Richard B. Sanders

The case involved D.F.F., who was involuntarily committed for psychiatric treatment under state law, with her proceedings automatically closed to the public under Mental Proceedings Rule 1.3. She appealed, arguing that the mandatory closure violated article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution, which requires that justice be administered openly. The Supreme Court ruled that MPR 1.3 is unconstitutional, as it imposes blanket closure without satisfying the individualized findings and five-part test established in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa for any exception to open proceedings. The court determined that D.F.F. had standing under article I, section 10 because the open administration of justice protects both public access and an individual's right to have proceedings open to scrutiny, including by family or others who might assist.

civil rightsprocedurehealthcare

The case involved wrongful death and survival claims brought by the estate and siblings of Tyler DeLeon, a child who died from neglect and abuse by his adoptive mother, against DSHS employees and medical providers who had treated him. The claims against the doctors and clinic alleged medical malpractice and failure to report suspected child abuse under RCW 26.44.030. The superior court granted partial summary judgment dismissing the wrongful death and survival actions because the siblings were not dependents of Tyler and dismissing the failure-to-report claim as precluded by the medical malpractice statute (chapter 7.70 RCW). The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissals, holding that the medical malpractice framework subsumes any implied civil remedy for failure to report and that the siblings did not qualify as dependents under the wrongful death statutes.

torts & liabilityhealthcarefamily law

This case involved the estate and siblings of Tyler DeLeon suing the Washington Department of Social and Health Services, its employees, and medical providers after Tyler died from neglect and abuse by his adoptive mother despite multiple CPS referrals. The plaintiffs asserted wrongful death and survival claims along with medical malpractice and an implied civil action for failure to report suspected child abuse under RCW 26.44.030. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the superior court's partial summary judgments dismissing the wrongful death and survival actions because the siblings did not qualify as dependents under the relevant statutes, and it dismissed the implied reporting claim because chapter 7.70 RCW governs medical malpractice remedies. The core reasoning rested on statutory interpretation requiring real and substantial dependency for wrongful death beneficiaries and legislative intent that the malpractice statute subsumes separate causes of action for reporting failures.

torts & liabilityfamily lawhealthcare

In State v. Marohl, the defendant was charged with second or third degree assault after placing another man in a choke hold during an altercation at a casino bar, causing the victim to fall unconscious and injure his face and prosthetic arm upon hitting the floor. A jury acquitted on second degree assault but convicted on third degree assault under RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d), which requires causing bodily harm by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that insufficient evidence supported the conviction because a casino floor is not an "instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm" under the statute. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language requires an object similar to a weapon, and passive objects like floors do not qualify when the contact is incidental to the act rather than an intended instrumentality.

criminal law

In State v. Marohl, the defendant was charged with third degree assault after placing the victim in a choke hold during an altercation at a bar, causing the victim to fall to the floor and sustain injuries including a broken prosthetic arm. The jury convicted him under RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d), which requires causing bodily harm by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The court reasoned that the casino floor, as a passive object, did not qualify as an "instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm" under the plain meaning of the statute, and neither the defendant's arm nor the floor could support the conviction.

criminal law

The case involved the estate of Edward Gregoire suing the City of Oak Harbor for negligence after Gregoire, who had been arrested on misdemeanor warrants and exhibited unstable and suicidal behavior in custody, hanged himself in a jail cell roughly half an hour after arrival. The trial court instructed the jury on assumption of risk and contributory negligence over the plaintiff's objections; the jury found the city negligent but determined its negligence was not the proximate cause of death, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that because jailors owe a special duty of care to inmates, jury instructions on assumption of risk and contributory negligence are inappropriate in cases of inmate suicide.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

The case concerned whether double jeopardy was violated by multiple convictions arising from the same conduct when Shawn Francis pleaded guilty to felony murder of one victim, first degree attempted robbery of a second victim, and second degree assault of the second victim. The court held that the robbery and assault convictions violated double jeopardy protections because the State had charged the assault conduct as the element elevating the attempted robbery to first degree. It therefore vacated the assault conviction and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that a guilty plea does not waive a double jeopardy challenge to multiple convictions for the same offense and that the offenses merged under the facts as charged.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the City of Seattle charged Matthew Jacob with DUI, and the municipal court suppressed breath test evidence based on governmental misconduct in certifying the calibration solution, applying CrRLJ 8.3(b) to suppress rather than dismiss the prosecution. The superior court denied the City's petition for a writ of review, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the rule permits only dismissal and that a writ was available to challenge the error. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, ruling that CrRLJ 8.3(b) authorizes only dismissal of the prosecution for such misconduct and that a writ of review was not an appropriate remedy because the City had other avenues for review after final judgment. The court based its decision on the plain language of the rule, which does not mention suppression, and on precedents limiting writs to cases without adequate alternative remedies.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a Lummi Nation tribal police officer had authority to pursue and detain a non-Indian driver suspected of DUI after observing traffic violations on the reservation and continuing the stop after the driver crossed the reservation boundary into a gas station. The Washington Supreme Court held that tribal officers may continue fresh pursuit of motorists who violate traffic laws on the reservation and drive beyond its boundaries until state authorities with arrest jurisdiction arrive. This ruling extended the precedent in State v. Schmuck, which allowed on-reservation detention of non-Indians, by recognizing tribes' inherent sovereign authority to enforce internal criminal laws and prevent evasion through jurisdictional lines. The court affirmed the trial court's DUI conviction, reasoning that such pursuit aligns with the tribe's retained sovereignty over its territory and members as well as state mutual aid and fresh pursuit policies.

criminal lawfederal power

The case concerned whether Washington's statute (RCW 9.46.240) criminalizing the transmission and reception of gambling information over the Internet violated the dormant commerce clause by unduly burdening interstate and foreign commerce. Lee Rousso, a state resident who had played online poker, sought a declaratory judgment that the law was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the statute, holding that Congress had not expressly authorized state regulation in a manner that removed dormant commerce clause scrutiny, but the law applied evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state actors. The court reasoned that the ban served a legitimate state purpose of protecting residents from the harms of gambling and that any resulting burden on interstate commerce was not clearly excessive in relation to that benefit, leaving policy choices about gambling to the legislature.

criminal lawfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In State v. Doughty, the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether a police officer lawfully conducted an investigative Terry stop of a driver observed approaching a suspected drug house for under two minutes at 3:20 a.m., leading to a records check, arrest for driving with a suspended license, and discovery of methamphetamine. The court held the seizure unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the drug possession conviction. The officer relied on neighbor complaints identifying the house as a suspected drug house and the brief late-night visit, but had no direct observations of drug activity or other specific facts about the defendant. The court reasoned that mere presence in a high-crime area or proximity to suspected criminal conduct at a late hour does not, by itself, establish the particularized reasonable suspicion required for a warrantless stop.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Rob Freeman's 2006 motion to modify or terminate a permanent domestic violence protection order that his ex-wife Robin obtained in 1998 during their Washington divorce proceedings, based on two incidents where Rob physically pushed Robin's daughter and displayed guns in a way that frightened Robin. The superior court commissioner denied the motion, finding Robin's ongoing fear reasonable due to the past events and Rob's military background, despite Rob's claims of no contact since 1998, relocation to Missouri, a hand amputation, and lack of any current threat. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that any fear must relate to a threat of imminent harm, which time and distance made unsupported here. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the commissioner abused her discretion by failing to terminate the order under these circumstances.

family law

The case involved Michael Segaline, an electrical contractor, who sued the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries after the agency issued a no-trespass notice barring him from its office due to his behavior during permit transactions and later had him arrested for criminal trespass. Segaline alleged claims including negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, negligent supervision, and a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against an agency employee. The court held that the Department does not qualify as a 'person' under RCW 4.24.510, the state's anti-SLAPP statute providing immunity for communications to government agencies, because the statute's purpose is to protect private parties' free speech rights, which government entities do not possess. The court also ruled that Segaline's § 1983 claim was time-barred as it was added after the statute of limitations had expired without relation back to the original filing.

free speechcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Michael Segaline, an electrical contractor, who sued the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) after being issued a no-trespass notice and arrested for returning to an L&I office to obtain permits, alleging claims including negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, negligent supervision, and a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against employee Alan Croft. The court held that L&I does not qualify as a 'person' entitled to immunity under RCW 4.24.510, the state's anti-SLAPP statute protecting communications to government agencies, and that Segaline's § 1983 claim against Croft was time-barred. The core reasoning was that the statute's purpose is to safeguard First Amendment and state constitutional free speech rights, which government agencies lack, making the immunity inapplicable; additionally, amending the complaint to add Croft as a defendant after the limitations period constituted inexcusable neglect that did not relate back to the original filing.

free speechcivil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

The case involved Marilea R. Mitchell, who was charged with first degree criminal mistreatment under RCW 9A.42.020(1) for allegedly withholding basic necessities of life from a severely malnourished four-year-old boy in her care. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell's conviction after a bench trial, rejecting her argument that the statutory terms "child" and "dependent person" are mutually exclusive. The court reasoned that the boy qualified as a dependent person based on his physical disabilities and incapacities, such as inability to stand, walk, or digest food, which satisfied the statutory definition, and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The decision focused solely on the sufficiency of evidence regarding the dependent person element.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute under Washington's Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA) over lease terms in a manufactured home park. Landlords offered 25-year leases with fixed rent increases to original tenants, but the leases converted to one- or two-year terms if assigned to others; tenants who assigned their leases later sued, arguing the provision violated the MHLTA's protections for lease assignments and was unenforceable. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the provision did not violate the MHLTA. The court reasoned that the statute expressly allows parties to negotiate and agree on the term of a rental agreement, and the leases here reflected such an agreement rather than an improper waiver of assignment rights.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In this case, Robert Vance was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of child molestation and communicating with a minor for immoral purposes involving several victims, and after prior convictions the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of consecutive prison terms totaling 594 months, finding that concurrent sentences under the default multiple offense policy would be clearly too lenient. Vance challenged the consecutive sentences on appeal, arguing that the judge's factual finding violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington and state precedent. The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate the Constitution. The court reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision in Oregon v. Ice established that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury findings to support consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' order for concurrent sentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Osman, the defendant was convicted of DUI after a district court denied his motion to suppress statements and found probable cause for the traffic stop and arrest, despite his claims of a language barrier affecting Miranda warnings and other issues. A portion of the electronic record from the suppression hearing was missing, including the end of cross-examination, redirect, counsel arguments, an exhibit admission, and the court's oral findings and conclusions. Osman sought a new trial under RALJ 5.4, arguing the missing record was significant or material to his appeal. The Washington Supreme Court held that the missing portions were material because they related directly to the issues raised on appeal and the trial court's credibility and factual determinations, entitling Osman to a new trial. The court reviewed the rule de novo, clarified the standard of review, and rejected arguments that the missing record was insignificant.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of 17-year-old Christopher Sieyes for unlawful possession of a firearm under RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(iii) after police found a loaded handgun in his car. The Washington Supreme Court addressed whether the Second Amendment applies to the states and whether the statute violated rights under the U.S. or Washington Constitutions. The court held that the Second Amendment's individual right to bear arms, as recognized in Heller, applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. However, it concluded that the statute's limits on minors' firearm possession did not unconstitutionally infringe on those rights or the state constitutional protections, based on the record presented and applicable standards of review. The decision focused on incorporation doctrine and the permissibility of age-based restrictions without finding a violation.

gunscriminal lawcivil rights

This case concerned a mother's challenge to the termination of her parental rights to her son C.S., who had been removed from her care in 2002 due to her substance abuse. After the mother successfully completed treatment and remained sober, the State petitioned to terminate her rights based on her alleged inability to manage the child's special needs related to ADHD and other disorders, without having offered her any services or training to address those needs. The Washington Supreme Court held that termination was improper under RCW 13.34.180 because the statute requires the State to provide all necessary services reasonably available to correct parental deficiencies before termination can occur. The court reasoned that the mother's fundamental liberty interest in the parent-child relationship could not be severed without clear and convincing evidence that the State had fulfilled its obligation to offer remedial services, and it reversed the termination order and Court of Appeals decision.

family lawcivil rights