State v. McMaster
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-12-13 · cited 12×
The case concerned whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a criminal prosecution for operating a vehicle while intoxicated under Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63 and 346.65 after the defendant's driving privileges had already been administratively suspended under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7) and (8) for a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the subsequent criminal prosecution is not prohibited. The court reasoned that the primary purpose of the administrative suspension statute is remedial—to protect the public by removing unsafe drivers from the road—rather than punitive, even if the statute has some deterrent effects, and therefore does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The decision relied on precedents such as United States v. Halper and distinguished cases involving taxes on illegal activities.
criminal lawprocedure
Milwaukee County v. LOUISE M.
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-11-27 · cited 12×
The case concerned whether circuit courts in Wisconsin have authority to review probable cause findings made by court commissioners in involuntary detention proceedings under the Mental Health Act, and what procedures apply to any such review. After two individuals were detained, had probable cause found by a commissioner, and were denied de novo hearings by the circuit court, the Supreme Court held that circuit courts retain original jurisdiction and thus possess the power to review commissioner determinations, though no statute or constitution creates a right to review. The Court decided that any review is discretionary, consists of examining the record, and must occur in a timely manner before the final hearing, distinguishing the situation from prior cases involving dismissals that required circuit court action to enable appeals.
procedurecivil rightshealthcare
Kleinke v. Farmers Cooperative Supply & Shipping
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-06-25 · cited 35×
In Kleinke v. Farmers Cooperative Supply & Shipping, plaintiffs sued multiple defendants after a fuel oil tank removal error led to 300 gallons of oil being pumped into their basement, causing property damage, physical issues from fumes, and severe emotional distress that forced them to abandon their long-time home. The circuit court dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim at the pleadings stage, the case proceeded to trial on other claims with partial recovery, and costs were awarded including mediation fees and photocopying expenses. On certification from the court of appeals, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that public policy considerations of legal causation, as analyzed in Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., bar recovery for emotional distress based on negligent property damage. The court also reversed the costs awards, ruling that neither mediation fees nor photocopying expenses are authorized by statute under provisions like Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2) or the omnibus costs statute. The decision emphasized that while negligence elements may be met, legal causation can independently preclude liability, and trial courts lack discretion to tax unenumerated costs.
torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure
State v. Smith
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-06-14 · cited 41×
The case concerned whether a defendant could enter an Alford plea, as part of a plea agreement, to the charge of child enticement under Wisconsin law when the alleged victim was 16 years old, making it legally impossible to commit that offense. The defendant had originally been charged with second-degree sexual assault and agreed to plead to the amended charge in exchange for a sentencing recommendation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an Alford plea requires strong proof of guilt as to every element of the charged crime, even in the context of a negotiated plea agreement, and that this standard could not be met here because the victim's age did not satisfy the statutory requirement. The court therefore reversed the decisions below and remanded for the defendant to withdraw the plea to prevent a manifest injustice.
criminal lawprocedure
UFE Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-05-22 · cited 228×
This case concerned whether an employer under Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act must pay for an employee's out-of-state medical treatment at the Mayo Clinic, which was referred by the employee's Wisconsin physician, without the employer's prior consent. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) determined that consent was not required because the treatment was by referral, not the employee's direct choice, and the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the relevant statute, Wis. Stat. § 102.42(2)(a), is ambiguous regarding consent for referred out-of-state care. Giving due deference to LIRC's interpretation as the most reasonable one that aligns with the Act's purpose of facilitating necessary treatment, the court affirmed the lower decisions requiring the employer to cover the expenses.
labor & employment
Towne Realty, Inc. v. Zurich Insurance
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-05-22 · cited 46×
This case concerned whether Zurich Insurance breached its duty to defend Towne Realty and related insureds in a lawsuit brought by the Balestrieris alleging breach of contract, tortious interference, misrepresentation, and fiduciary breaches. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a tender of defense occurs when the insurer receives notice of the claim against the insured, but that Zurich was not liable for legal expenses incurred before that notice or for expenses in pursuing counterclaims. The core reasoning was that the insurance policy requires defending suits seeking damages from the insured and does not cover pre-tender costs or offensive actions like countersuits, with damages limited to those recoverable under full contractual performance.
business & regulatory
State v. Cummings
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-04-01 · cited 82×
The case consolidated two appeals involving the interpretation of Wisconsin's John Doe proceeding statute, which authorizes secret investigations into potential criminal activity. In both matters, defendants challenged the use of John Doe proceedings to issue and seal search warrants and the timing of criminal complaints filed by district attorneys, with one defendant also raising Sixth Amendment right to counsel issues. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that John Doe judges have authority to issue and seal search warrants, district attorneys may file complaints independently of ongoing John Doe proceedings, and such proceedings cannot be used to gather evidence against defendants already charged with crimes, while rejecting the constitutional challenges. The decisions were based on statutory language, prior precedent, and the facts showing independent sources for complaints and voluntary waiver of counsel rights.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Harrell
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-03-28 · cited 35×
In State v. Harrell, the defendant, convicted of retail theft as a repeat offender in Dane County Circuit Court, moved to vacate the conviction and disqualify the presiding judge on the ground that the judge's spouse was an assistant district attorney in the same county office that prosecuted the case. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that neither Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a), which bars a judge from hearing a case when a close relative is "counsel thereto," nor Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), which bars a judge from hearing a case when the judge cannot remain impartial, required disqualification so long as the spouse did not participate in or prepare the case. The court interpreted "counsel thereto" narrowly to cover only attorneys of record or those who actually appear or work on the matter, not every employee of a government prosecutor's office, and concluded that the impartiality question under subsection (2)(g) is determined solely by the judge's own subjective assessment.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Ogden
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-03-14 · cited 14×
The case involved Andrea Ogden, who pleaded guilty to resisting an officer and was placed on probation that included a 30-day jail term as a condition. She requested Huber release privileges under Wis. Stat. § 303.08(1)(c) to care for her child while the father finished school, but the trial court denied the request based on its uniform policy of refusing such privileges for child care unless absolutely essential. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to exercise individualized discretion. The core reasoning was that sentencing and probation conditions require consideration of case-specific factors such as the gravity of the offense, the offender's character, and public protection needs, rather than preconceived policies closed to mitigating circumstances, and that the statute expressly allows Huber release for family care.
criminal lawprocedurefamily law
State v. Williams
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-02-01 · cited 23×
This case involved a defendant charged in a multi-count complaint with various drug offenses, including some enhanced counts for alleged delivery of controlled substances within 1,000 feet of a park. At the preliminary hearing, the State presented no evidence supporting the park proximity element for the enhanced counts, yet the circuit court bound the defendant over for trial on all counts. The court of appeals reversed, holding that probable cause must be shown for the precise felony alleged in each count under Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10). The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed that decision, ruling that in sets of transactionally related counts, the State need only establish probable cause that some felony was committed as to one count in the set to support a valid bindover on the entire set. The court reached this result through de novo interpretation of the statute's ambiguous language, focusing on legislative intent and the limited purpose of preliminary hearings.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Sostre
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1996-01-24 · cited 26×
The case concerned whether a live-in boyfriend acting as a volunteer caretaker qualified as a 'person responsible for the welfare of a child' under Wisconsin Statute § 948.03(5), making him subject to a penalty enhancer for child abuse. The defendant was charged with intentionally injuring his girlfriend's three-year-old son while caring for the child, and a jury convicted him of physical abuse under § 948.03(2)(b) with the enhancer applied. The circuit court denied the defendant's post-trial motion challenging the enhancer, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the boyfriend fell within the statutory definition in § 948.01(3) because the child's legal guardian had used him to exercise temporary care. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute includes persons employed by those legally responsible to provide such care, and the undisputed facts showed the defendant had assumed parental-like responsibilities during the relevant period.
criminal lawfamily law
Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebert
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-11-16 · cited 100×
The case concerned whether a family member exclusion in Sharon Ziebert's homeowner's insurance policy with Allstate barred coverage for a contribution claim brought by Whirlpool, which alleged that Sharon's negligent supervision contributed to her young daughter's injury from a meat grinder manufactured by Whirlpool. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' grant of summary judgment to Allstate, holding that family member exclusions applying to contribution actions are not contrary to public policy. The court reasoned that the risk of collusion between family members in intra-family lawsuits, previously recognized in direct suits, applies equally to indirect contribution claims, and that the policy language unambiguously encompassed such claims.
torts & liabilityfamily law
Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-10-24 · cited 172×
This case involved three employees who suffered hearing loss while working for Harnischfeger Corporation but had some prior hearing loss before their employment there. The dispute centered on the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.555(8) for calculating workers' compensation awards for occupational deafness, specifically whether LIRC's method of applying the same 30-decibel threshold to both "occupational deafness" and "previous deafness" was valid. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute is ambiguous, LIRC's longstanding interpretation is reasonable, and it is entitled to great weight deference rather than being rejected as contrary to the statute's plain language. The court therefore reversed the decisions of the court of appeals and circuit court, which had applied different formulas for the awards.
labor & employment
Steinberg v. Jensen
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-06-30 · cited 50×
This case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit filed by Marion Steinberg and her husband against Dr. Thomas Jensen after she suffered permanent brain damage allegedly due to negligent treatment of high blood pressure and related sodium deficiency. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants after a jury found negligence but no causation, but the court of appeals reversed on grounds that ex parte contacts by the defense with the plaintiff's treating physicians had potentially impaired her right to a fair trial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that defense counsel may communicate ex parte with a plaintiff's treating physicians provided no confidential information is disclosed, that a defendant-physician may do so outside judicial proceedings subject only to ethical duties of confidentiality, and that any sanctions for improper disclosure of confidential information are within the trial court's discretion. The core reasoning centered on the physician-patient privilege being waived by filing suit for personal injuries, allowing access to relevant non-confidential information while protecting the patient's expectation of confidentiality for other matters.
proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare
Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowner's Ass'n
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-06-20 · cited 24×
This case involved a dispute over the scope of an easement allowing non-riparian landowners access to a lake and the right to maintain a pier, which the parties resolved through a stipulated final order entered by the circuit court. After a later Supreme Court decision in an unrelated case, the DeNeveu Homeowner's Association moved for relief from the stipulated order under Wis. Stat. sec. 806.07(1)(f), claiming the new ruling had effectively overturned the precedent relied upon in the original proceeding. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute does not authorize such relief when case law applied in an unrelated matter has been overruled; relief is available only when a prior judgment that actually formed the basis for the current judgment, order, or stipulation has itself been reversed or vacated. The court reasoned that an appellate decision in a separate case cannot constitute the reversal or vacation of a prior judgment as required by the statute's plain language.
propertyprocedure
Larson v. City of Tomah
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-06-07 · cited 17×
In Larson v. City of Tomah, a police captain sued the city and police commission for wrongful discipline after being suspended without pay for delaying the handover of internal investigation materials, claiming the action violated public policy. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, the court of appeals affirmed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. The court held that police officers cannot invoke the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for wrongful discipline claims because the legislature has already enacted a specific statutory scheme under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) that protects officers against improper discipline and provides an administrative and judicial review process. The opinion emphasized that the exception is narrow and does not apply where a remedial statutory mechanism already exists, and further noted that officers subject to for-cause protections are not at-will employees.
labor & employment
State v. Wolverton
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-06-07 · cited 33×
In State v. Wolverton, the defendant was convicted of burglary with intent to commit first-degree sexual assault of a child after being identified in showups following suspicious behavior near homes where children were present. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed five issues, holding that Wolverton waived postconviction review of the denial of counsel and cross-examination limits at his preliminary hearing because he failed to appeal the nonfinal orders as required by State v. Webb. The court further held that the showup identifications were admissible and reliable under the totality of circumstances, so denying the suppression motion and a continuance was not reversible error; any error in admitting testimony about a potential burglary tool was harmless; and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict on the burglary elements. The reasoning emphasized procedural waiver rules, the reliability of the identifications based on witness proximity and descriptions, and the lack of prejudice from counsel's decisions.
criminal lawprocedure
St. Ex Rel. Levine v. Fox Point Review Bd.
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-03-14 · cited 23×
This case involved taxpayers in Fox Point, Wisconsin, who petitioned for review of their property tax assessments after the local board of review rejected their claims that the uniformity rule was violated because their newer homes were assessed at fair market value while older comparable properties were underassessed due to the assessor's arbitrary methodology and improper considerations. The circuit court reversed the board and remanded for further proceedings, but the court of appeals reinstated the board's decision by applying a precedent requiring evidence that at least two percent of other properties were underassessed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that taxpayers whose properties are assessed at fair market value are entitled to reassessment upon showing that improper considerations caused underassessment of other properties in the district, without needing to meet any two-percent threshold. The court's reasoning rested on the state constitutional requirement of uniform taxation and its interpretation of prior case law, emphasizing that the assessor's failure to consider relevant sales data and use of arbitrary factors violated uniformity regardless of the number of affected properties.
taxesproperty
County of Adams v. Romeo
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-03-14 · cited 11×
The case involved the Romeos, who operated a fee-based fishing business and sold fish and other products from a building on their property located in a conservancy district regulated by the Adams County Shoreland Protection Ordinance. The county cited them for prohibited commercial activities, leading to a circuit court judgment imposing a forfeiture and injunction, which the court of appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the ordinance permits charging fees for fishing because it expressly allows fishing in conservancy districts, but prohibits using a non-residential building to sell fresh fish, smoked fish, and jams since such sales are not expressly permitted uses. The court reasoned that the ordinance's permitted uses section lists specific activities like fishing and certain building uses tied to raising aquatic animals, and any unlisted uses are barred, requiring interpretation of the zoning rules without deference to lower courts. It therefore reversed in part and affirmed in part.
environmentpropertybusiness & regulatory
Bauernfeind v. Zell
Wisconsin Supreme Court · 1995-03-08 · cited 14×
This case involved a worker, Richard Bauernfeind, employed by Penda Corporation, who was injured while assisting Coleman-Zell Construction with installing storage racking on Penda's premises. Bauernfeind sued Coleman-Zell for negligence, but the court addressed whether his claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act because he qualified as a "loaned employee." The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the four-prong "loaned employee" test from Seaman Body Corporation v. Industrial Comm. applied, rather than the temporary help agency statute, since no compensation was paid to Penda. Applying that test, the court concluded as a matter of law that Bauernfeind consented to work for Coleman-Zell, performed its work, was subject to its control, and his work primarily benefited Coleman-Zell, thus barring his claim.
labor & employmenttorts & liability