George B. Simpson

This case involved a dispute over the estate of Gottlop Schwank, where plaintiff Evaline Ellis alleged she was his daughter and that defendant Albert Schwank had fraudulently destroyed later wills and written acknowledgments recognizing her status, while probating an earlier 1920 will that excluded her. Ellis sought to recover a one-half interest in the roughly $500,000 estate through an independent action claiming a constructive trust based on extrinsic fraud. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the complaint. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the alleged fraud was extrinsic because it prevented Ellis from presenting her claims in the probate proceeding, and that the complaint adequately stated a cause of action for equitable relief. Dissenting opinions argued the action was premature absent allegations that a final decree of distribution had been entered.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In Burch v. Rice, the plaintiff sued his former wife to obtain a decree declaring him the owner of a one-half interest in a restaurant business known as Mother’s Kitchen and for an accounting of profits. The trial court dismissed the action and confirmed full title in the defendant; on appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The parties had executed a written property settlement agreement in 1936 during divorce proceedings in which the plaintiff transferred all interest in the restaurant to the defendant in exchange for other assets and monthly payments. Although the couple briefly reconciled afterward, they did not alter the agreement, and the plaintiff waited nearly ten years before asserting any claim while the defendant improved the property. The court held the settlement enforceable and concluded that the plaintiff’s delay constituted laches.

family lawproperty

In Davies v. Krueger, a plaintiff sued on behalf of residents in King County Water District No. 79 to enjoin the sale of general obligation and revenue bonds approved by voters, arguing that the district failed to comply with statutory requirements for publishing election notices. The trial court denied the injunction, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that unless a statute expressly voids an election for noncompliance, notice rules are directory rather than mandatory, and the election remains valid if voters received sufficient information through alternative channels such as local newspapers, community meetings, and canvassing, leading to broad participation. It noted that courts apply a more lenient standard to post-election challenges when the process produced a fair expression of voter intent.

electionsprocedure

This case concerned the Public Service Commission's grant of a common carrier permit to Pacific Inland Transport, Ltd., for intrastate transportation of petroleum in eastern Washington, which was challenged by existing carriers. The superior court reversed the permit, and the Commission appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Commission's order was invalid because its findings did not comply with statutory requirements, which mandate specific determinations on the applicant's fitness, impact on highways and existing services, and public interest before issuing a permit. The court reasoned that administrative findings must include ultimate facts rather than arguments or recitations of evidence, and remanded the matter for proper findings based on the existing record.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the enforcement of an option to purchase real property included in a month-to-month lease agreement signed in 1944. The plaintiff sought specific performance after notifying the defendants of intent to exercise the option in 1946, but the defendants refused, claiming the agreement was invalid under the statute of frauds due to lack of acknowledgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purchase option was a valid executory contract separate from the lease and enforceable despite not being acknowledged, and that the defendants' refusals caused any delay in closing.

property

In Barrington v. Murry, the plaintiff, as assignee of a joint adventure group, sued defendant Murry to recover $3,580.89 advanced for converting an Allison airplane engine to diesel operation, after the defendants had provided warranties about their expertise, the machine shop's capabilities, the conversion's maximum cost of $1,500, and its successful performance. The trial court, sitting without a jury, made detailed findings of fact establishing the warranties, the failed attempts to start the engine, and the joint venture relationship, and entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, treating the trial court's findings as verities because the evidence did not preponderate against them and applying joint adventure principles that hold participants liable for representations made to induce advances of funds.

business & regulatory

The case involved a worker who suffered a serious injury in an extrahazardous occupation on July 30, 1945, and whose claim for industrial insurance compensation was initially allowed by the supervisor but later increased by the joint board and then further increased by the superior court. The state appealed, arguing that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because the worker's notice of appeal from the supervisor's order to the joint board was filed after the 60-day statutory deadline under Rem. Supp. 1943, § 7697. The court held that the joint board possessed broad authority under Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10837 to jointly hear and decide matters it deemed sufficiently important, including granting a rehearing on its own initiative, and that this exercise of discretion preserved the claimant's right to appeal to the courts. It further reasoned that precedents allowing the department to reopen claims despite time limits supported the board's power here, so the trial court properly considered the appeal. The judgment increasing compensation was affirmed.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned a petition by the Great Northern Railway Company, supported by the Department of Transportation, to close an at-grade railroad crossing on Park Avenue in the town of Mukilteo, Washington, on the grounds that it posed a danger to public safety. The department ordered the crossing closed, but the trial court ruled against closure, and this dissenting opinion argues that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. The core reasoning is that the crossing had operated safely for 42 years with no recorded accidents, alternative access via an overhead crossing at Lincoln Avenue would create new hazards and inconvenience for residents and emergency services in the small community, and local interests were better suited than a state agency to determine the balance of safety and access needs.

business & regulatory

The case involved the estate of Susannah E. Marshall, whose 1944 will granted the executrix broad control over the property to carry out the testatrix's separate instructions but did not name specific beneficiaries for the residue. After probate in 1946, the executrix sought to distribute the residue according to a 1945 letter listing individuals, but the state objected that those persons were not named in the will itself. The trial court rejected the proposed distribution and ordered the residue to escheat to the state, and the executrix appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state had not contested the will's validity and that the letter could not be treated as part of the will because it was neither attached to the will nor properly presented on appeal under the court's procedural rules.

propertyprocedure

This case was a personal injury lawsuit against the City of Seattle in which the city admitted liability after a bus door closed on the plaintiff, causing him to fall and break his leg near the hip. The jury awarded $14,000 in damages for the plaintiff's extended hospitalization, bedsores, weight loss, ongoing pain, use of crutches, and discolored scarring nearly two years after the accident, and the city appealed on grounds that the verdict was excessive and that jury instruction No. 4 on life expectancy was improper without medical evidence of permanent injury. The court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that the amount was justified by evidence of prolonged suffering and reduced dollar value and that the instruction was supported by the plaintiff's testimony of continued pain and incomplete recovery, which permitted an inference of permanence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Miller v. City of Spokane, operators of pinball machines sued to enjoin city officials from enforcing an ordinance that banned possession and operation of the machines, after a referendum petition challenged the ban and earlier ordinances had taxed and regulated them. The trial court granted a permanent injunction, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and ordered dismissal of the action. The court held that pinball machines qualify as gambling devices under state statute Rem. Rev. Stat. § 2472 because they involve chance rather than skill, making their operation a gross misdemeanor. Under Article XI, § 10 of the state constitution, local ordinances and referendums cannot conflict with or supersede general state laws prohibiting such devices, so neither the city commission nor voters could legalize them.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiff Minder suing to collect on a promissory note from defendant Rowley and to enforce a written agreement against defendants Case requiring them to pay Minder from the proceeds of selling logs that Rowley had assigned to Case after first reimbursing Case's own advancements to Rowley. The trial court entered judgment against Rowley and ordered the Cases to turn over a specified sum to be credited on that judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the contract's reference to "proceeds" meant gross proceeds and that the Cases were bound by the unambiguous terms of the agreement they signed, which contained no fraud or misunderstanding.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a Seattle cigarette seller suing to block enforcement of a 1949 Washington statute that levied an additional excise tax on cigarettes to finance $80 million in bonds for paying bonuses to World War II veterans. The plaintiff alleged the law violated multiple provisions of the state constitution, including single-subject and amendment rules, debt limits, and equal-protection guarantees, and sought injunctions against tax collection, bond issuance, and related state actions. The trial court overruled the state's demurrer and granted the injunction, but the Supreme Court reversed, ruling the statute constitutional because legislative acts carry a strong presumption of validity, the cigarette-tax proceeds could lawfully be redirected to a special veterans' fund, and none of the cited constitutional clauses were clearly breached.

taxes

This case involved a divorce proceeding in which the superior court granted an interlocutory decree to both parties and ordered the sale of the family home, with provisions allowing each spouse an opportunity to buy out the other's interest after accounting for the value difference in awarded vehicles. The wife, who received custody of the two minor children, appealed the property division, arguing she should have been awarded the home outright to care for the children and without crediting the husband for the car awarded to her. Because the wife did not file a statement of facts, the appellate court was limited to reviewing whether the trial court's findings supported the judgment and had to presume those findings were correct. The court affirmed the order, holding that the findings supported the decree and that the absence of a full factual record prevented it from concluding the trial court erred in its disposition of the home and vehicles.

family lawproperty

In Darnell v. Noel, buyers sued sellers to rescind a sale of real and personal property, alleging that the sellers had misrepresented the boundaries by pointing out an area that included part of a public street on which the house actually stood. The trial court granted rescission and awarded the buyers the purchase price less credits for rents received during their possession. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, applied the rule that boundary representations are treated as facts rather than opinions, examined the evidence showing the sellers' inaccurate indications and the buyers' timely discovery and suit, and concluded that the trial court's decree was supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence with no laches or excessive credits.

property

This case concerns a dispute over a trial court's entry of summary judgment against a client for attorney's fees upon a change of counsel. The majority upheld the judgment, but the dissent argues that the governing 1863 statutes (Rem. Rev. Stat. §§ 133, 134, 136, 138) authorize only limited remedies such as liens on papers, funds, or judgments and do not permit summary adjudication of fee claims. The dissent further contends that the act's title violates Article II, § 19 of the Washington Constitution by failing to express the subject of summary judgments and that the procedure infringes the right to jury trial under Article I, § 21.

procedurecivil rights

The case concerned a criminal prosecution, apparently involving a murder charge carrying the death penalty, in which the defendant sought to introduce testimony from witnesses about statements he had made regarding his physical and mental condition to support an insanity defense. The trial court repeatedly sustained objections to questions eliciting the content of those conversations, allowing only evidence of complaints made, and the majority affirmed the conviction on the ground that defense counsel had failed to make a formal offer of proof. The dissenting opinion contended that no offer of proof was required because the questions themselves made clear the nature of the evidence sought and the court had definitively ruled that conversations would not be admitted. It relied on established exceptions to the offer-of-proof rule and authorities holding that such evidence is admissible when its purpose is apparent from the questions asked.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a wrongful death action brought by the widow of a man electrocuted by a broken power line while he attempted to move the wire away from a smoldering fire near his property using a wooden board. The dissenting opinion concludes that the claim should have been dismissed because the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law by voluntarily and knowingly approaching the live wire despite awareness of the hazard. The dissent reasons that established precedent, including Druse v. Pacific Power & Light Co., bars recovery when an adult knowingly exposes himself to electrical danger to protect property, and that the presumption of due care can be overcome by evidence from any competent witness.

torts & liability

The case concerned a challenge by Northwest Greyhound Lines to an order by the Department of Transportation that denied Greyhound authority to operate bus service on certain routes between Spokane and the Grand Coulee Dam area while granting such authority to a competitor. The superior court upheld the department's order, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. The court held that Greyhound's 1933 certificate of public convenience and necessity, along with subsequent department approvals, gave it a vested right to serve the dam site and adjacent developing towns such as Mason City and Grand Coulee. The department's later order was inconsistent with its prior actions recognizing Greyhound's rights and lacked any showing of legal violations by Greyhound that would justify revocation or limitation of those rights.

business & regulatory

The case involved the conviction of a married man for attempted carnal knowledge of an eight-year-old girl after he invited her into his car, drove her outside town, and engaged in sexual acts including attempted penetration as described in her testimony. The defendant was charged with the completed offense under state law but the trial court instructed the jury solely on the included crime of attempt, leading to his conviction on that lesser charge. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that statutes permitted the jury to convict of an attempt even after the greater offense was withdrawn from consideration and that the evidence, including the child's account of the defendant's actions, sufficiently supported the verdict. It also found the trial court's credibility instructions adequate and rejected challenges to other jury instructions as harmless or unnecessary.

criminal law