E. Harold Hallows

The case Dumer v. State concerned the conviction of an eighteen-year-old defendant for rape after he followed a twenty-six-year-old woman, struck her when she resisted, and engaged in sexual intercourse with her in a clump of bushes after pulling her across an alley. The defendant appealed on grounds that the civil branch of the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal case and that the trial court had improperly invoked its authority, while also raising issues related to pretrial discovery of witnesses. The court held that Wisconsin circuit courts possess original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters not prohibited by law, that the administrative designation of specific branches for criminal cases in Milwaukee County was not exclusive, and that the assignment of the case to the civil branch judge was valid under statutes authorizing transfers and general assignments by the chief justice. The court further reasoned that the evidence, including the complainant's testimony of physical violence and the defendant's partial admission, established that the victim's will to resist was overcome by force, upholding the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

In Brown v. State, the defendant, charged with armed robbery, moved to suppress statements he made to police after arrest on grounds they were involuntary, claiming police threats and denial of counsel despite his requests; he sought to introduce evidence of his prior experiences successfully invoking his right to silence and his former attorney's repeated advice to remain silent without counsel. The trial court excluded this evidence as immaterial, credited the officers' testimony, found the statements voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, and allowed the case to proceed to a guilty plea on a reduced robbery charge. On appeal from the conviction, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the excluded evidence had only slight probative value regarding voluntariness, that its exclusion was within the trial court's discretion under evidence rules and constituted at most harmless error, and that the statements were properly admitted, so the conviction stood.

criminal lawprocedure

In Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., a restaurant cook sued the ketchup manufacturer after a sealed bottle broke in his hand while he attempted to open it by tapping it, causing a laceration; the case proceeded solely on a strict liability theory after the bottle and packaging showed no visible damage. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the application of strict liability under the rule from Dippel v. Sciano adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which imposes prima facie liability on a seller of a defective product that is unreasonably dangerous and reaches the user unchanged, treating it as negligence per se while shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove negligence. The court reasoned that this doctrine is not absolute liability, permits ordinary negligence defenses including contributory negligence and product misuse if not reasonably foreseeable, and that the evidence of an intact carton and the plaintiff's ordinary handling was sufficient to support the jury verdict against the manufacturer.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether defendant Upchurch was entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of his inculpatory statement to police before or during his robbery trial, and whether the statement could be used on rebuttal after he testified without such a hearing. The trial court denied a Goodchild hearing as untimely and allowed the statement into evidence via a police officer's rebuttal testimony. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that under Wis. Stat. § 971.31(3), Upchurch had a statutory right to an evidentiary hearing on the statement's admissibility at trial unless previously waived, and that voluntariness must be determined by the court before the statement could be used even for impeachment because trustworthiness depends on it not being involuntary. The court remanded the case for a limited hearing on voluntariness, with instructions to reinstate the conviction if the statement was voluntary or grant a new trial if involuntary.

criminal lawprocedure

In Nelson v. Fisher Well Drilling Co., employees sued a contractor for unpaid wages on a municipal sewer construction project, alleging they performed tasks in higher-paying job classifications such as pipelayer or air-tool operator but were compensated only at the general laborer rate under the prevailing wage scale incorporated into the contract. The court reviewed the facts of the work performed, the wage determinations made by the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations pursuant to secs. 66.293 and 103.49, Stats., and the contractor's statute of limitations defense for pre-1969 claims. The core reasoning emphasized that, per the statutes and Wis. Adm. Code ch. IND 90, the type of work done—not prior occupational titles—determines the applicable minimum prevailing wage rate, with liability including liquidated damages for noncompliance.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit by the Nolans against Venus Ford, Inc., arising from an automobile collision, in which the plaintiffs had settled with two other drivers before trial. The Nolans challenged the trial court's denial of their requests to excuse jurors with ties to a local insurance company for cause, its decision to structure the special verdict by asking about the settled nonparty drivers' negligence before Venus Ford's, and its refusal to grant a new trial in the interests of justice. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the juror qualification statute requires individualized proof of bias rather than automatic exclusion of insurance-affiliated jurors, that trial courts have broad discretion in framing verdicts under precedents like Pierringer v. Hoger, and that the plaintiffs had not shown any abuse of that discretion or other grounds warranting a new trial.

proceduretorts & liability

The case was a lawsuit by attorney Theuerkauf against former client Schnellbaecher to recover fees for legal services provided in a divorce action and related matters. The trial court awarded Theuerkauf $3,500 after a bench trial, finding that amount to be the reasonable value of the services. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding that Schnellbaecher had waived the right to a jury trial by not demanding one at the pretrial conference as required by statute, that the trial court properly denied a late-filed amended answer, and that sufficient evidence supported the fee award.

procedurefamily law

In Britton v. Hoyt, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a 1968 car accident in which defendant Hoyt struck plaintiffs Britton and Lund after they parked their vehicle partially on a rural road at night and stood in the roadway. The jury found Britton 50 percent causally negligent, barring his recovery under the contributory negligence statute then in effect, but the trial court reduced Britton's share to 30 percent to allow partial recovery. On appeal, the court addressed whether the jury's apportionment of negligence could be altered when unsupported by credible evidence. The court decided that both trial and appellate courts have authority to change such apportionments, treating them like damage awards under the Powers rule, when the jury's finding is against the great weight of the evidence or lacks minimum evidentiary support, in order to avoid unnecessary retrials.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the application of uninsured motorist and medical payments coverage under two separate insurance policies after an insured was injured by an uninsured motorist. The court examined whether excess and reducing clauses in the Mutual Service policy violated Wisconsin statute section 204.30(5) by limiting total recovery through offsets for other insurance and medical payments. The court held that the clauses were valid and enforceable, allowing reduction of uninsured motorist limits by medical payments and treating the coverage as excess over primary insurance. The reasoning relied on prior Wisconsin decisions in Leatherman and Scherr, consistent with the minority of jurisdictions interpreting similar statutes as setting minimum coverage floors without prohibiting such policy provisions.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Levesque's guilty plea and conviction for burglary under Wis. Stat. sec. 943.10(1)(a) after he entered a sandwich shop during business hours, hid in the ceiling until closing, then stole money from an unlocked safe. Levesque moved to withdraw his plea, arguing the facts did not support the charge because he had entered with the owner's consent and any violation should have been charged under the subsection for unlawful entry into a room. The court affirmed the conviction and denied post-conviction relief, holding that public consent to enter a business is impliedly limited by time, place, and purpose, so Levesque's presence after closing and in non-public areas constituted entry without consent accompanied by intent to steal. The court also ruled that petitions for plea withdrawal or post-conviction relief must allege specific facts rather than conclusory claims to warrant an evidentiary hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Town of Howard could recover $750 in costs for fighting a fire negligently started by sparks from a Soo Line locomotive on land within the town. The railroad argued it owed nothing because it paid only state taxes and was exempt from local taxes or assessments under sec. 76.23, and that no common-law liability or statutory liability existed for fire-suppression expenses absent proof the fire was a forest fire under secs. 26.21 and 26.14(8)(b). The court concluded the stipulated facts did not establish that the “large grass fire” met the statutory definition of a forest fire or identify the land owner, so neither the town’s recovery under the forest-fire statutes nor the railroad’s motion for summary judgment could be granted on the existing record. The judgment for the town was reversed and the matter remanded for trial.

torts & liabilitytaxesproperty

The case concerned whether a 1969 Wisconsin statute criminalizing the delivery of dangerous drugs, including LSD as defined to encompass lysergic acid diethylamide and chemically identical substances, applied to nonhallucinogenic isomers of LSD or only to the hallucinogenic d-LSD isomer. Berg was convicted after selling a substance confirmed as LSD through various tests, though not shown to be the hallucinogenic form. The court examined the statutory text, chemical distinctions among the four isomers, and expert testimony on testing methods like infrared spectrophotometry, concluding that the law required proof of the hallucinogenic isomer for conviction.

criminal law

The case involved a defendant convicted of armed robbery who challenged his conviction based on an out-of-court identification made during an informal confrontation in a district attorney's office without counsel present, as well as the suggestiveness of that identification. The court dismissed the writ of error reviewing the judgment of conviction because it was filed more than a year after the judgment. On review of the order denying a new trial, the court held that the informal confrontation did not violate the defendant's right to counsel and was not unduly suggestive, as the identification was reliable under the factors from Neil v. Biggers, including the witness's opportunity to observe the perpetrator, the accuracy of the description, and the short time between the crime and identification; the in-court identification was also deemed based on independent recollection. The court therefore affirmed the order denying a new trial, applying a de novo review for the legal questions presented rather than an abuse of discretion standard.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a defendant placed on probation with a condition of confinement in a county jail was entitled to good time credit that reduces the period of confinement under Wisconsin statute sec. 53.43. The court held that the good time provision did not apply to such probationers. The core reasoning was that probation is an alternative to sentencing, not a sentence, and the statute's references to diminution of a "sentence" or "term" apply only to those serving sentences, such as Huber Law prisoners; statutory language for probation uses "confine" rather than terms tied to sentencing, and confinement as a probation condition is subject to jail rules but not good time entitlements. The court distinguished reforestation camp rules and noted that trial courts retain flexibility to adjust probation terms if desired.

criminal lawprocedure

In Sass v. State, the defendant sought postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. sec. 974.06 after his conviction, raising claims that he was not advised of his appeal rights, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to not entering a judgment of conviction before sentencing, that uncorroborated accomplice testimony was insufficient, and that the court erred by not instructing the jury on accomplice testimony. The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that sec. 974.06 relief is limited to constitutional violations, jurisdictional defects, and excessive sentences and cannot serve as a substitute for a direct appeal to raise ordinary trial errors. The court reasoned that prior precedent, including Peterson v. State and related cases, did not expand the statute's scope to allow such claims when no timely appeal was taken, and that the accomplice-related issues were neither constitutional nor jurisdictional.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a public works contract between contractor E. D. Wesley Co. and the City of New Berlin for installing pumps and related equipment in a water facility at a fixed price. The city claimed offsets totaling over $6,000 for repairs to a fire pump engine, booster pump, and pump house roof after incidents including overheating, lifting damage, and a coupling crack, arguing the contractor remained strictly liable for all issues until formal acceptance via final engineer certificate. Wesley maintained it had completed its obligations and bore responsibility only for proven defects under the one-year guarantee clause after acceptance. The trial court disallowed the offsets for lack of evidence tying the issues to defective work or materials by Wesley and awarded the contractor the contract balance plus interest. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for a judgment consistent with its analysis of contract acceptance, guarantee terms, and liability allocation.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved plaintiffs who bought land for development and sued to quiet title after defendant Lesperance recorded an affidavit claiming a repurchase option, which the plaintiffs alleged was false; the complaint was later amended to add a claim for slander of title seeking statutory penalties and damages under Wis. Stat. sec. 706.13. The trial court quieted title in the plaintiffs' favor, found the affidavit maliciously false, and allowed recovery of actual damages, though it rejected retroactive application of the statutory penalty. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the order on damages and remanded for retrial, holding that sec. 706.13 was merely declaratory of the existing common-law tort of malicious slander of title and did not revive any cause of action barred by the statute of limitations; the court directed further proceedings on the common-law claim, including the limitations defense and scope of damages.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a dispute over liability for a traffic accident where a disabled truck leased from Avis Rent-A-Car was parked partially in a highway lane, and another driver collided with it. The trial court held the Avis truck's operator 100 percent negligent, citing failure to use warning flags and rejecting tailgating negligence by the other driver. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the flag statute did not apply because the location was within city limits, that the tailgating statute applied and the following driver was causally negligent, and that the emergency doctrine was improperly applied, thus requiring a new trial on liability.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case Vier v. Vier concerned a divorce action in which the parties disputed the division of property from a resort business they had operated together after moving from Hammond, Wisconsin, in 1957. Mrs. Vier challenged the trial court's award of $10,000 to Mr. Vier, arguing that the court failed to make explicit findings on the factors required by Lacey v. Lacey for a fair property division, including contributions during the marriage and other relevant circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that while trial courts should explain the basis for property awards, the failure to do so is not reversible error or an abuse of discretion if the overall division is reasonable and supported by the record. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that Mr. Vier's contributions to the business justified the award given to him alongside other personal assets, with the resort and its operations awarded to Mrs. Vier.

family lawproperty

The case concerned defendant Bell, who was charged with burglary after being found hiding in a building and who sought to disqualify the assigned trial judge on grounds of prejudice while also challenging the admission of evidence seized without a warrant from his nearby car. The court decided that Bell's request for substitution of judge was properly denied as untimely under Wis. Stat. sec. 971.20 because it was not filed before arraignment or any motion, and that he had no independent constitutional right to a factual hearing on actual prejudice when the statutory procedure had been available but unused. On the evidence issue, the court upheld the plain-view seizure of items from the unlocked car, finding the discovery inadvertent during a legitimate nighttime investigation and that exigent circumstances justified proceeding without a warrant to secure the vehicle and its contents. The order and judgment were affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure