This case concerned whether a circuit court could absolutely discharge numerous juvenile inmates from a state reformatory without remanding them to the originating juvenile courts, after they challenged their commitments on the ground that they lacked counsel at their delinquency hearings in violation of In re Gault. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that prohibition was available to review the matter, that Gault's right-to-counsel rule applied retroactively to such hearings, and that a habeas court must remand the juveniles to the juvenile court's jurisdiction rather than grant outright release. The court reasoned that its constitutional superintending authority over inferior courts permitted the writ where appeal would be too late to prevent grave public harm, that Gault equated the need for counsel in juvenile proceedings to the adult right recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright (which is retroactive), and that habeas statutes and precedents authorize remand to correct jurisdictional defects while preserving the original court's authority.
The case concerned whether a bond issued by defendant Bever to the city of Clintonville was assignable to plaintiff Wipfli, which would allow Wipfli to foreclose on the mortgage given to secure the bond. The court decided that the bond was assignable. It reasoned that the bond and mortgage were executed together as part of the same transaction and therefore must be construed together, and the mortgage's language explicitly required payment to Clintonville "its successors or assigns," making the bond's benefits enforceable by an assignee.
The case concerned two procedural questions in a civil lawsuit: whether a defendant could obtain summary judgment by relying solely on verified pleadings without any supporting affidavit, and whether an order denying review of a prior denial of summary judgment was appealable. The court held that the trial court correctly denied the summary judgment motion because the defendant failed to comply with the statutory requirement under sec. 270.635(2) to submit affidavits setting forth evidentiary facts. It further ruled that the appeal from the second order must be dismissed, as an order refusing to modify a prior order is neither a final order under sec. 274.33(1) nor an appealable nonfinal order under sec. 274.33(3). The court explained that a summary judgment motion differs from a motion for judgment on the pleadings and that such review orders do not prevent entry of a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken.
The case concerned whether an insured's cause of action against an automobile liability insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim within policy limits, resulting in an excess judgment, vests in the insured's bankruptcy trustee under section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. The court held that the claim does vest in the trustee because it is assignable under Wisconsin law. The court reasoned that the action is a species of fraud that damages the insured's property rights or interests, as it pecuniarily diminishes the estate by subjecting the insured to an enforceable judgment, and thus survives under Wisconsin's survival statute, section 895.01, making it transferable. The court relied on the statute's 1907 amendment, precedents interpreting "property rights or interests," and the principle that the nature of the action is determined by state law.
The case concerned the constitutionality of Wisconsin's pre-judgment garnishment statutes, which allowed a creditor to seize a portion of a debtor's wages before any court judgment on the underlying debt. The debtor, Sniadach, challenged the statutes on due process, equal protection, and separation-of-powers grounds, arguing they imposed undue hardships without adequate safeguards. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a litigant may not attack a statute on constitutional grounds that do not personally affect her and rejected the specific claims raised by Sniadach. The court reasoned that the garnishment created only a temporary lien to preserve the status quo, with notice and a hearing provided before any final deprivation of property, consistent with historical practice and U.S. Supreme Court precedent on attachments. The decision upheld the statutes as constitutional as applied.
This case concerned whether a landlord providing heat, light, water, and power to tenants in a large apartment complex qualifies as a public utility under Wisconsin Statute section 196.01(1), thereby falling under the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction. The court held that such a landlord is not a public utility. It reasoned that the statute targets service to the general public rather than to a restricted group like tenants, following the precedent in Cawker v. Meyer, where even incidental service to a few neighbors did not make one a public utility, and similar rulings in other states confirmed that tenants do not constitute "the public" regardless of their number.