The case involved graduates of Southern University Law School who failed the July 1974 Louisiana Bar Examination and sued the Louisiana State Bar Association, alleging that the lack of written objective grading criteria and the absence of post-examination review violated their due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge federal court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. The court reasoned that the examination procedures, which included anonymous grading, general and specific criteria provided to examiners, and a multi-level review process for failing or borderline papers by the Committee on Bar Admissions, were constitutional, and that the opportunity for re-examination satisfied due process requirements, consistent with prior precedent.
The State of Louisiana, representing turtle farmers and shippers, sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the FDA Commissioner seeking a declaratory judgment that a 1975 FDA regulation banning the sale and distribution of small turtles was invalid, as it would eliminate a major industry in the state. The defendants moved to dismiss the state's claims for lack of standing. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged economic injury in fact to an interest within the zone protected by the Administrative Procedure Act, satisfying Article III's case-or-controversy requirement and the standards from cases such as Data Processing Service v. Camp. The opinion emphasized that even a minor economic harm provides the concrete adverseness needed for judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 702.
This case involved a plaintiff's claim for statutory damages under the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z for alleged inadequate disclosures in a loan transaction, where the defendant counterclaimed for the unpaid balance on the promissory note. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding no violations of the Act or regulations and awarding the defendant the amount due on the note plus interest and attorney's fees. The court reasoned that identifying the security interest through a separate chattel mortgage satisfied the requirement for meaningful disclosure under 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5), and that breaking down the finance charge was unnecessary under 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(d)(3) when it consisted solely of interest, consistent with Federal Reserve Board guidance. The material facts were undisputed, and the plaintiff raised no defenses to the counterclaim.
In Gaulter v. Capdeboscq, an Australian citizen plaintiff, acting as authorized agent for her Louisiana-citizen husband on behalf of their marital community, brought a possessory action seeking damages and injunctive relief over disputed real property in Tangipahoa Parish, alleging that local sheriff and clerk officials conspired with private defendants under color of law to violate her due process and equal protection rights under the 14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). The court determined that diversity jurisdiction was absent under 28 U.S.C. § 1359 because the plaintiff's appointment as agent was made to manufacture diversity, applying factors such as the husband's normal role as head of the community, his greater interest in the suit, and the local nature of the boundary dispute. However, the court held that the complaint adequately stated claims under §§ 1983 and 1985(3) by alleging joint action by state officials and a conspiracy to deprive rights, and it granted a permanent injunction prohibiting trespass, harassment, and related acts until ownership is resolved in the parallel state proceeding.
The case involved a plaintiff employed by a temporary help service who was injured while painting a structure known as the MV BUNA, a former steamboat that had been stripped of propulsion equipment, permanently moored to shore with utility connections, and used as an office by defendant Federal Barge Lines. The plaintiff sued the defendant in admiralty, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness on the theory that the BUNA remained a vessel in navigation and that the claim had sufficient maritime contacts. The court treated the defendant's motion as one for summary judgment and granted it, concluding that the structure was no longer functioning as a vessel and was instead an extension of land, and that the tort lacked the necessary maritime nexus under Fifth Circuit precedents such as Cook v. Belden Concrete Products. The decision rested on the BUNA's actual function and status at the time of the injury, the nature of the plaintiff's painting work, and the absence of direct ties to traditional maritime activity.
In this case, plaintiff Charles Froust sued his employer Coating Specialists, Inc. and its insurers under the Jones Act and general maritime law, claiming he developed silicosis from negligence and unseaworthy sandblasting equipment during his employment as a sandblaster from 1959 to 1970; a separate action sought maintenance and cure. The parties stipulated to liability and damages of $175,000 against the employer, leaving only the question of which insurers were responsible. The court found that silicosis qualifies as a disease rather than an injury by accident, and that the prior insurers' policies covered only diseases where the last exposure occurred during their policy periods. Because the plaintiff's final exposure and manifestation of the disease fell within the coverage period of Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association, that insurer was held liable to indemnify the employer, while all earlier insurers were dismissed.
