Donald R. Wilson

The case concerned whether former West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Sam R. Harshbarger qualified for benefits under the state's judges' retirement system based on his eight years of judicial service plus prior military and local government service. The circuit court, relying on the precedents in In re Dostert, Oakley v. Gainer, and DePond v. Gainer, had granted Harshbarger a writ of mandamus directing the state auditor to pay him a judicial pension. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed that order, explicitly disapproving Dostert and its progeny. It held that those decisions rested on an improper procedural foundation lacking a genuine case or controversy and had judicially expanded the retirement system beyond what the constitution and statutes allowed. Without the disapproved precedent, Harshbarger's credited service fell short of the minimum required for a judges' pension.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a challenge by Excavation Construction, Inc., and Shenandoah Quarry, Inc., to the West Virginia Commissioner of Highways' decision not to award a road construction contract to Excavation despite its lowest bid, or to rebid the project. The Commissioner had rejected the bid as irregular because it omitted a required free competitive bidding affidavit, which was submitted the day after bids opened, and instead awarded the contract to the next lowest bidder. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the mandamus petition, holding that the petitioners failed to show an abuse of discretion. The court relied on statutes requiring award to the lowest responsible bidder and regulations mandating the affidavit with the bid, citing precedent that public officials have wide discretion in such matters absent clear fraud, collusion, or palpable abuse.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Freddie Joe Noe, who was convicted by a jury in Cabell County Circuit Court of the first-degree murder of Donna Gail McClung based primarily on fingerprint evidence found in the victim's apartment. Noe appealed, arguing errors including insufficient fingerprint evidence, improper admission of evidence, withholding of evidence, and issues with the prosecutor's closing argument. The Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed the conviction and granted a new trial, finding that the fingerprint evidence was confusing and legally insufficient to sustain the conviction, that certain opinion evidence was improperly admitted, and that the prosecutor's remarks improperly commented on the defendant's failure to testify or present an alibi defense.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. McGee, the defendant was convicted by a jury in Mineral County Circuit Court of delivering marijuana based on an undercover agent's testimony about a 1973 transaction in a car. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant, over objection, about possible prior offenses after she took the stand. The court rejected other claims, including that newly discovered evidence from affidavits warranted a new trial due to lack of diligence and failure to meet established criteria for such motions, and that the plea was not properly entered. The core reasoning focused on the prejudicial risk of prior-offense questioning, which must be balanced against probative value for credibility and accompanied by firm jury instructions limiting its use.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Knight, the defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Wood County of delivering marijuana after the trial court refused his proposed jury instruction on entrapment, denied a motion for acquittal, and gave a state instruction on the offense elements. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the conviction solely because the trial court had refused the entrapment instruction. The court reasoned that while defendants who deny committing an offense generally may not assert entrapment due to inconsistency, an exception applies when the state's own evidence in its case-in-chief supports an inference of entrapment, entitling the defendant to have the jury instructed on that defense under a not-guilty plea. The court found no merit in the other assignments of error regarding the directed verdict or the state's instruction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether interior decorating qualifies as a 'professional service' exempt from West Virginia's Consumers Sales and Service Tax under W. Va. Code 11-15-8. The taxpayer, an interior decorator assessed $847.71 in taxes for 1966-1971, argued her work fell under the professional services exception, while the State Tax Commissioner maintained it did not. The circuit court sided with the taxpayer by shifting the burden to the Commissioner, but the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute presumes all services are taxable and places the burden on the taxpayer to clearly establish an exception. Because the term 'professional services' is undefined, the court applied its ordinary meaning and found that interior decorating had not been shown to involve the required standards of study, knowledge, or general acceptance as a profession, unlike occupations explicitly regulated under Chapter 30 of the Code. Accordingly, the court entered judgment for the Commissioner.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the West Virginia Joint Committee on Government and Finance's attempt to enforce a subpoena against the Superintendent of the Department of Public Safety for records needed to study the agency's administration and personnel policies, as authorized by statute and legislative resolutions. The superintendent refused, citing confidentiality and employee privacy concerns, leading the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling production. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the writ, holding that the legislature possesses inherent investigatory authority to obtain information from executive agencies to support its lawmaking functions. The court reasoned that this authority, grounded in separation of powers principles, does not create an unconstitutional confrontation between branches when exercised for legitimate oversight purposes.

procedure

In State v. Pendry, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting and killing his father-in-law amid marital discord and was sentenced following a jury trial in which he raised an insanity defense supported by psychiatric testimony. The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, primarily because certain state jury instructions improperly placed the burden on the defendant to prove insanity and relied on presumptions that conflicted with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur regarding the prosecution's burden to prove every element of the offense. The court also addressed but found no error in the admission of rebuttal medical testimony from hospital staff reports and the handling of voir dire challenges, while directing that the Mullaney principles on burden of proof apply prospectively to pending cases.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an original mandamus proceeding brought by Democratic primary candidate Richard Benson against county commissioners in Braxton, Nicholas, and Pocahontas Counties. Benson sought an order compelling the commissioners to certify the May 11, 1976 primary election results for State Senator as declared after the initial canvass, despite opponent D.P. Given's recount demands, on the ground that the commissioners failed to give Benson proper statutory notice of the recounts under W. Va. Code 3-6-9. The court accepted the petition's allegations as true due to the respondents' failure to file responsive pleadings. It denied the requested relief of forcing certification of the canvass results, reasoning that this would improperly override Given's validly requested recounts, but exercised its discretion to issue a writ directing the counties to provide proper notice to Benson via the Randolph County sheriff and to conduct the recounts only after the required three-day period. The decision interprets the notice and service provisions of the election statute to ensure due process in multi-county recounts.

electionsprocedure

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against West Virginia attorney Thomas Mullins, initiated after client John Curry complained that Mullins had neglected personal injury claims from a 1971 automobile accident by failing to file suit before the statute of limitations expired, misleading the clients about the case status, losing documents, and ignoring potential uninsured motorist coverage or other remedies. The Committee on Legal Ethics found that Mullins violated provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility through this neglect and by refusing to respond to multiple inquiries from the Bar's executive director and ethics committee chairman or to participate in the subcommittee hearing. The committee recommended a one-year suspension of Mullins' license to practice law, supported by findings that Mullins admitted in an affidavit, and the court evaluated the recommendation under the Bar's bylaws.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a lawsuit by an infant passenger and her father seeking damages for injuries sustained in a 1970 automobile collision on U.S. Route 250, where the car driven by defendant Harris struck the rear of defendant Kurucz's stalled vehicle that was partially blocking the highway, then veered into a third car. The jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants, but the trial court set it aside and ordered a new trial. On appeal by defendant Kurucz, the court affirmed that decision, holding that the verdict defied the evidence because the accident could only be explained by negligence on the part of one or both defendants, with no basis for finding an unavoidable accident or lack of fault by either driver. The court emphasized that a trial judge has the duty to set aside a plainly wrong verdict to prevent a miscarriage of justice, even if supported by some evidence, and that the trial court's action in granting a new trial carries particular weight on review.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned the dismissal of a state employee serving as Assistant Director of the Driver’s License Division for off-duty reckless driving in his personal vehicle, which the Commissioner argued undermined public confidence in his ability to conduct hearings and make decisions on similar license matters. The Civil Service Commission reinstated the employee, concluding it lacked authority to discipline for off-duty conduct not involving state property unless it involved a crime of moral turpitude. The court reversed that ruling, holding that Article XI, Section 2 of the Civil Service Rules permits dismissal for gross misconduct or unfitness to perform duties when the off-duty conduct bears a substantial relationship to the employee’s responsibilities, even absent a moral turpitude conviction, and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate the evidence of that relationship.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this negligence action, plaintiff Allen Sanders sued Georgia-Pacific Corporation and contractor Rupert Sturgill for personal injuries sustained while loading logs on company premises using a crane supplied and maintained by Georgia-Pacific. A jury awarded Sanders $50,000, but the trial court set aside the verdict, ruling that Sturgill was an independent contractor whose negligence could not be imputed to Georgia-Pacific and that the company owed no direct duty of care. The appellate court reversed and reinstated the verdict, reasoning that the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, supported a jury finding of actual control by Georgia-Pacific over Sturgill as well as a breach of the company's independent duty as premises owner to provide a safe place to work.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case involved Cecil I. Walker Machinery Company seeking to recover from Stauben, Inc., and its surety Maryland Casualty Company for major repairs made to a bulldozer that Stauben had used on a West Virginia highway construction project secured by a statutory bond under W. Va. Code 17-4-20. The trial court entered judgment against Stauben but denied recovery against Maryland Casualty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the denial of recovery from the surety. The court reasoned that the bond covers only repairs and materials reasonably consumed in the project work, not major repairs performed after project completion that substantially increased the equipment's value and could not reasonably be expected to be used on the bonded job.

business & regulatory

The case involved an unlawful detainer action by Ashland Oil against its former dealer, Donahue, to recover possession of a gasoline service station premises after Ashland terminated both the year-to-year lease and dealer contract on ten days' written notice. The circuit court struck Donahue's defenses alleging an implied covenant against termination without good cause, a joint venture, and reliance on Ashland's representations, then granted Ashland judgment on the pleadings. The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ten-day termination clause could be unconscionable under the UCC and that Donahue's defenses 5, 7, and 8 sufficiently raised factual issues about the commercial context, implied terms, and course of dealing that could not be resolved on the pleadings alone, warranting remand for further proceedings.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved Warren Gayle Myers, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder after a fight at a tavern led to him shooting and killing David Sam Haddix; Myers had pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, offering expert psychiatric testimony diagnosing him with paranoid schizophrenia based on his history and records. The trial court restricted the psychiatrists from fully disclosing the defendant's history from interviews and medical/military records, gave jury instructions on insanity that the defendant challenged, and did not declare a mistrial or adequately caution the jury after the prosecutor's remarks about punishment and the likelihood of release from mental hospitals. On appeal, the court held that these restrictions prevented full presentation of the psychiatric defense, that the instructions were erroneous, and that the prosecutor's comments were prejudicial, reversing the conviction and awarding a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure