This case involved a contractual dispute between the two equal shareholders of Evald Moulding, Inc., over a 1992 Buy-Sell Agreement that allowed the non-disabled shareholder to purchase the disabled shareholder's shares at book value upon total disability. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that the agreement was unenforceable under the circumstances because the corporation's incomplete records prevented accurate determination of book value, and Ehlinger was entitled to inspect the books. The court further held that the corporation could not pay Hauser's litigation expenses because he was not entitled to indemnification under Wis. Stat. § 180.0855 and the expenses were not incurred for the corporation's own defense. It rejected Hauser's challenges to the special magistrate process and the scope of GAAP requirements. The decision modified and affirmed the court of appeals, remanding for appointment of a receiver.
This case involved a dispute between Kang and the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. The matter reached the Supreme Court of Wisconsin under case number 2005AP0507 as a petition for review. On March 14, 2007, the court denied the petition for review, leaving any lower court decision in place. Justice Bradley did not participate in the decision, and no substantive reasoning or details about the underlying claims appear in the provided excerpt.
This case concerns a petition for review filed in Hottenroth v. Hetsko before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The court denied the petition for review. Justice Bradley dissented from the denial, while Justice Roggensack did not participate in the decision.
The case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney Mark R. Prichard, who faced 77 counts of misconduct across 20 client matters. The allegations included failures to cooperate with grievance investigations, lack of diligence in client representation, inadequate communication with clients, improper handling of client trust funds, failure to protect client interests upon termination of representation, and dishonesty or misrepresentation in two matters. Prichard filed a petition for consensual license revocation under SCR 22.19, acknowledging he could not successfully defend against the charges and waiving his right to a formal hearing. The court granted the petition, revoked his license to practice law, and directed compliance with post-revocation duties under SCR 22.26.
In State v. Velez, the defendant was charged as an adult with first-degree intentional homicide for a crime committed when he was a juvenile, and he moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the State deliberately delayed charging him to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction and requesting an evidentiary hearing on whether the State manipulated the system. The circuit court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the defendant had not made a sufficient threshold showing of manipulative intent based on the motion papers and the prosecutor's offer of proof regarding police efforts to locate the defendant as a juvenile. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err, as the record showed that police obtained a juvenile arrest warrant shortly after identifying the defendant as a suspect, continued searching for him, and issued a criminal warrant only after he turned 18, without evidence of deliberate delay. The core reasoning was that absent a preliminary showing of improper intent, no evidentiary hearing was required before denying the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
This case involved the sentencing of William E. Spaeth for a fifth offense of operating a motor vehicle after revocation (OAR) within five years, which carries enhanced penalties under Wisconsin statutes. The defendant argued that his four prior OAR convictions were not properly admitted or proven by the State. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the record, including the criminal complaint's reference to a Department of Transportation record check, did not sufficiently establish the prior convictions for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, the court reversed the enhanced sentence and commuted it to the maximum authorized without the repeater enhancement. The decision turned on the requirement that prior convictions must be admitted by the defendant or proven by the State, applying standards from repeater sentencing statutes.
