Oliver D. Kessel

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit by Carlton Shields against Church Brothers, Inc., after a bulldozer operated by the defendant's employee struck a log that whipped around and fractured the plaintiff's leg while clearing land. A jury returned a small verdict covering only the plaintiff's hospital bill, which the trial court interpreted as inadequate and set aside, ordering a new trial solely on damages. On appeal, the court reversed that order, holding that the jury verdict should be treated as a finding for the defendant on liability (perversely expressed due to contributory negligence or lack of proximate cause) and reinstated it with judgment for the defendant. The reasoning centered on the principle that new trials limited to damages are appropriate only when liability is clearly established and separable, which was not the case here given the evidence of the plaintiff's awareness of the risks.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved Lester Rollings Haines, who was indicted and convicted of armed robbery under West Virginia law for an incident where he and two others allegedly assaulted Austin B. Greer and stole five dollars. The defendant was tried separately as a principal in the second degree for aiding and abetting, receiving a ten-year sentence, while the principal in the first degree was convicted only of assault and battery. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the evidence showed only the defendant's mere presence at the scene without any act of participation, consent, or encouragement, which is insufficient to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiff Taylor E. Hines suing multiple defendants, including members of the Hoover family and The Sun Lumber Company, seeking specific performance of an alleged oral contract to convey about 600 acres of land in exchange for caretaking services or, alternatively, damages for breach. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no enforceable contract due to the statute of frauds, the dead man's statute, lack of agency authority, and laches. On appeal, the court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case. The appellate court held that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the existence of any contract, the agency relationships involved, and related matters, making summary judgment improper because the trial court had impermissibly weighed the evidence by a preponderance standard rather than determining whether disputed facts precluded judgment as a matter of law.

propertyprocedure

This case is an original habeas corpus proceeding in which relator Tweel Browning sought release from a one-year jail sentence imposed by the Circuit Court of Boone County for criminal contempt. The underlying incident was a physical altercation between Browning and attorney Jerry W. Cook that occurred in the circuit clerk's office on April 26, 1972, during a heated discussion about absentee voting and election matters; the judge ordered Browning's immediate arrest and conducted a summary contempt hearing without prior written notice or counsel. The court held that the conduct did not satisfy the statutory requirements for summary contempt under W. Va. Code § 61-5-26, as it did not occur in the presence of the court so as to obstruct justice and the attorney was not shown to have been attending court in respect of a pending proceeding, and the evidence failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court discharged Browning from custody. The opinion also notes that any fine or imprisonment for such contempt without a jury is limited to $50 or ten days.

criminal lawprocedureelections

This case involved a civil lawsuit by Mary Bell Orndoff and her husband for personal injuries, medical expenses, and loss of consortium after she was struck by a car driven by defendant Teddy Rowan while crossing University Avenue in Morgantown, West Virginia. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs damages against Rowan and his insurer. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment, set aside the verdict, and ordered a new trial. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs' case and the trial court's jury instructions presupposed the existence of a legal crosswalk at the accident site, but the record showed no such marked crosswalk had been established or approved, rendering the instructions unsupported by evidence and prejudicial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a pedestrian, Roy Lee Thomas, suing Louise Ramey for personal injuries after being struck by her car at a marked crosswalk on Heber Street in Beckley, West Virginia; the United States intervened to recover medical expenses it had paid. A jury returned a verdict for the defendant, but the trial court set it aside and ordered a new trial on the grounds that it had improperly refused a peremptory instruction for the plaintiff and had given instructions on contributory negligence. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant was guilty of primary negligence as a matter of law because she violated a city ordinance requiring drivers to yield to pedestrians in crosswalks and that, under the undisputed facts, the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

torts & liabilityprocedure