This case involved a motion by an attorney petitioner seeking court-ordered compensation from funds due to preferred creditors for his services in proceedings before a special master to establish priority claims in a receivership of New York State Rys. The court denied the motion, holding that the petitioner could not recover fees from the shares of creditors other than his own client. The core reasoning was that each client must pay their own attorney, the petitioner did not create or secure the preexisting fund for the benefit of the class as required under equitable common-fund doctrine, many creditors had separate counsel, and there was no consent or basis to impose shared fees.
This case involves a bankruptcy proceeding where a creditor sought to prevent the discharge of a judgment debt arising from a partnership dispute. The debtor, a former partner, had been ordered by a state court to pay over funds collected on behalf of the partnership after dissolution but failed to account for them and destroyed records. The court decided that the debt was not dischargeable in bankruptcy, reasoning that although the partnership did not create a technical fiduciary relationship for bankruptcy purposes, the debtor's actions constituted a willful and malicious injury to the creditor's property.
This case involved a dispute over general average contribution for expenses incurred when a motorship carrying wheat stranded on Fraser’s Shoal in the St. Lawrence River. The ship owner sought recovery from the cargo owner, attributing the incident to the captain’s faulty navigation, while the cargo owner argued the cause was a defective telemotor steering apparatus. After reviewing evidence of prior leaks, repairs, and repeated failures in the by-pass valve, the court determined that the steering gear malfunction caused the stranding and that the vessel was unseaworthy when the voyage began. The owner failed to prove due diligence in inspecting or maintaining the apparatus, so recovery in general average was unavailable. The libel was therefore dismissed.
This case involved a bankrupt individual, Ingrao, who moved to vacate his bankruptcy discharge granted in February 1929 in order to amend his schedules and add certain deficiency judgments from foreclosure proceedings that had been omitted due to his ignorance of their existence at the time of filing his petition in July 1928. The court noted that section 15 of the Bankruptcy Act permits revocation of a discharge only upon a showing of fraud by the bankrupt, which was not present here. However, relying on the court's general equity powers to correct mistakes, surprise, or excusable neglect—as recognized in cases like Rash v. Metzger—the court determined that the omission resulted from misinformation or inadvertence without any fraudulent intent or harm to creditors. It therefore granted the motion to vacate the discharge solely to allow amendment of the schedules to include the pre-petition judgments.
In United States v. Marra, prohibition officers entered and searched the defendant's premises after announcing their intent to inspect and receiving the reply "All right," without obtaining a search warrant. The court considered whether this constituted consent or an invitation to search. It determined that the defendant's response amounted only to acquiescence under the circumstances, not a voluntary invitation, and that the officers should have secured a warrant beforehand. Consequently, the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search.
The case concerned a bankrupt individual's motion to stay enforcement of a state court judgment obtained by his former employer for approximately $24,475 in excess compensation received over several years by padding purchase bills, with the parties disputing whether the excess was authorized compensation. The jury specifically found that the excess amount had been received but was not obtained through fraud or deceit. The court held that the judgment was dischargeable in bankruptcy, reasoning that it did not fall under the non-dischargeable categories of section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act because there was no fiduciary relationship and the jury's findings established the absence of willful and malicious injury.
