
Vankirk v. Green Construction Co.
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1995-12-08 · cited 19×
This case involved a declaratory judgment action by the West Virginia Division of Highways (DOH) against Green Construction Company and its surety, American Insurance Company, seeking indemnification for a $1.2 million award that the Court of Claims had granted to subcontractor Elmo Greer and Sons due to delays and construction errors on an overlapping Interstate 64 project. The circuit court granted summary judgment to DOH, and the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the indemnity provisions in Green's contract and performance bond obligated Green and American to cover DOH's losses from Green's performance failures. It further ruled that Green and American, who had received timely notice of the Court of Claims proceeding and an opportunity to defend, were bound by that award under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that their due process rights were not violated.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Rose v. Oneida Coal Co., Inc.
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1995-12-08 · cited 16×
The case involved surface landowners suing an underground coal mining company for damages to their water supply and land from subsidence, despite a waiver of subjacent support in a 1915 severance deed. After an earlier ruling that the waiver barred common-law claims, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege violations of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act (particularly water protection and subsidence provisions) and parallel federal SMCRA requirements, seeking damages under the acts' citizen-suit provisions. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the water statute applied only to surface mining and that neither state nor federal law required protection against subsidence damage in this context. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals reviewed the matter de novo, stressing that state law must be interpreted consistently with and no less stringently than federal law, and analyzed the specific statutory and regulatory language governing water rights and subsidence controls for underground operations.
environmentpropertybusiness & regulatoryfederal power
State Ex Rel. Morgan v. Trent
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1995-11-17 · cited 42×
This case consolidated appeals from two convictions for first-degree sexual assault under W.Va. Code § 61-8B-3(a), where each victim was eleven years and eight months old at the time of the offense. The relators argued that the State failed to prove the victims were "eleven years old or less," asserting that the statutory language excludes anyone who has passed their eleventh birthday, and they sought relief on due-process grounds under Jackson v. Virginia. The court applied the plain-error doctrine to address the unpreserved statutory-interpretation claim and construed the phrase according to its common meaning, holding that a person remains "eleven years old" until reaching the twelfth birthday. It therefore concluded that the victims' ages fell within the statute's coverage and upheld the convictions.
criminal lawprocedure
Graham v. Graham
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1995-11-17 · cited 13×
In Graham v. Graham, the case concerned whether a term life insurance policy acquired during marriage as an employment benefit, which had no cash value, qualified as marital property under West Virginia law and was subject to a pendente lite order prohibiting the disposal of marital assets during divorce proceedings. Lawrence Graham changed the beneficiary from his wife Barbara to his uncle Simon after the order was entered, and upon Lawrence's death the proceeds were paid to Simon; Barbara then sued to recover them. The Circuit Court of Logan County granted summary judgment to Barbara, and the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the policy constituted marital property because the statutory definition in W.Va. Code 48-2-1(e)(1) broadly encompasses all property and valuable interests acquired during marriage, including expectancies without present cash value, as illustrated by precedents involving contingent fees and other similar interests. It further reasoned that the beneficiary change violated the nondisposal order, so the proceeds were properly directed to the wife.
family lawproperty
Miller v. Lambert
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1995-10-26 · cited 12×
The case arose from a 1988 car accident in which plaintiff Denise Miller, then a minor, was injured and her mother killed by an uninsured driver; the insurer paid its $50,000 single-limit uninsured-motorist coverage plus medical benefits to the mother's estate without court approval under W.Va. Code §55-7-7, then asserted that the limits were exhausted when Miller later sued for her own injuries. The circuit court certified two questions: whether the statutory minimums in W.Va. Code §§17D-4-2 and 33-6-31(b) ($20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident) preclude exhausting a single-limit policy by settlement with one claimant, and whether the insurer acted in good faith. The court held that the mandatory per-person and per-accident limits required by the financial-responsibility and uninsured-motorist statutes take precedence over contrary single-limit policy language, citing precedents such as Jones v. Motorists Mutual and Dorn v. Liberty Mutual, and that the absence of required court approval for the minor's interest raised a good-faith issue.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
Barber v. Barber
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1995-10-16 · cited 10×
This case concerned the priority of competing judgment liens against Larry Barber's inherited share of his mother Maude Barber's estate, following Larry's conviction for the voluntary manslaughter of his brother Charles. Grace Huang Barber, as administratrix of Charles's estate, obtained a 1991 wrongful-death judgment awarding her Larry's portion of the estate, while Rilda Sue Barber Call later secured a child-support judgment against Larry and sought to enforce it via writ of execution and suggestion on the estate's personal property. The circuit court had ordered distribution of Larry's share to Grace, treating its prior order as awarding the assets directly. The West Virginia Supreme Court held that Grace's lien had priority over the real estate due to its earlier date, but Rilda's properly perfected liens under W.Va. Code §§ 38-4-8 and 38-5-10 gave her priority over the personal property, and the 1991 order did not itself create a lien on personal assets without further enforcement steps; the court also upheld the use of Rule 60(a) to clarify the earlier order.
family lawpropertyprocedurecriminal law
Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L.
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1995-06-21 · cited 871×
In this case, a mother who signed a prenatal adoption agreement stating that a particular man was the natural father of her child later sued a third party for paternity, child support, and birth expenses after the adoption was not completed. Blood tests showed a 99.94% probability that the third party was the biological father and ruled out the man named in the agreement. The circuit court held that the adoption agreement met the requirements of W.Va. Code 48A-6-6(b) (1990) to legally establish paternity, but the Supreme Court reversed on de novo review, concluding that the statute applies only to direct acknowledgments by a biological father and mother, not to adoption agreements, which are governed by separate statutory provisions serving different purposes.
family law
Bass v. Coltelli
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-12-12 · cited 45×
This case involved certified questions from a circuit court concerning a mother's attempt to sue her son's attorney over contingent fees deducted from medical payments received for injuries the son sustained as a minor in a car accident. The mother had initially retained the attorney on behalf of herself and her son, but after the son reached majority and settled claims directly, disputes arose regarding the mother's standing, her rights to retain or offset portions of medical expense recoveries from insurance, and whether the fees were unconscionable or outside the contract scope. The court answered that the mother generally lacked standing once the son was an adult with his own attorney agreement, had no individual claim to settlement proceeds for medical expenses absent asserted subrogation rights during minority, and that contingent fees were permissible if within the employment contract; it ultimately dismissed the certification because the factual record was insufficient to resolve the legal issues controlling the case.
procedurefamily lawtorts & liability
State Ex Rel. Lawrence v. Polan
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-12-12 · cited 4×
This case is an original mandamus proceeding brought by the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Tourism and Parks against the Secretary of the Department of Administration to compel approval of a purchase order for $6 million in park development revenue bonds. The bonds were intended to finance improvements at Stonewall Jackson State Park as part of a settlement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, with repayment to come solely from revenues generated by the state park system. The Secretary challenged the bonds on constitutional and statutory grounds, including whether the repayment structure violated the state constitution's prohibition on state debt. The court held that the bonds could not be issued because the repayment mechanism violated Article X, Section 4 of the West Virginia Constitution. The decision rested on the conclusion that using park revenues in this manner constituted an impermissible incurrence of debt by the state.
business & regulatory
Matter of Means
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-11-23 · cited 2×
This case is a judicial disciplinary proceeding against Family Law Master Means, who presided over a domestic relations matter in which one party's attorney was his equal business partner in a corporation that owned the property where Means lived rent-free. The Judicial Hearing Board found no violation of the Judicial Code of Ethics, but the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Means violated Canon 5C(1) by maintaining financial and business dealings that involved frequent transactions with a lawyer appearing before him and that could reflect adversely on his impartiality. The court reasoned that the joint ownership created an impermissible continuing interest, requiring recusal, and that the canon was substantially similar to the current Code's Canon 4D(1). As a sanction, the court issued a public reprimand.
family lawprocedure
Paxton v. State Department of Tax & Revenue
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-11-23 · cited 11×
The case concerned whether the West Virginia Lottery Commission, as a public entity under the ADA, must require all licensed lottery vendors to make their sales locations accessible to individuals with disabilities as a condition of issuing or renewing licenses. Larry Paxton, a paraplegic, petitioned for a writ of mandamus, which the circuit court granted based on Title II of the ADA and implementing regulations such as 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) and (b)(4). The Supreme Court examined the Commission's arguments that regulations like 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 limit obligations for existing facilities and that state lottery statutes do not impose additional accessibility mandates, while analyzing the interplay between federal non-discrimination rules and the Commission's licensing authority over private vendors.
civil rightsfederal powerbusiness & regulatory
Morrison v. Haynes
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-11-23 · cited 6×
This case involved the administrator of Paul Morrison's estate seeking to recover from Erie Insurance an excess verdict exceeding the limits of its uninsured motorist coverage after a jury awarded $775,000 in a wrongful death action. Paul Morrison was killed when a rifle in the car discharged due to the negligent driving of uninsured defendant Richard Haynes. Erie had provided $200,000 in coverage on family vehicles, conceded coverage before trial but offered only $120,000 to settle, and paid its limits after the verdict; the trial court had dismissed the claim for excess amounts for lack of jurisdiction. Relying on its recent decision in Marshall v. Saseen, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that under W.Va. Code 33-6-31 an uninsured motorist carrier served with the complaint and participating in the defense can be directly liable for the full amounts the insured is legally entitled to recover, with remand for further proceedings on fees and interest if the plaintiff substantially prevails.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Darlington v. Mangum
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-11-02 · cited 10×
This case concerned whether the Raleigh County Commission could require deputy sheriffs electing health coverage to pay part of the monthly insurance premiums, or whether that action violated a statute protecting deputies from removal, discharge, suspension, or reduction in pay or rank without just cause. The court held that the commission had authority to impose the premium contributions. The core reasoning was that the protective statute applies only to disciplinary actions, while a separate statute expressly authorizes county commissions to pay all or part of group health premiums and to deduct employee shares from wages; statements in a personnel handbook or by officials promising full coverage could not override the statutory authorization.
labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure
Marshall v. Saseen
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-11-02 · cited 50×
The case concerned whether car accident victims (the Marshalls) could recover a jury award exceeding the $100,000 limit of their underinsured motorist policy from insurer Erie Insurance after the at-fault driver’s $50,000 liability policy settled and Erie waived subrogation rights. The trial court credited the settlement, found Erie in bad faith as a matter of law, and entered a direct excess judgment against Erie for roughly $176,000. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court reviewed W.Va. Code 33-6-31(d) and prior cases such as Postlethwait and Karl, reiterating that direct suits against an underinsured motorist carrier are generally barred until judgment against the tortfeasor, subject to a narrow exception when the liability carrier pays its limits and the UIM carrier waives subrogation; the opinion also addressed the contractual nature of UIM claims and the insurer’s procedural rights to defend in the tortfeasor’s name or its own.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Davenport v. Gatson
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-11-02 · cited 15×
This case involved an unemployment compensation claim by a substitute teacher who worked 36 days during the 1991-92 school year, signed a similar contract for the following year, and sought benefits for the summer vacation period between academic years. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the claim was barred by W.Va. Code § 21A-6-15(2)(a), which denies benefits to individuals who performed services in one academic year and have a contract or reasonable assurance of performing services in the next. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language applies to substitute teachers even without a guaranteed number of work days, as the flexible nature of substitute teaching and related statutes do not require fixed employment quotas, and similar provisions in other states reflect the policy that teachers can anticipate summer breaks. The decision applied the statute without liberal construction overriding its clear terms.
labor & employment
State Ex Rel. Holmes v. Gainer
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-07-20 · cited 8×
The case concerned whether House Bill 4031, which increased compensation and expense allowances for West Virginia legislators and other officials based on a resolution from the Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission, complied with the procedural requirements of Article VI, Section 33 of the state constitution. The relators sought a writ of mandamus to compel the State Auditor to issue payment warrants and a writ of prohibition to halt a related circuit court declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted mandamus relief, holding that the Commission's single meeting and submission of its resolution, followed by legislative enactment, satisfied the constitutional mandate allowing meetings "as often as may be necessary" and that ex parte contacts between legislators and commission members did not invalidate the process. The court rejected arguments that the four-year cycle language barred more frequent submissions and found no due process violation from the contacts.
procedure
Bank of White Sulphur Springs v. PATRIOT
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-06-16 · cited 2×
This case involved a dispute over lien priority on a 1988 Ford Bronco between the Bank of White Sulphur Springs, which held a perfected security interest from loans to the owner, and Patriot Ford, which performed repairs and claimed common law and statutory liens for repairs and storage. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Bank, finding its lien superior, and the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. The court relied on precedent holding that the statutory improver's lien under West Virginia Code 38-11-3 is expressly subordinated to prior perfected security interests of which the lienholder had notice. The court rejected the repair shop's argument that the security agreement's requirement to keep the vehicle in good condition implied consent to repairs, noting that the agreement also required written consent for repairs, which was not obtained.
business & regulatoryproperty
Powroznik v. C. & W. COAL CO.
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-05-27 · cited 6×
This case involved a dispute over the appropriate attorney's fee in a wrongful death lawsuit brought under West Virginia's deliberate intent exception to workers' compensation immunity, where the employer had coverage through the Employers' Excess Liability Fund (EELF). The circuit court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals after a guardian ad litem challenged a one-third contingent fee agreement in a settlement paid by the EELF, arguing instead for the 20 percent statutory cap applicable to workers' compensation claims. The court answered both questions in the negative, holding that the workers' compensation fee limit in W.Va. Code § 23-5-5 does not apply to deliberate intent civil actions and that a one-third contingent fee is not prohibited in settlements funded by the EELF. The reasoning centered on the distinction between traditional workers' compensation claims and the tort-based nature of deliberate intent suits under W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(b), which permits recovery as if the workers' compensation chapter had not been enacted, along with the separate statutory framework and purpose of the EELF as excess insurance. The court noted that the settlement amount already reflected an offset for workers' compensation benefits received.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
Stamper Ex Rel. Stamper v. Kanawha County Board of Education
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-05-27 · cited 23×
The case involved an infant plaintiff injured on an outdoor basketball court at a public elementary school owned by the Kanawha County Board of Education while playing a recreational game; the court below granted summary judgment to the Board based on a recreational use statute limiting landowner liability. The Supreme Court examined whether W.Va. Code 19-25-1 et seq. applied to public entities, noting the statute's derivation from a model act aimed at private landowners and its strict construction as a derogation of common law. It also considered the statute's potential conflict with the more specific Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, which allows negligence claims against political subdivisions like school boards for failure to maintain property. The court concluded that the recreational use limitations do not extend to governmental owners such as the Board.
torts & liabilityproperty
In Re Investigation of the West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, Serology Division
West Virginia Supreme Court · 1994-05-20 · cited 19×
This case is a follow-up to a prior investigation (Zain I) into misconduct by West Virginia State Police serologist Fred Zain, who was found to have systematically falsified evidence and testimony in criminal cases. The court here examines whether other serologists in the same lab engaged in similar intentional misconduct. After reviewing a special judge's report based on an ASCLD analysis, the court adopts the findings that other serologists made only occasional minor errors, with no pattern of intentional falsification or significant impact on prosecutions. The court therefore concludes that these cases do not warrant a presumption of tainted evidence or systematic post-conviction review, unlike Zain's cases, and closes the investigation while requiring individual defendants to prove any false evidence claims under existing standards for newly discovered evidence. The decision rests on the absence of due process violations that materially affected jury verdicts.
criminal lawprocedure