Charles T. Wright

This case is an attorney disciplinary proceeding against Stanley B. Allper, referred to the Washington Supreme Court after the Disciplinary Board recommended disbarment for mishandling client funds and related violations. The court ordered Allper disbarred, finding that he failed to retain $2,520 in escrow in his trust account as required, allowed the trust account balance to drop below the needed amount with multiple NSF checks, and closed the account without paying the clients. The decision rested on violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (DR 9-102 on trust funds and DR 1-102 on unfitness to practice), combined with Allper's prior disciplinary record of censures and reprimands for neglect and conflicts, his failure to cooperate or appear at hearings, and distinctions from a prior case involving lesser sanctions.

procedure

This case is an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction in Washington, centered on whether testimony about a key prosecution witness (initially the prime suspect) taking two polygraph examinations was improperly admitted at trial. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the testimony violated the rule barring polygraph evidence absent stipulation because it created a strong inference that the witness had passed the tests and was therefore truthful. The court reasoned that the defense's cross-examination questioning the adequacy of the police investigation did not open the door to this evidence, that the implication was manifestly prejudicial to the defendant, and that the error was compounded by the prosecution's reference to the tests in closing argument.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether an assignee of a vendor's right to receive payments under an executory real estate sales contract obtains priority over later lien creditors, including a bankruptcy trustee, when the assignment is recorded in county real property records but not filed as a financing statement under the Uniform Commercial Code. The Washington Supreme Court held that the vendor's right to contract payments is personal property and that an assignment of that right for security purposes constitutes a secured transaction governed by UCC Article 9. Because the assignments at issue were not perfected by filing under the UCC, the assignees lacked priority and the bankruptcy trustees could collect the payments as general creditors. The court reached this conclusion by relying on prior Washington precedent characterizing vendors' interests in real estate contracts as personalty and by rejecting arguments that the transactions fell within UCC exclusions for real property interests.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved appeals by Johnie Scott, Roger Benson, and Kevin Sample from their first-degree robbery convictions arising from an armed robbery of The Office Tavern in Tacoma on March 25, 1977, during which police stopped a matching vehicle based on a prior similar robbery and arrested the defendants shortly after the crime. The court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause given the vehicle description, its prior use in a similar robbery, and the officers' reasonable actions in setting up checkpoints. Challenges to the lineup procedures, habitual criminal proceedings, and related jury instructions were rejected as meritless, with the sole modification being deletion of the armed enhancement from the sentences of Benson and Sample.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned challenges by neighboring landowners to Kitsap County's rezoning of a 38-acre tract and the City of Bremerton's preannexation comprehensive plan adoption and zoning of a larger area, both intended to permit construction of a regional shopping center. The court held that county zoning ordinances need not strictly conform to comprehensive plans under the Planning Enabling Act, as such plans serve as guides rather than binding requirements. It reversed the county's rezone after finding the environmental impact statement inadequate for lacking sufficient analysis of alternative sites and socio-economic effects on the downtown area, but affirmed the city's actions on the ground that its EIS was adequate under the rule of reason.

business & regulatoryenvironmentproperty

The case concerned whether the City of Tacoma could impose its business and occupation tax on the Hyster Company for sales and service activities involving Tacoma customers. Hyster had no office in Tacoma but maintained telephone listings, advertised locally, and assigned employees who spent substantial time there on sales calls, customer solicitations, and on-site repairs, with all contracts ultimately approved in Seattle. The trial court ruled that Hyster's activities did not create sufficient nexus for Tacoma to tax the company. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employees' ongoing sales-supporting and service activities within the city provided the required nexus under due process, allowing taxation measured by gross receipts from Tacoma customers. The court relied on precedents establishing that a reasonable relationship between the taxed activities and local benefits satisfies constitutional requirements for jurisdiction to tax.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a challenge to a Skagit County substantial development permit issued to Marine Construction and Dredging, Inc. (MCD) allowing dredging and placement of dredge spoil on an 11-acre shoreline site near Padilla Bay, which state agencies argued violated the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, related DOE regulations, and the county's shoreline master program. The Shorelines Hearings Board ruled that spoil could be placed on 4 acres but not the remaining 7 acres (which it required to remain a buffer and wildlife habitat), and the superior court upheld that decision. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the permit could not authorize spoil placement on any portion of the site. The court reasoned that the master program and SMA require prior DOE designation of spoil disposal areas, which had not occurred, and that the entire site functions as a valuable wildlife habitat whose development would be inconsistent with shoreline use preferences and buffer requirements under RCW 90.58.020 and the master program. The permit was remanded for modification to prohibit spoil disposal anywhere on the 11 acres.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Lorenzo Rice, who was convicted under Seattle's criminal trespass ordinance after being arrested for remaining in the city's Public Safety Building despite a prior ban by police. The ordinance made it unlawful to defy a 'lawful order' not to enter or remain on premises open to the public. The trial court set aside the jury verdict, and on appeal the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding the ordinance unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that the term 'lawful order' failed to give persons of ordinary understanding fair notice of prohibited conduct and lacked explicit standards, risking arbitrary enforcement by police. The decision rested on due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over an oral lease-option agreement for a farm where the lessees sued for breach after being evicted and unable to exercise the option to purchase. The jury awarded $40,000 in damages to the Powers, but the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding the agreement unenforceable under the statute of frauds due to lack of sufficient part performance. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held there was substantial evidence before the jury of the contract's terms, character, and existence based on admissions by both parties, as well as part performance through possession, payments, and improvements that took the agreement outside the statute of frauds.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether four King County Council members violated RCW 42.17.130 by voting at a public meeting to endorse a statewide antipornography ballot measure, which the Public Disclosure Commission and Superior Court found improper as use of public facilities to support a ballot proposition. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding the endorsement qualified for the statutory exception allowing activities that are part of the normal and regular conduct of the office. The court determined the action was normal because the council and similar bodies had made comparable endorsements on multiple prior occasions, and regular because the county's home rule charter granted broad authority to adopt policy declarations without the force of law.

electionsfree speech

This case involved two high school teachers who sued their school district after being restricted from teaching a pilot 'Global Studies' history course using their preferred team-teaching method with small groups and individual projects. The district had approved the course but, due to low student enrollment via a preference registration system, reduced the classes offered and reassigned one teacher to conventional history instruction and another to a science lab; the teachers claimed violations of academic freedom, free speech, retaliation for filing a grievance, and equal protection. The trial court granted summary judgment to the school board, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that curriculum content, teaching methods, and course offerings are within the board's statutory authority under state law, with no protected teacher right to override administrative directives or student choices. The court further found no First Amendment violation because the asserted academic freedom claim was independent of student rights and the cases cited by the teachers involved different facts like prior notice or controversial content. It also rejected the retaliation and equal protection claims for lack of supporting evidence or legal basis.

free speechcivil rights

This case concerned a juvenile offender who pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary, then escaped from custody twice and was charged with two counts of first-degree escape. The sole issue was whether a juvenile can be convicted of first-degree escape, an offense that requires detention pursuant to a felony conviction. The court granted the personal restraint petition, ruling that the juvenile could not be guilty because Washington statutes define a juvenile offense as an act that would be a crime only if committed by an adult, and an adjudication of delinquency is not a criminal conviction. The core reasoning was that the plain language of the relevant provisions (including RCW 13.04.240 and RCW 13.40.020) prevents treating the juvenile's burglary adjudication as a felony conviction, so an essential element of first-degree escape was missing.

criminal law

This case is a class action brought by AFDC recipients in Washington challenging state rules that required them to assign support payments to the state, cooperate in enforcement, immediately remit any support received, and repay retained amounts or face grant reductions and protective payee arrangements. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class against DSHS and OSE, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that WAC 388-14-200(4) conflicts with the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)) and HEW regulations (45 C.F.R. § 232.12), which condition eligibility on assignment and cooperation but require protective payments for children when a caretaker relative is ineligible, without the state's additional harsh repayment mandates. The core reasoning was that the state rule exceeds federal requirements by imposing repayment conditions that often prevent recipients from regaining eligibility, rendering it void.

federal powerfamily law

This case involved an injured worker's application to reopen his workers' compensation claim for aggravation of a back injury sustained in 1972 while moving drums at a bakery. The claim had been closed in 1973 with a 6% permanent partial disability award, but the worker sought reopening in late 1973 based on worsening symptoms; the Department of Labor and Industries and Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals denied it, though the Superior Court granted the application. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. The core reasoning was that medical testimony from the treating physician, grounded in objective findings from examinations designed to minimize malingering, provided substantial evidence of aggravation between the claim closure date and the denial date, consistent with precedent requiring such proof for reopening.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Ricardo Solis Garcia, who was convicted of rape in Yakima County Superior Court after expressing dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel on the morning of trial and requesting different attorneys. Garcia appealed on multiple grounds, including claims related to his right to self-representation, leading the Court of Appeals to remand for a determination of whether he wished to proceed pro se. The Washington Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the conviction, ruling that a trial court has no duty to advise a defendant of the right to self-representation absent an unequivocal request and that Garcia never made such a request, as his statements only indicated a desire for substitute counsel. The court further held that expressions of dissatisfaction with appointed counsel do not equate to a clear waiver of counsel or invocation of the pro se right. The timeliness of any such request was not reached because no valid request occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a house built under permit No. 398 violated a Lake Forest Park ordinance limiting buildings to two stories, specifically whether the basement counted as a third story under the ordinance's definition of 'grade.' Petitioners had obtained a temporary injunction against an earlier permit but later challenged the revised permit after abandoning their height claim. The trial court dismissed the complaint and awarded the Lockes damages on the injunction bond, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that 'grade' must be measured at each point along the building's perimeter to determine if the floor above the basement exceeds six feet for more than 50 percent of the perimeter; this interpretation avoids absurd results and gives effect to all ordinance language. The court also upheld the bond judgment because the initial injunction was based on a clerical error in the first permit.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. McIntyre, the defendant was taken to a police station for questioning in a statutory rape investigation, which the trial court found constituted an arrest on December 5, 1978; he was later charged by information filed January 31, 1979, and arraigned March 6, 1979. McIntyre moved to dismiss under CrR 3.3, arguing the speedy-trial clock began running 10 days after his arrest. The trial court denied the motion, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rule's plain language requires the time limit to commence from the tenth day following arrest when no preliminary hearing is held and the charge is filed directly in superior court. The court applied principles of statutory construction to the unambiguous rule text and confirmed that the December 5 encounter met the definition of arrest because McIntyre was not free to leave.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Frederick McDonald, an unsuccessful applicant to the University of Washington School of Medicine, who sued alleging that the school's denial of his 1976 application involved racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the admissions standards and procedures were arbitrary and capricious. The trial court dismissed the action after McDonald presented his case, and the Washington Supreme Court reviewed the certified appeal. The court examined the competitive admissions process, which used GPA and MCAT scores for an initial screen, followed by interviews evaluating noncognitive factors, with race considered as one positive factor among others for certain applicants, resulting in McDonald ranking below many admitted candidates including some minorities with lower initial scores. Drawing on precedents such as Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the court held that the policy of considering race did not violate equal protection and that the overall standards and their application to McDonald were not arbitrary or capricious.

civil rights

This case concerned whether a Washington State Patrol trooper could lawfully arrest a driver for driving under the influence at a hospital after investigating a one-car accident at the scene under RCW 46.64.017. The district court ruled the arrest illegal and dismissed the charges, the superior court modified the dismissal to be without prejudice, and both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed. The majority held the statute ambiguous as to the location of arrest, applied strict construction because it derogates the common-law rule requiring misdemeanors to occur in an officer's presence, and invoked the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in the defendant's favor. The court concluded that any expansion of arrest authority must come from clear legislative language rather than judicial interpretation. Dissenters argued the statute plainly permits arrest wherever the identified officer locates the driver.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a defendant whose suspended sentence for second-degree burglary was revoked after a guilty plea to heroin possession, based on incomplete and erroneous information from a drug testing center indicating noncompliance with court-ordered tests. The trial court initially imposed sentence and revoked the suspension but the next day vacated both orders on its own motion after receiving corrected facts showing the defendant had sought testing as required and that a positive result could stem from a cold tablet. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CR 60(b)(11) applies to criminal cases and authorizes relief from judgments under these unusual circumstances where the court acted on mistaken information and the defendant had been diligent in requesting continuances.

criminal lawprocedure