John E. Carrigan

The case involved Larry Eugene Smith, who was convicted in circuit court of possessing marijuana in violation of state narcotics law after an undercover trooper entered his home with an arrest warrant for a roommate, leading to a confrontation where Smith allegedly displayed a bowl containing the substance. The court reviewed multiple alleged trial errors, including the denial of Smith's motion to examine the alleged marijuana, improper communications between the court and jury during deliberations, a bailiff's conversation with jurors, and the refusal to poll the jury after a reported deadlock. The appellate court held that these errors, along with their cumulative effect, prejudiced Smith and denied him a fair trial under state and federal constitutions. It therefore reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by John Wayne Ford challenging his life sentence for first-degree murder after a jury found him guilty 'as charged' in an indictment for the slaying of Henry Russell. Ford argued that the verdict was invalid because it did not expressly state 'murder in the first degree' as required by statute, despite the trial involving a felony-murder theory based on robbery and burglary. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the denial of relief, holding that the statutory definition of first-degree murder encompasses killings during robbery or burglary, the evidence supported that classification, and the verdict under the indictment was sufficient to uphold the sentence. The court reasoned that West Virginia law does not require separate indictments for degrees of murder and that the jury could only have found first-degree murder or acquittal based on the instructions and facts presented. A dissent argued the verdict supported only second-degree murder sentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs suing a newspaper company and its manager for malicious prosecution after the defendants allegedly instigated the plaintiffs' arrest on kidnapping charges stemming from an incident where they gave rides to two female hitchhikers. The charges were dismissed at a preliminary hearing, and the plaintiffs sought damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, but the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding probable cause and malice that required a trial.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In Keiffer v. Queen, the plaintiffs sued for damages arising from a 1965 automobile collision in which the defendant made a left turn into the path of the plaintiffs' vehicle on a two-lane highway. The jury awarded the driver $5,000 but returned verdicts of no damages for the two passengers despite uncontradicted evidence of their physical injuries. The court affirmed the driver's verdict but reversed as to the passengers and ordered a new trial limited to the amount of their damages, holding that the finding for the driver established the defendant's negligence and that the passengers' lack of contributory negligence plus proof of substantial injuries required an award of some damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by Bonnie Jo Boury and her father against John Hamm and his father for personal injuries and medical expenses arising from a car accident on a rainy night in 1964, in which the vehicle skidded on a wet road, hit a utility pole, and ejected the occupants. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Ohio County that resulted in a verdict for the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed the denial of their motion for a new trial, arguing errors in the jury charge and the refusal to direct a verdict on liability. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence presented a factual question of negligence for the jury, that skidding alone does not establish negligence, that the instructions on skidding and unavoidable accident correctly stated the law, and that there was no evidence supporting claims of failure to keep a proper lookout or other driver negligence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the West Virginia Board of Regents filing an eminent domain petition to acquire surface rights, rights of way, and aerial easements over railroad land for construction of a personal rapid transit system connected to West Virginia University. The railroads demurred, challenging the petition's sufficiency on grounds including lack of authority to condemn property already devoted to public use and failure to allege a public use or describe the property with certainty. The trial court overruled the demurrer, found the petition sufficient, and granted immediate entry; on appeal, the court affirmed, reasoning that statutes authorize the Regents as an arm of the state to condemn land for university purposes, that the state's eminent domain power is superior to that of utilities and requires no special legislation, and that the petition adequately showed a public use and described the property.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a worker's compensation claim by Lewis Roberts, who sustained a back and neck injury in 1966 while employed by Raleigh Eagle Coal Company and received a 10% permanent partial disability award. Roberts appealed, arguing that combined with his prior injuries (including a 14% award for a hand/foot injury and 20% for silicosis), the 1966 injury rendered him permanently and totally disabled under West Virginia's second injury statute, entitling him to a life award charged against the second injury reserve. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the 10% partial award for the 1966 injury alone but reversed the denial of total permanent disability, holding that the uncontroverted medical evidence from Roberts' physicians established total disability when considering the combined effects. The court reasoned that the Appeal Board, as fact-finder, erred by disregarding this evidence in the absence of any contrary medical opinions.

labor & employment

The case involved a will contest over a 1962 holographic document offered as the last will of J. Hammond Siler, Jr., who died in 1969; the writing had been found in the decedent's home with its signature crossed out in ink, other provisions struck through in pencil, and the words 'Voided for revision 9/13/68' added in the testator's hand. The sole paternal heir (contestant) challenged the probate, arguing revocation under West Virginia statute, while the executors and maternal-side legatees (proponents) sought to uphold it. After a jury trial in circuit court found the document valid, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the markings demonstrated a knowing and purposeful cancellation by the testator with intent to revoke, creating a presumption of revocation that was unrebutted and presenting no factual issue for the jury on intent or revival. The court concluded the trial judge should have directed a verdict for the contestant as a matter of law rather than submitting the issue to the jury.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Tom Scott seeking a writ of prohibition to halt his prosecution in Cabell County on five 1970 indictments charging possession of LSD under Article 8B and possession or sale of marijuana under Article 8A of Chapter 16 of the West Virginia Code. Scott argued the statutes were unconstitutional due to improper delegation of legislative authority to the pharmacy board and federal regulations, vagueness, failure to inform the accused, and violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court denied the writ, ruling that the statutes validly defined dangerous drugs without unconstitutional delegation or vagueness, that LSD met the statutory criteria, and that the possession bans did not implicate protected privacy, religious, or other rights under the cited amendments, as the legislature holds authority to classify substances and prescribe penalties. The court distinguished precedents involving marital privacy or religious peyote use and noted that the subsequent Uniform Controlled Substances Act did not affect the validity of the prior laws for these offenses.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case is an original habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioner John E. Koton, Jr. sought release from a one-to-ten-year sentence for grand larceny imposed by the Circuit Court of Preston County, alleging denial of his right to appeal as an indigent. The court examined the record and found that the sentencing order directed confinement to the West Virginia Medium Security Prison rather than the penitentiary required by statute, and that no valid final judgment order had been entered to start the appeal period. It held that a criminal judgment must strictly conform to the governing statute and that deviation in the place of confinement renders the judgment void. The court therefore granted the writ but remanded the petitioner to custody for thirty days to permit resentencing in the trial court with credit for time served, after which he would be discharged if no proper order was entered.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a disciplinary proceeding by the West Virginia State Bar's Committee on Legal Ethics to annul the law license of attorney Marshall G. West following his federal conviction. West was convicted by a jury in 1970 under 18 U.S.C. Section 1341 for using the mails to defraud, with the conviction affirmed on appeal through the Fourth Circuit and denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. The court found that mail fraud constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude because it entails fraud or attempted fraud, consistent with prior decisions such as In the Matter of Fletcher W. Mann. West's answer raising due process and other claims was rejected on demurrer. Pursuant to the Bar's by-laws requiring mandatory annulment upon conviction of such a crime, the court annulled West's license.

criminal law

This case involves an original proceeding in prohibition where petitioner Albert Richard Parsons sought to bar his prosecution for the 1969 murder of his wife under West Virginia's three-term rule, which requires discharge if a defendant is not tried within three terms of court after indictment unless excused by specific reasons like insanity. The court had ordered multiple psychiatric evaluations and commitments starting in the April 1969 term, delaying return to Grant County until after the April 1970 term, with further competency hearings extending into 1970; meanwhile, Parsons was tried twice on a separate murder indictment in the November 1970 and April 1971 terms, both ending in hung juries. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that after competency was restored by April 1970, no statutory excuse applied to the subsequent terms, petitioner's pretrial motions did not justify delay, and the state bore the risk of proceeding on the other charge without addressing this indictment. Accordingly, the court awarded the writ, prohibiting trial under the wife's murder indictment as three unexcused terms had passed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Charles P. Caldwell appealing his dismissal from the West Virginia Public Service Commission, where he had served as Chief of the Rate and Tariff Division until his position was abolished in a 1970 reorganization. The Civil Service Commission upheld the dismissal after a hearing, finding the reorganization proper and rejecting claims of discrimination or political motivation. On appeal, the court affirmed the Commission's order, concluding that the reorganization was requested and approved to meet changing operational needs and reduce inefficiency, that the abolished position was no longer required, and that Caldwell presented no evidence other than his own testimony to show bad faith or non-merit factors in the decision.

labor & employment

This case involved an appeal by Lena Barton and her insurer Nationwide from a trial court judgment awarding damages to Otis Mooney and his wife for harm to their car, which Barton had been driving when it was wrecked due to her negligence. The dispute centered on whether Barton's insurance policy provided coverage for the Mooneys as third-party beneficiaries under a clause extending collision coverage to other vehicles in the policyholder's 'actual possession.' The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs after finding Barton had such possession, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the policy language should be construed against the insurer if ambiguous, that the trial court's factual findings based on the agreed statement of facts were presumed correct on appeal due to the incomplete record, and that the facts supported liability under the policy terms.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an appeal by a defendant convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, based in part on results from a Breathalyzer test showing 0.13% blood alcohol content, which led to a jail sentence, fine, and license revocation. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The core reasoning was that the test results were improperly admitted into evidence because the prosecution failed to establish that the test was administered at the direction of a qualifying arresting officer, in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Health, or with proper safeguards for the equipment and subject, as required by the state's implied consent statute; this lack of foundation made the results prejudicial given their prima facie evidentiary weight.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves the appeal of Glen N. Bowman, Sr., who was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for fatally shooting his neighbor, Hart, through a screen door as Hart rapidly approached the Bowmans' porch and reached toward the door. The incident followed prior minor disputes between the families over a dog, property lines, and children, but Hart was unarmed, made no threats, and had not been involved in the most recent argument with Bowman's wife. Bowman claimed self-defense due to fear from the earlier events, but the court found the evidence insufficient to justify the use of deadly force. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding there were no errors in the trial court's handling of jury instructions, evidence regarding the victim's blood alcohol level, or the prosecutor's closing argument.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was an original habeas corpus proceeding in which the petitioner, convicted of cannabis possession under West Virginia law, sought to void his two-year prison sentence on the ground that the grand jury that indicted him was unlawfully constituted. The Circuit Court of Logan County had sentenced him after a trial, but the petitioner later discovered that the jury commissioners for the September 1970 term had been appointed by the circuit clerk rather than by the court as required by statute. The West Virginia Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered the petitioner's release, holding that the statutory appointment requirement is mandatory, that an indictment returned by a grand jury selected by improperly appointed commissioners is void, and that habeas corpus lies to challenge a conviction based on such a nullity even after trial. The court reasoned that the clerk's appointment order spoke for itself, that discussion between the judge and clerk did not satisfy the statute, and that the defect was distinguishable from mere directory irregularities addressed in prior cases.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioner Michael H. Ghiz sought release on bail after being indicted for armed robbery in Kanawha County, West Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted the writ and permitted bail, holding that the intermediate court abused its discretion in denying bail. The court reasoned that Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution and Code § 62-1C-1 guarantee a right to reasonable bail (with discretion only for offenses punishable by life imprisonment), and that the lower court placed excessive weight on the hospital location of the alleged offense while failing to adequately consider factors such as the petitioner's lack of prior record, honorable military service, voluntary surrender, and community ties. The court reviewed the evidence presented at the bail hearing and concluded that these factors supported admission to bail pending trial.

criminal lawprocedure