Nathan S. Heffernan

In Bittner v. American Honda Motor Co., plaintiff Russell Bittner sued Honda after suffering severe injuries when his 1983 three-wheel ATV overturned, alleging the vehicle was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous under theories of strict product liability and negligence. The trial court admitted Honda's evidence comparing injury risks from ATVs to those of dissimilar products and activities such as cars, bicycles, skiing, and aviation, which contributed to a defense verdict after a seven-week trial. On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this comparative risk evidence was inadmissible because it was irrelevant to whether the ATV's specific design features created an unreasonable danger or violated the manufacturer's duty of care. The court reversed the lower courts' rulings, vacated the judgment, and ordered a new trial on all issues.

torts & liability

This case concerned whether Wisconsin municipal courts have statutory authority to suspend drivers' licenses as a means to compel payment of fines imposed for non-traffic municipal ordinance violations such as disorderly conduct or trespass, and whether such authority is constitutional. Petitioners, whose licenses were suspended after they failed to pay fines, challenged the practice under secs. 800.09 and 800.095, arguing it was barred by sec. 343.30(5) and violated due process and excessive fines protections. The circuit court agreed and enjoined the suspensions, but the court of appeals reversed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that the statutes provide authority for the suspensions, that any omission from sec. 343.30(5) was legislative inadvertence, that municipal courts have jurisdiction in this context, and that the grant of power is constitutional.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved adult children suing their deceased father's uninsured motorist insurer for pecuniary damages based on lost inheritance after he and his wife died in a car accident. The circuit court allowed admission of evidence regarding a $500,000 life insurance policy owned by the father, prompting a stipulated dismissal of the action while preserving the evidentiary issue for appeal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that evidence of the life insurance policy is admissible at trial because it is relevant to the decedent's propensity for thrift and savings as well as his earnings in excess of expenses, but the death benefit proceeds actually received by the heirs are not relevant to the lost inheritance claim. The court reasoned that lost inheritance is measured by the pecuniary value of assets the decedent would likely have accumulated and left to heirs over a natural lifespan, and therefore the policy's relevance is limited to assessing savings habits rather than the proceeds themselves or any inference about disposition toward the plaintiffs.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned whether Wisconsin's statute allowing continued commitment of an insanity acquittee in a mental health facility after the person is no longer mentally ill, based solely on dangerousness to self or others, violates due process under the U.S. Constitution. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the scheme is constitutional, provided the commitment does not exceed the maximum prison term for the charged offense and includes treatment consistent with the commitment's purposes. The court reasoned that a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict establishes dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, creating a continuing inference that justifies confinement, and distinguished the Wisconsin procedures from the invalid Louisiana scheme in Foucha v. Louisiana by noting that the state bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence and that treatment addresses behavioral issues. The defendant, Randall, had been found not guilty by reason of insanity on multiple charges including first-degree murder and burglary. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial of the constitutional challenge and remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case concerned whether Katherine Christenson's 1966 recorded offer to dedicate Block 3 of her subdivision as a public park remained valid after her 1969 death, allowing the Town of East Troy to accept it in 1990, or whether the offer had been revoked either by her death or by her successor K.G.R. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the offer was not automatically revoked by Christenson's death and instead ran with the land, remaining subject to acceptance by the town unless all successors holding interests in the entire subdivision jointly revoked it. The court reasoned from principles of contract and property law that revocation requires unanimous action by all current owners with an interest in the dedicated property, and that the dedicator's death is irrelevant once she has conveyed away all interest during her lifetime. The case was remanded to address unresolved issues, including whether K.G.R. held sufficient interest in the full subdivision to effect a revocation.

property

This case concerned whether engaging in commercial clam shelling without a valid resident license, in violation of Wisconsin Statute section 29.38(3)(a)1, constitutes a felony punishable under section 29.99(1m)(c) or merely a forfeiture under section 29.99(1m)(a). The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' rulings that treated it as a felony. The court reasoned that the felony penalties apply exclusively to violations involving the unlawful possession of clams exceeding certain values, whereas licensing violations are subject only to forfeiture penalties, based on the plain language distinguishing the penalty provisions.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Edgerton Sand & Gravel, Inc. (ES&G) was entitled to insurance coverage for defending administrative proceedings that it argued were equivalent to a suit at law. In the underlying June 1994 decision, a divided court ruled against ES&G on the coverage issue. ES&G later moved to vacate that decision or obtain rehearing, asserting that Justice Geske was disqualified because her husband worked for a company listed in an amicus brief appendix, which she had disclosed at oral argument without objection. The court dismissed the motion, holding that ES&G had waived any objection by failing to raise it promptly after disclosure or in its initial reconsideration request, and that the claim was meritless under the state disqualification statute because no significant financial or personal interest was shown. The court noted it would not reconsider prior denials of reconsideration and that the disclosure and waiver framework had been properly followed.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Gerard, the case concerned whether a criminal information containing a repeater allegation under Wisconsin statutes could be amended after the defendant pleaded to correct an error in the number of years stated for the sentence enhancement on one count. The circuit court allowed the state's post-plea amendment to fix the clerical mistake in the enhancement for the obstructing charge, but the court of appeals reversed that ruling. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the information could be amended after the plea to correct the clerical error in the penalty enhancement portion when the amendment does not prejudice the defendant, because the documents correctly alleged the prior convictions and the error did not affect the sufficiency of notice provided.

criminal lawprocedure

This case consolidated appeals from OWI-related proceedings in which defendants challenged the admissibility of their intoxilyzer test results. They argued that Wisconsin's standard "Informing the Accused" form under the Implied Consent Law, sec. 343.305, Stats., misstated the effect of requesting a second chemical test and thereby violated due process by deterring them from exercising that right. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, upholding admission of the test results in each case. It held that the statutory warnings accurately and consistently informed defendants of their rights to an alternative test, that the statutes and forms were neither contradictory nor misleading when read as a whole, and that no suppression was warranted.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Pederson negligently failed to diagnose a brain tumor, causing the patient's vision loss and subsequent injuries. After the jury found negligence and awarded damages including $750,000 for pain and suffering, it emerged that one juror had independently researched and shared a statistic on the average medical malpractice award during deliberations on damages. The court concluded that this extraneous information was prejudicial to the damages award because it was irrelevant to the specific case, not common knowledge, and could not be tested or addressed at trial, but had no effect on the negligence or causation findings. It therefore affirmed the verdict on liability and causation while reversing and remanding for a new trial solely on damages.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case involved Jerry Peete's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, enhanced by a finding that he committed the crime while possessing a dangerous weapon under Wis. Stat. sec. 939.63. The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed whether the statute's use of 'possessing' covers constructive possession and whether it requires the state to prove a nexus between the weapon and the underlying offense. The court held that possession includes both actual and constructive forms, consistent with other criminal statutes and jury instructions, but that the state must show the weapon was used to facilitate the crime to avoid punishing coincidental possession. Because the jury was not instructed on the nexus element, the court affirmed the drug conviction but reversed the weapons enhancement and remanded for a new trial limited to that issue.

criminal lawguns

This case involved employees of a subcontractor on a municipal public works project who sued the prime contractor and its surety for underpayment of prevailing wages required by Wisconsin statute. The plaintiffs sought not only the wage deficiencies but also double damages as liquidated damages plus attorney fees and costs under the prevailing wage law, while relying on the public contract bond statute to hold the prime contractor and surety liable. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' award of double wages and attorney fees, holding that the bond statute guarantees payment of the base prevailing wages but does not incorporate the penalty provisions or fee-shifting from the separate wage statute. It affirmed recovery of the actual wage shortfalls for the two named plaintiffs and other employees who timely filed written consents to join the action within the one-year limitations period. The decision turned on statutory interpretation distinguishing the scope of liability under the two laws and enforcing procedural requirements for class participation.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over perpetual hunting and fishing rights granted to the Carcajou Shooting Club in an 1896 deed covering land later purchased by the Figliuzzis, with the rights last recorded in 1942. The Figliuzzis sought a declaratory judgment after obtaining permits to build a 26-unit condominium complex, park, playground, and paths on the property, arguing the development would not be barred by the old rights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the hunting and fishing rights qualify as an easement under Wis. Stat. sec. 893.33(6), exempting them from the 30-year recording requirement because Wisconsin law draws no relevant distinction between easements and profits a prendre for recording purposes. The court further concluded that the proposed development would unreasonably interfere with the easement rights by greatly increasing human activity, vehicles, and developed land while reducing wildlife habitat, thereby virtually destroying hunting and fishing on the property.

property

The case involved James Oimen, convicted as a party to the crime of felony murder under Wis. Stat. sec. 940.03 and attempted armed robbery after he planned a robbery with two others, one of whom was fatally shot by the intended victim during the attempt. The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed whether the felony murder statute applies when a co-felon is killed by the felony victim and whether the jury instructions on the elements were erroneous. The court held that the statute applies because it requires only proof that the defendant caused the death while committing or attempting one of the listed dangerous felonies, with no limitation on who performs the killing and with the causal connection extending to immediate flight from the felony. It affirmed the convictions, concluding the instructions were proper and any error in the party-to-a-crime instruction was harmless.

criminal law

This case involved a property owner's challenge to a city assessor's valuation of a recently purchased vacant commercial building in Two Rivers, Wisconsin. After the Board of Review upheld the $345,500 assessment despite the $130,000 purchase price, the circuit court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that two conditions for an arm's-length sale were presumed met. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that the taxpayer bears the burden of proving all six conditions for an arm's-length transaction under the Property Assessment Manual, with no legal presumptions shifting that burden, and that Doneff failed to meet this burden because the sellers lacked market knowledge and were not shown to be uncompelled. The Court further held that the assessor properly used cost and comparable-sales approaches when no arm's-length sale existed, providing a reasonable basis for the board's valuation.

propertytaxesprocedure

This case concerned Edward Kraemer & Sons, Inc.'s request for a special exception permit to extract minerals from a 40-acre parcel zoned for agricultural use near the Baraboo bluffs in Sauk County. After two hearings, the Sauk County Board of Adjustment denied the permit, finding that the proposed operation would cause substantial harm to the bluffs contrary to ordinance provisions requiring wise use of county resources and avoidance of harm to public health, safety, and welfare. The circuit court upheld the denial on certiorari review, but the court of appeals reversed; the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that the Board correctly interpreted the ordinances to allow consideration of impacts on the bluffs and that the applicant had not met its burden to demonstrate compliance. The Board had provisionally denied the permit to give Kraemer an opportunity to submit a more detailed plan addressing preservation of the bluffs.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

In Vivid, Inc. v. Fiedler, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed whether the Department of Transportation must pay just compensation under section 84.30(6), Stats., for removing two billboards owned by Vivid as part of a highway expansion project near Janesville. The billboards, erected in 1965 and 1966, were lawfully in existence on March 18, 1972, but did not conform to the statute's requirements, and the DOT had acquired the underlying land through condemnation proceedings before ordering removal while offering only relocation expenses. The court held that the statute mandates just compensation in these circumstances, affirming the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court's summary judgment for the DOT with a modification to remand for determining the compensation amount.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from an automobile accident, where a mistrial was declared after defense counsel interrupted testimony to inform the jury about a defendant's wife's medical emergency, following an earlier comment by plaintiffs' counsel about courtroom activity. The circuit court awarded the plaintiffs' and county's costs against defense attorney Carroll Metzner personally for causing the mistrial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' partial reversal, holding that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in imposing these costs on the attorney, as his actions created potential prejudice that prevented a fair trial. The court affirmed the award of county costs against Metzner as well.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether owners of a wet boathouse destroyed by a tornado could rebuild it under a Department of Natural Resources rule exempting such structures from repair limitations, despite Oneida County's zoning ordinance prohibiting it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the DNR lacked authority under section 30.121 to promulgate the rule allowing reconstruction of boathouses damaged by wind, vandalism, or fire, rendering the rule invalid. The court reasoned that the statute's clear intent is to phase out wet boathouses by prohibiting new construction and limiting repairs to 50% of value, and agency rules cannot contradict this unambiguous legislative purpose. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the circuit court's order requiring the owners to pay forfeitures and remove the rebuilt boathouse.

environmentpropertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved Stanley Bartus's challenge to the revocation of his probation stemming from a 1986 conviction for operating without permits, including disputes over whether a 1988 resentencing and restitution order were valid and whether his original probation term had already expired. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed an unpublished court of appeals decision that had dismissed the matter sua sponte for the Department of Corrections' failure to give the required 90-day notice under sec. 973.09(3)(b) before probation expiration. The court reversed, concluding that the Division of Hearings and Appeals lacked jurisdiction to void or nullify a facially valid circuit court order and that the appeals court had misinterpreted the notice statute. It remanded for a determination of whether Bartus had already completed his 1986 probation and directed discharge if so. The reasoning centered on the principle that administrative agencies cannot reverse circuit court judgments and that the statutory notice requirement did not apply in the manner used to dismiss the action.

criminal lawprocedure