John E. Martin

This case involved a challenge to the will of a testatrix executed in January 1960, with contestants alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by beneficiaries Harold and Sylvia Lena. The trial court upheld the will, finding proper execution, sufficient capacity, and insufficient proof of undue influence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings were supported by the greater weight of the evidence, including testimony from witnesses who observed the testatrix near the time of execution showing she was rational and not influenced, while the medical expert's opinion allowed for possible competence. The court emphasized that the burden was on the challengers to prove incapacity and undue influence by clear and convincing evidence, and credibility determinations rest with the trial court.

family lawproperty

The case involved a plaintiff suing police officers for false arrest and excessive force during an arrest for reckless driving after the officers observed erratic driving and pursued the vehicle. The trial court instructed the jury only on false arrest and related matters, resulting in a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed various jury instructions and the failure to submit excessive force to the jury. The court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff had waived any right to a jury determination on excessive force by failing to request instructions on the issue, that other alleged errors in the instructions were either not erroneous or not prejudicial, and that the evidence supported the outcome reached.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In Hintz v. Mielke, a five-year-old boy was injured in a January 1958 car accident at an icy, uncontrolled intersection near a school, leading his parents to sue the driver for negligence in lookout, speed, management and control, and yielding the right of way, and to claim resulting permanent brain damage. The jury found the driver not negligent and determined that any brain condition pre-existed the accident and was not caused or aggravated by it. The trial court upheld these findings based on the driver's testimony that the boy stepped into the path suddenly, evidence of slow speed and quick stopping on ice, and medical experts' opinions attributing the condition to long-standing developmental causes rather than the incident. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that credible evidence supported the jury's conclusions and that any instructional errors were not prejudicial.

torts & liability

The case involved Milwaukee Western Bank suing its former part-time director and executive committee member, Lienemann, for fraud after he received 100 shares of stock in Mercury Engineering Corporation in exchange for arranging a $100,000 line of credit from the bank, investing his own funds, and providing financial services. The bank claimed this arrangement constituted fraud, but the court addressed whether the claim was timely under Wisconsin's six-year statute of limitations for fraud actions, which begins upon discovery of the facts constituting the fraud. The trial court found that bank officers had actual knowledge by 1950 of Lienemann's receipt of stock for his services, including obtaining the loan, and that diligent inquiry would have revealed any fraud well before December 1952. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bank's cause of action accrued earlier based on this information and was therefore barred when suit was filed in 1958.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case arose from a 1959 car collision in Madison, Wisconsin, where Little's eastbound vehicle struck Wendel's northbound car in the intersection, causing Wendel neck and spine injuries described as whiplash. Wendel sued for damages, and the jury awarded compensation while finding him contributorily negligent and comparing fault; the trial court later changed the negligence answers as a matter of law to eliminate Wendel's fault, struck the comparison question, and upheld the damage award. On appeal, Wendel challenged the damages as inadequate and the verdict changes, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported directing a finding of no contributory negligence and that the jury's damage determination, bolstered by the trial court's observations, did not require a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a car accident at an intersection where appellant Van Wie, driving a truck towing another vehicle, collided with respondent Hill's stationary car after attempting a left turn. The jury found Van Wie causally negligent in managing and controlling his truck and in traveling at excessive speed, which forfeited his statutory right of way, and apportioned 51% of the causal negligence to him and 49% to Hill. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that credible evidence, including photographs, witness testimony, and the positions of the vehicles, supported the jury's findings on negligence, speed, and apportionment, and that any issues regarding jury instructions or verdict form were either waived or without merit.

torts & liability

In Pines v. Perssion, tenants leased a furnished house intended for student housing but found it filthy and with defective plumbing, heating, and wiring systems that rendered it unfit for occupancy under building codes. The landlord sought rent under the lease, but the tenants argued they were not liable due to the condition of the premises. The court held that an implied warranty of habitability applied to the lease of a furnished house, which was breached here, making the parties' covenants mutually dependent. This exception to the traditional caveat emptor rule was justified by modern legislation such as building codes and health regulations that impose duties on property owners. As a result, the tenants were relieved of full rent liability and owed only the reasonable rental value for the period of actual occupancy.

property

The case involved whether Althea Taylor Earle was bound by two contracts between Nutrena Mills and her husband Roger Earle for the purchase of feed and livestock, where she had signed the documents next to her husband's name under the designation 'Grower' even though she was not named in the body of the contracts. The trial court dismissed the complaint against her, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that order. The majority held that because the contracts were complete on their face between the named parties and did not mention Mrs. Earle, the only consistent construction was that she had signed as a witness rather than as a party, with any ambiguity resolved against the drafter Nutrena. Parol evidence could not be used to vary the unambiguous terms of the instrument. The court therefore concluded she was not liable under the contracts.

business & regulatory

This case involved a plaintiff who slipped and fell on rutted snow and ice in a semicircular driveway in front of a hotel, sustaining injuries, and sued the hotel and a cab company under Wisconsin's safe-place statute for failing to maintain the area safely. The court determined that the driveway qualified as a 'place of employment' because both defendants conducted business operations there, employed personnel to work in the area, and exercised control over it, despite city ownership. The jury had apportioned negligence among the parties, but the trial court erred by combining the defendants' negligence for comparison with the plaintiff's instead of comparing it individually with each defendant, and also made instructional errors by overemphasizing certain evidence. As a result, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on liability issues only.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a 1959 automobile collision on a divided highway outside Madison, Wisconsin, where Mayville's truck emerged slowly from a motel driveway and was struck by Hart's eastbound pickup truck near a crossover. The jury found Mayville causally negligent for inadequate lookout and Hart negligent for excessive speed, awarding damages to Hart. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the crossover constituted an intersection under the speed-reduction statute, which improperly pressured a finding of Hart's negligence even if he was traveling at or below the 65 mph limit. The court also noted that Mayville's sole statutory duty was to yield the right of way, not to stop absent a sidewalk or sign, and that the erroneous instruction likely affected both the negligence findings and the apportionment of fault.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a claim for alienation of affections under Wisconsin law, where the defendant moved to dismiss based on the one-year statute of limitations in Sec. 330.22 (2), Stats. The court held that the cause of action accrues only upon the actual loss of consortium, which is the wife's companionship, society, and conjugal duties, and that alienation is typically a gradual process. The complaint alleged that the defendant began gaining the wife's affections on October 15, 1957, but did not admit an immediate or completed loss of consortium more than one year before suit was filed. The court construed the pleadings to allow the possibility that the loss occurred within the limitations period and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, leaving the timing issue for trial.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned two related actions filed in 1930 by property owners against Clark County—one for trespass and injunction, the other an appeal from a condemnation award—both of which remained dormant for over thirty years without being brought to trial. The trial court dismissed both under Wis. Stat. sec. 269.25, which permits dismissal of any action not tried within five years of commencement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute is discretionary and that the plaintiffs bore the duty to prosecute their claims, offering no excuse for the extreme delay; it rejected arguments that dismissal violated constitutional rights to a remedy or just compensation, noting that the statute imposes reasonable conditions on the pursuit of legal claims and that the condemnation appeal was treated as an ordinary civil action subject to the same rules.

procedureproperty

The case involved a dispute over the foreclosure of a note and mortgage given as part of a property division settlement following the annulment of a marriage between the plaintiff and defendant Jean Gigante. The plaintiff sought to avoid enforcement by claiming fraud and duress in the procurement of the documents. The court affirmed the judgment of foreclosure, holding that the fraud claim failed because the plaintiff knew the allegedly false statements were untrue and thus could not have relied on them, and that the duress claim was unfounded as threatening legal action does not constitute duress and the plaintiff acted with counsel's advice. The court also noted that the settlement was equitable given the parties' joint contributions to the business and assets during their marriage.

family lawproperty

This case involved a personal injury claim by plaintiff Steeno against defendant property owners Wolff after she tripped on a metal prong projecting about one inch above a sidewalk grate covering a basement window well in front of their building, which had been installed by the city of West Allis. The complaint alleged negligence in permitting the dangerous condition and creating a nuisance, along with a claim that the defendants had a duty to maintain the grate safely. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supported by affidavits showing the city had installed the grate without their control or involvement and that the condition had not changed since installation. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that they had no duty or control over the grate, the projection was not a trap or nuisance under Wisconsin law, and the plaintiff had seen the grate before falling. The decision rested on the absence of any factual dispute material to the defendants' lack of liability.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case involved a car accident in which the jury awarded $1,000 to plaintiff Robert Jennings for his own personal injuries, $112.49 for his wife's medical expenses, and other damages, despite evidence that his injuries were minor (bruises, soreness, and lost wages of $120) and that he had previously stated he was not claiming personal injuries. The appellants challenged the verdict as excessive, arguing it lacked support in the record. The court held that the trial judge improperly speculated that the jury had included loss-of-consortium and loss-of-services damages in the $1,000 award, contrary to the clear jury instructions, and that the award could not stand given the limited evidence of injury and the prior statement. It therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial solely on the issue of damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case centered on determining liability after a 1958 car accident in which the vehicle left the road and hit a tree, with disputes over whether Browne, Clements, or another passenger was driving. The trial court found Browne was the driver based on the positions of the occupants' bodies, vehicle damage, and expert physics testimony, leading to a judgment that Clements appealed on grounds including withheld witness statements, uncalled witnesses, and conflicting counsel representation by the insurer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that the absence of a bill of exceptions required assuming the trial findings were supported by evidence and that any procedural issues raised were either not prejudicial or not properly preserved for review.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a homeowner injured when a trench wall collapsed on a city street as he laid sewer pipe after connecting to the main line. The plaintiff sued the City of Hurley alleging it supervised the digging by his hired contractor and invited him into the trench, but the city denied such control and asserted the digger was an independent contractor. The court affirmed summary judgment for the city, reasoning that the city reserved only rights to inspection, location, and depth without controlling the manner of excavation, and thus was not liable under the safe-place statute for hazards created by the contractor after taking over the premises.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case concerned Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corporation's application to the Public Service Commission for higher fares on its urban mass-transit system. After granting an emergency increase, the commission issued a final order authorizing a smaller permanent increase, rescinding the emergency order, and requiring refunds to pass holders; it calculated the allowed return based on a rate base that excluded 60 percent of the Cold Springs shops and yards and that treated an insurance reserve as income reducing future expenses. Transport challenged the commission's rate-base determinations and sought independent judicial findings on investment and revenues. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial court's affirmance and remanded the matter to the commission, holding that the partial exclusion of the shops and yards lacked substantial evidence of non-operating status and that the commission could not require past surplus to offset future expenses through the reserve.

business & regulatory

The case Frion v. Coren concerned a tenant's claim against building owners for injuries from a defective balcony railing, asserting liability under Wisconsin's safe-place statute for failure to make the structure as safe as reasonably possible. The court determined that the statute applies to structural defects throughout a building occupied by three or more tenants, even in areas not used by the public or in common, though the duty to maintain safe conditions is limited to common or controlled portions. Core reasoning drew from precedents like Gobar, Bewley, and Skrzypczak, which distinguish structural defects from repair issues and emphasize the statute's goal of protecting occupants from dangers in multi-tenant buildings; the court rejected evidence of employment status or certain building codes as inapplicable and directed entry of judgment on the jury verdict.

torts & liability

This case involved a car collision at an intersection where defendant Hecht, approaching from a non-arterial road, failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with plaintiff Anderson's vehicle traveling on the arterial highway. The jury found Hecht causally negligent as to lookout, failure to stop, and failure to yield the right of way, while finding Anderson not negligent as to lookout or speed and attributing 100 percent fault to Hecht. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the question of Anderson's lookout was properly left to the jury because he was entitled to assume Hecht would obey the stop sign and yield the right of way, and the evidence did not establish Anderson's negligence as a matter of law despite visibility obstructions from a snow fence and sign. The court also upheld the admissibility of Hecht's guilty plea to a traffic violation as an admission against interest.

torts & liability