denial of counsel and due process failed because he had acted competently and voluntarily in directing his appointed counsel's strategy, including agreeing to an early trial date and limiting the witnesses called. Other arguments, such as statutory timing requirements and challenges to the victim's identity, were deemed either repealed, untimely, or outside the scope of habeas review.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a dispute over whether a road crossing the defendants' land in Grant County, Washington, had become a public road through prescriptive use. The trial court ruled that the road had been established as public by adverse use from 1907 to 1919. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that because the land was wild, vacant, open, and unenclosed, the plaintiff's evidence of mere periodic travel over the road was insufficient to prove adverse use rather than permissive use, as required to establish a prescriptive right.

property

This case is the second appeal in a negligence lawsuit involving a building owner’s liability. After a verdict for the plaintiff in the second trial, the defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to give certain requested jury instructions on foreseeability, contributory negligence, damages for loss of earning capacity, and the standard of care for building owners. Applying the law-of-the-case doctrine, the court held that the parties and trial court were bound by the rulings and suggested instructions from the first appeal, which had not been followed, and therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a plumbing contracting company whose president had withdrawn from the defendant union, after which the company employed no union members and had no collective bargaining agreement with the union. The union picketed the company's job sites to force it to deal exclusively with the union and hire only union workers, which the trial court found was intended to destroy the business and caused irreparable harm. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the permanent injunction against the picketing, holding that no labor dispute existed under the state labor disputes act because the company had no union employees and that the picketing was coercive rather than persuasive in violation of state public policy.

labor & employment

This case involved a claim for personal injuries by plaintiffs against defendants who had a contract to improve streets in Everett, Washington. The defendants removed a concrete gutter, leaving a shallow trench around a housing project where plaintiffs lived. Plaintiff wife fell and was injured while crossing the trench, which she had done safely before and knew about. The trial court dismissed the action after all evidence was presented, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to show any breach of duty or actionable negligence by defendants, as the trench created only a slight hazard relative to its utility and the conditions were known to the plaintiff.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Romano v. Abraham, plaintiffs sued defendants to recover the unpaid balance on a written settlement agreement resolving a disputed joint venture involving plywood and log sales, where defendants had allegedly over-drawn funds. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs after rejecting defendants' claims of fraud in inducing the agreement and lack of consideration, as well as their request for an accounting. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the settlement of an unliquidated and disputed claim was supported by consideration through the resolution of the dispute itself, that fraud was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that the parties' prior access to records and the binding nature of the settlement eliminated any need for further accounting or offsets. The court modified the judgment on plaintiffs' cross-appeal to disallow a $108.25 offset that had been discussed during settlement negotiations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, a mother appealed the trial court's dismissal of her petition to modify the child custody provisions of a 1952 divorce decree, seeking sole custody of her two young children after remarrying and establishing a home in Seattle. The trial court found that her remarriage and new home were conditions already contemplated in the original decree, which alternated custody every six months until school age, and that no material change in circumstances justified modification, despite both parents being deemed fit. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that custody modifications require a showing of changed circumstances occurring after the original decree, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of pre-decree conditions or in weighing the children's welfare, and that divided custody decrees are generally disfavored but permissible here. The court did modify the judgment to relieve the mother of costs for transcribing the divorce trial transcript. The case centers on standards for post-divorce custody changes under state law.

family lawprocedure

This case concerns whether a parent seeking to modify child custody provisions in a divorce decree can request a different judge by filing an affidavit of prejudice under Washington statutes. The superior court denied the request, ruling it untimely because it followed the original divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the modification proceeding constitutes a new action based on changed circumstances since the decree, entitling the petitioner to a change of judge as a matter of right. The court reasoned that the statutes apply to such independent proceedings, and the motions were properly filed without undue delay.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a widow's appeal from a trial court judgment that reversed a board order and denied her claim for an industrial insurance pension after her husband's death. The claim alleged that the death resulted from a work-related rupture of a varicose vein caused by operating a brake pedal on a lift truck, leading to a fatal blood clot. The jury found that the board was incorrect in allowing the claim, and the trial court entered judgment on that verdict after denying post-trial motions. The court affirmed, holding that the factual issues of causation and the existence of a traumatic injury were properly submitted to the jury under the workers' compensation statutes, that the board's presumption of correctness was overcome by the verdict, and that substantial evidence supported the jury's decision. The appeal bond issue was resolved in the claimant's favor by prior ruling, as no bond is required in these special proceedings.

labor & employmentprocedure