Thomas Brooks

Mission Insurance Company sued Cash, Sullivan & Cross and its agent for misrepresentations that allegedly caused Mission to issue an insurance policy and pay over $3 million on a claim. After the case was placed on the inactive calendar and delayed by an injunction from a separate receivership proceeding, Mission's attorney failed to seek relief from the injunction or otherwise prosecute the action, leading to dismissal without prejudice for lack of prosecution in March 1989. Mission moved for relief from judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(6) and alternatively for permission to refile under the savings statute, A.R.S. § 12-504, but the trial court denied both motions, citing the absence of extraordinary circumstances and Mission's prolonged failure to pursue its claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Ammer v. Arizona Water Co., the Ammers sought a prescriptive easement over a portion of land owned by Arizona Water Company that they and their lessees had used as a parking lot since 1971, after AWC fenced the area and counterclaimed for trespass and to quiet title. The trial court granted summary judgment to AWC, finding that the Ammers had not shown the required ten years of continuous exclusive possession. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that exclusive possession is not an element of a prescriptive easement claim and that the Ammers should have the opportunity to present evidence on whether successive periods of use could be tacked based on privity of estate. The opinion clarified that the rules for adverse possession do not fully apply to easements by prescription, particularly regarding exclusivity.

property

The case involved Harvey and Anna Marie Blutreich seeking a declaratory judgment against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company regarding the extent of coverage obligations under the underinsured motorist provision of their automobile policy following a 1982 accident in Arizona. The trial court entered judgment for the insurer, ruling that the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions barred the claim because it began to run on the date of the accident. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that the limitations period instead begins only upon an event constituting a breach by the insurer, such as its refusal to pay disputed benefits, consistent with general contract law principles applied to uninsured and underinsured motorist claims.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved an Arizona workers' compensation claimant who suffered a lower back injury in 1984 while employed by one company, had that claim closed without permanent impairment, and then experienced a second back injury in 1986 while working for a different employer. The claimant filed both a petition to reopen the first claim and a new injury claim, which were consolidated before the Industrial Commission. The administrative law judge initially granted reopening and denied the new injury claim, but after appellate review the court applied the successive injury doctrine, determining that the second injury qualified as a new compensable event and that the remedies were mutually exclusive when both were actively pursued. The court affirmed the award granting the new injury claim while denying reopening, reasoning that when a claimant pursues both alternatives in a consolidated proceeding the successive injury doctrine governs to prevent double recovery for the same condition.

labor & employment

The case involved the state's appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of a second indictment charging Frank Robert Marquess with manslaughter and endangerment arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident. After the initial indictment was dismissed without prejudice and converted to with prejudice when the state failed to refile within thirty days, the state obtained a new indictment based on the same charges. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the new indictment, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the prior dismissal order became a final judgment barring refiling even without an explicit finding that the interests of justice required dismissal with prejudice under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.5(d), as such a finding could be presumed from the circumstances. The court rejected jurisdictional challenges and concluded that further prosecution was precluded once the order was not timely challenged.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Takacs, the state appealed the trial court's dismissal of an indictment charging defendants with multiple counts of promoting gambling under A.R.S. section 13-3303, based on the court's finding that the statute and its exceptions for amusement and social gambling were unconstitutionally vague due to undefined phrases such as 'control to any material degree,' 'conducted as a business,' and 'compete on equal terms.' The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that due process does not require absolute precision in drafting, that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality for legislative enactments, and that a statute is not vague merely because certain terms are undefined or susceptible to multiple interpretations, as long as it provides fair notice and adequate standards for enforcement.

criminal law