The case involved consolidated lawsuits by the owner of a building damaged in a natural gas explosion, along with his insurer, and by tenants operating a garage business whose contents were destroyed; both sought recovery from the defendant public utility that supplied gas in Douglas, Wyoming. After a jury trial resulted in verdicts for the defendant, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court should have declared the defendant in default because it failed to timely pay costs and post a bond after obtaining an order changing venue, and that a new trial should have been granted on various grounds including evidentiary insufficiency and jury misconduct. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the relevant statute's directive to adjudge an abandoning defendant in default was not mandatory but instead permissive, allowing the trial court to exercise discretion rather than automatically impose default, and that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying the motions for default or new trial. The judgments for the defendant were therefore affirmed.
The case arose in a criminal proceeding when a male defendant charged with felony objected to women serving on his trial jury, arguing that the Wyoming Constitution guarantees a jury of men only and that the 1949 statute making women eligible for jury service was unconstitutional. The court addressed certified questions on whether women are eligible as petit jurors in district court cases and whether Chapter 61 of the 1949 Session Laws is valid. It answered that women are eligible, the statute is a valid enactment, and it does not violate Article 1, Section 9 or other provisions of the state constitution. The reasoning focused on the historical context of jury qualifications, the constitution's equality provisions confirming women's civil and political rights, and interpretations from other states holding that references to "men" in jury clauses do not restrict legislative authority to expand eligibility.
The case involves a pedestrian plaintiff injured in a highway collision with an automobile driven by defendant Thomas Vukelic. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff after a bench trial. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, concluding that any variance between the pleadings (which alleged the wife was driving) and the proof (that the husband was driving) was immaterial under the applicable statutes. The court further held there was no substantial evidence of the defendant's negligence or to support recovery under the last clear chance doctrine, given the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
This case concerns a father's appeal from a district court order approving the adoption of his two young daughters by the Lucas family without his consent, which was granted on grounds that he had abandoned the children after placing them with his mother and later the petitioners following personal hardships including his second wife's death. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the adoption order and directed dismissal of a related counterclaim for child support costs. The court held that the evidence failed to show the father's intent to forgo all parental duties, noting his arrangements for the children's care, occasional financial contributions, and lack of communication during a work absence in Alaska did not constitute abandonment when the children remained in stable temporary care. The court also ruled that monetary claims for support were improperly litigated in the adoption proceeding under applicable civil procedure rules.
This case concerned the enforceability of a 1931 postnuptial agreement in which a husband promised to waive his statutory right, under what is now Wyo. Stat. § 6-301, to elect to take one-half of his wife's estate rather than accept the terms of her will, which left him less than that amount. The wife had died in 1945 without children, and the executor sued for a declaratory judgment that the agreement barred the surviving husband from filing an election in probate court. The trial court upheld the agreement as valid but ruled it did not affect the husband's separate statutory exemptions. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, holding the agreement unenforceable because it was supported only by the wife's promise to return to the marriage and the husband's receipt of $100, without any showing of additional consideration or circumstances that would estop the husband from exercising his statutory right after her death. The court dismissed the executor's cross-appeal as moot.
This case involves a worker's compensation claim by the widow and children of Gerald R. White, who died after suffering a crushing injury to his chest and shoulders while repairing a truck axle for his employer, Maverick Production Company. The district court awarded benefits, finding that the injury contributed to White's death from coronary thrombosis 22 days later. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the award, holding that there was substantial evidence, including medical expert testimony and witness accounts of White's deteriorating condition, to support the finding that the accident was a predisposing cause of the fatal blood clot. The court reasoned that the expert opinion linking the trauma to clot formation was sufficient, especially given the worker's prior good health and the lack of alternative explanations.