State v. Thorn
Washington Supreme Court · 1996-09-21
In State v. Thorn, the State appealed the suppression of evidence in a prosecution for possession of a controlled substance after a police officer approached a legally parked car, observed a flicker of light, and asked the driver, "Where is the pipe?" leading the driver to hand over drug paraphernalia and resulting in the discovery of psilocybin mushrooms. The trial court and Court of Appeals had suppressed the evidence, finding that the question constituted a seizure without reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, concluding that whether a seizure occurred is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo, and that the officer's single question did not rise to the level of a seizure because it would not have caused a reasonable person to believe they were not free to leave. The court declined to consider greater protections under the Washington Constitution due to insufficient briefing on the Gunwall factors.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Cardenas
Washington Supreme Court · 1996-04-11 · cited 46×
This case involved the State of Washington's appeal from a Court of Appeals decision that reversed an exceptional sentence imposed on Eliezer Cardenas after he pleaded guilty to vehicular assault and hit-and-run injury. Cardenas, while driving drunk at high speed in a residential area, struck 69-year-old Margaret Michel in her yard, causing her severe injuries including a leg amputation, and then fled the scene. The trial court had imposed a 60-month exceptional sentence based on multiple factors including the victim's particular vulnerability due to advanced age, the severity and multiplicity of her injuries, and the defendant's egregious conduct. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting victim vulnerability as a valid aggravating factor under the Sentencing Reform Act, since the statute expressly allows consideration of a victim's advanced age, but agreed that the injury-related factors were not valid because the injuries were of the type contemplated by the vehicular assault statute. The court therefore upheld the exceptional sentence on the basis of victim vulnerability alone.
criminal lawprocedure
Organization to Preserve Agr. v. Adams Co.
Washington Supreme Court · 1996-03-28 · cited 1×
The case involved a challenge by the Organization to Preserve Agricultural Lands (OPAL) to Adams County's issuance of an Unclassified Use Permit allowing Waste Management to build a private regional landfill. The trial court upheld the permit after rejecting claims that the environmental impact statement was inadequate for omitting offsite alternatives and deferring groundwater studies, that the commissioners violated the appearance of fairness doctrine or the Open Public Meetings Act, that the permit conflicted with the county's solid waste plan, and that it was improperly tied to host fee payments. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the project was private so offsite alternatives were not required, that phased review and the studies were sufficient at this stage, that no procedural violations occurred, and that OPAL lacked standing to contest the fees under procurement statutes.
environmentbusiness & regulatory
PHILADELPHIA II v. Gregoire
Washington Supreme Court · 1996-02-29 · cited 48×
The case involved petitioners seeking to place Initiative 641, which aimed to create a national direct democracy process through state initiatives, on the Washington ballot. The Attorney General declined to prepare a ballot title, determining the measure exceeded the state's legislative authority, and the superior court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court held that while the Attorney General should have prepared the ballot title, the initiative was not within the scope of the people's initiative power under the state constitution because it primarily sought to enact federal law and lacked an independent state purpose. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal, preventing the initiative from appearing on the ballot.
electionsfederal power
State v. Thomas
Washington Supreme Court · 1996-02-08 · cited 90×
The case involved Tyrone Thomas's conviction for first-degree possession of stolen property after a one-day trial in which he did not testify. Thomas appealed, claiming the trial court erred by failing to advise him of his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf under the U.S. and Washington Constitutions. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the trial court has no duty to conduct a colloquy or advise the defendant of this right because ensuring a knowing and voluntary waiver is the responsibility of defense counsel, and evidence from counsel's affidavit showed Thomas had discussed and decided against testifying. The court also rejected an independent state constitutional claim due to inadequate briefing under the Gunwall factors.
criminal lawcivil rights
Sherman v. State
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-11-16 · cited 134×
Dr. Scott Sherman was terminated from the University of Washington School of Medicine's anesthesiology residency program after an incident suggesting possible drug use while treating a patient, following his prior treatment for chemical dependency on anesthetic narcotics. Sherman sued under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act challenging the termination and added claims including breach of contract, handicap discrimination, and retaliatory discharge against the State, University, and officials. The trial court granted summary judgment to Sherman without reaching the merits of the termination, vacated the University's order, awarded nearly $900,000 in damages and fees, and disqualified the Attorney General's office from representing the appellants. The Supreme Court reversed all these rulings and remanded for trial on the remaining claims.
labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedurehealthcare
Mid-Century Insurance v. Henault
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-11-16 · cited 50×
The case involved Christine Henault seeking uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage from Mid-Century Insurance after being injured by an uninsured driver while lying in the roadway following ejection from her uninsured motorcycle in a prior collision. The trial court granted summary judgment to Mid-Century, finding the policy's owned-vehicle exclusion applied because Henault was "occupying" her motorcycle, but the court of appeals reversed on UIM coverage. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that under the policy's definition of "occupying" as "in, on, getting into or out of," Henault was no longer occupying the motorcycle after being ejected and thus the exclusion did not bar coverage.
business & regulatoryprocedure
State v. Brown
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-10-12 · cited 77×
The case concerned James Brown's conviction for second-degree rape, stemming from an incident in which the complainant alleged she was raped after going to Brown's apartment. Brown challenged the admission of the victim's 911 tape as an excited utterance and the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on second-degree rape as a lesser included offense of the charged first-degree rape. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction. It held that the 911 tape was inadmissible as an excited utterance because the victim had decided prior to the call to fabricate part of her account, removing the spontaneity required for the exception. The opinion also addressed the two-prong test for lesser-included instructions but centered the reversal on the evidentiary ruling.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Bostrom
Washington Supreme Court · 1995-09-14 · cited 40×
In State v. Bostrom, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed consolidated cases from Thurston County District Court involving drivers arrested for DUI after July 1, 1994, where some consented to breath tests yielding results of 0.10 or higher and others refused. The district court had suppressed the test results and refusal evidence, finding the implied consent warnings inadequate because they omitted new administrative penalties like license suspension or probationary status for high test results and enhanced penalties for refusal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warnings given complied with the implied consent statute (RCW 46.20.308), which was not amended in 1994 to require additional information, and that due process did not mandate further warnings since the existing advisements were not fundamentally unfair or misleading in light of drivers' general awareness of DUI consequences. The court remanded the cases for trial.
criminal lawprocedure