Timothy Brown

The case concerned whether the City of Wauwatosa had statutory authority to enact an ordinance and resolution creating a commercial refuse collection district that charged fees for properties including multi-unit dwellings over four units, while continuing free collection for residential properties and requiring residents to place containers at the curb. The trial court ruled the measures illegal and unconstitutional, but the appellate court reversed. The court held that secs. 66.049 and 66.60(16)(a), Stats., expressly authorize cities to classify properties for refuse services, create districts, and use methods such as special charges or taxes to recover costs. It further concluded that the classification did not violate equal protection because it treated all properties within each defined class alike and had a rational basis.

propertycivil rightsbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether a property owner complied with Wis. Stat. § 66.05(3) by serving and later filing a summons and complaint to challenge a municipal building inspector's order to raze an allegedly dilapidated structure. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this procedure did not satisfy the statute, which requires an affected person to apply to the circuit court for a restraining order within 30 days, and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal on demurrer. The majority reasoned that the statute's exclusive remedy demands strict compliance with its time limits and procedures, interpreting an "application for an order" as a motion under ch. 269 rather than the commencement of an ordinary action. The court emphasized that the statutory framework is designed to allow swift municipal action against unsafe buildings while providing a narrow, expedited path for judicial review. A dissent argued that a summons and complaint demanding the contemplated relief could constitute a valid application under the statute.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether Arthur Duvick qualified as an employee of Orbeck Bros., Inc., a Wisconsin tavern corporation, for purposes of workers' compensation after he and associates purchased nearly all of the corporation's stock and he took over management of the business. Duvick was injured while stacking beer cases at the tavern in 1959. The Industrial Commission found that Duvick was self-employed rather than an employee because he effectively owned the business and exercised complete control over his own work, and therefore denied benefits. The circuit court reversed, holding that a corporate resolution appointing Duvick as liquor-license agent created an express contract of hire. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Commission's order, reasoning that findings of near-total stock ownership and full authority over employment were supported by the record and, under established precedent, precluded an employer-employee relationship as a matter of law.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a 1959 highway collision in which a semi-truck driven by defendant Robert Oman attempted to pass a house trailer operated by plaintiff Robert Girtz, resulting in injuries to both Robert and his passenger Gertrude Girtz. The plaintiffs sued Oman and related parties for negligence, and the jury awarded damages including $4,000 for Robert's lost earnings, finding Oman 90 percent causally negligent. On appeal the court held that the lost-earnings award lacked evidentiary support because the record contained no proof that the minor injuries prevented Robert from working. The court also upheld the trial judge's allowance of mid-trial amendments to the complaints alleging additional negligence theories and affirmed the remaining awards after reducing Robert's judgment by $4,000. The negligence findings were sustained on the basis that the jury could reasonably credit testimony that either the truck's side mirror struck the trailer or that air currents from the close pass caused the trailer to weave into the truck.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether a petition to vacate a portion of Cleora Drive under Wis. Stat. sec. 66.296(1) was valid, specifically whether signatures from owners along a disconnected segment of the drive located about 1,000 feet away across another lot had to be included in the required frontage calculation. The court held that the petition was sufficient and the city council's resolution vacating the street segment between Burton and Frederick streets was valid. It reasoned that a 'street' under the statute means a continuous public way, so the separated segments were distinct streets and only frontage on the connected portion within 2,650 feet needed to be considered. The court noted that an official map showing a possible future connection did not establish the segments as one street, and the owners' own 1962 plat had not provided for such a link. Summary judgment for the respondents was affirmed.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the state seeking to recover $3,400 in showman's license fees from the operator of a permanent amusement park for its mechanical rides over nine years under Wis. Stat. sec. 129.14. The trial court sustained a demurrer, finding the statute unconstitutionally vague, but the supreme court affirmed dismissal of the action on other grounds. The court interpreted the statute, based on its text requiring applications to detail travel plans, its legislative history distinguishing mobile from fixed entertainments, and differing regulatory schemes, as applying only to traveling shows and not to stationary amusement parks regulated by counties. The court declined to address constitutionality since the interpretive issue resolved the case.

business & regulatoryprocedure