Robert J. Cindrich

This case involves a labor dispute under the Railway Labor Act between the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and US Airways over the airline's plan to subcontract heavy maintenance work (S-Checks) on Airbus aircraft. The union argued that the subcontracting violated the scope-of-work provisions in the parties' collective bargaining agreement, which prohibits farming out covered work except in limited circumstances, and sought injunctive relief to maintain the status quo. The court determined that the dispute qualified as a major dispute rather than a minor one because it concerned an attempt to modify the existing agreement rather than merely interpret it. As a result, the court had authority to issue injunctive relief to preserve the status quo pending statutory settlement procedures under the RLA, without the usual equitable balancing required for minor disputes.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a copyright infringement lawsuit by SESAC against WPNT, Inc. for unauthorized broadcasting of songs, where a jury awarded substantial statutory damages on a per-song basis after finding willful infringement. The defendants moved for a new trial on damages or remittitur, arguing the verdict was excessive and should be reduced to a lump sum or aligned with license costs. The court denied the motion, holding that the jury followed the per-song verdict slip and instructions requested by the defendants, properly evaluated evidence of willfulness and credibility, and awarded damages within the statutory range that included a deterrent effect. The opinion stressed that the court would not substitute its judgment for the jury's fact-finding or Congress's statutory framework.

propertyprocedure

This case arose when plaintiff John Doe challenged Pennsylvania officials' application of Megan's Law community notification requirements to his out-of-state sex offense conviction, claiming lack of due process; although Doe brought federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court granted summary judgment and injunctive relief on state-law grounds under the Interstate Compact Concerning Parole, finding that the state could not impose notification without affording the same process given to in-state offenders. The defendants withdrew their appeal, making Doe the prevailing party. Doe then petitioned for attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court applied the lodestar method, requiring the fee applicant to document reasonable hours and market rates while allowing the opposing party to object with specificity, and explained that it would adjust the award for excessive, undocumented, or unsuccessful work but would not reduce fees on grounds not raised by the defendants.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant indicted on federal charges of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and heroin as well as possession with intent to distribute, who sought to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant executed after a controlled buy at a co-defendant's residence. Following a suppression hearing, the district court orally denied the motion, after which the defendant entered a guilty plea; this memorandum opinion addresses the warrant issue in greater detail. The court explained that anticipatory warrants must satisfy the Fourth Amendment's probable-cause requirement at the time of issuance, not merely after the triggering event occurs, and found the supporting affidavit deficient because it lacked facts linking the anticipated drug transaction to the new premises or explaining the basis for expecting a crack buy within 72 hours. Nevertheless, the court denied suppression of the evidence, relying on the good-faith exception articulated in cases such as United States v. Loy and United States v. Williams.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved two Title VII claims of sex discrimination by plaintiff Cary against her employer Allegheny Technologies, alleging failure to promote her to Vice President of Human Resources and discriminatory discharge. After a jury trial that ended in a split verdict—finding for the company on the promotion claim but for the plaintiff on the discharge claim—the company filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain testimony, the weight of the evidence, and a supplemental jury instruction given after deadlock. The court denied the motion in full, concluding that the evidence supported an involuntary and discriminatory termination independent of the promotion claim, that the disputed evidence was relevant mainly to the claim on which the company prevailed, and that the modified Allen charge was appropriate in this civil context because it urged jurors not to surrender honest beliefs while emphasizing the costs of retrial. The court noted the civil rules' focus on just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution distinguishes such instructions from their use in criminal cases.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case was a bankruptcy appeal in which the trustee sought to recover from the appellants, who had guaranteed a loan to the debtor, payments the debtor made to the lender in the year before filing for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court held that the appellants qualified as creditors under the Bankruptcy Code because the payments reduced their contingent liability on the guarantee, and that the payments were not in the ordinary course of business. The district court affirmed, ruling that guarantors fall within the broad definition of creditor and that the appellants failed to carry their burden of showing the ordinary-course exception applied.

business & regulatory

This case is a bankruptcy appeal concerning whether a private assignee of municipal liens for unpaid utility bills holds secured claims under Pennsylvania's Municipal Claims and Tax Lien Act. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the debtor, which had treated the claims as unsecured. The court reasoned that, despite a later state appellate decision, it would follow the Third Circuit's prediction that assignees stand in the shoes of municipalities, allowing them to invoke the same lien perfection periods and priorities as the government entities.

propertytaxesprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a hospital executive who purchased disability insurance through her employer's benefit plan, had her claim for benefits denied by the insurer, and then sued under Pennsylvania state law for breach of contract and bad faith. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the policy was part of an ERISA-covered employee welfare benefit plan, which would preempt the state claims. The court analyzed whether the policy fell within ERISA's safe harbor exemption, focusing on whether the employer had endorsed the program. After reviewing the employer's limited role and applying both a reasonable-employee standard and a proposed bright-line test, the court concluded that the safe harbor applied because there was no endorsement. It therefore denied summary judgment and allowed the state-law claims to proceed.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case involved a former drug and alcohol counselor terminated after 24 years who sued his employer, a community mental health center, alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and PHRA as well as interference with benefits under ERISA. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, found the plaintiff established a prima facie case, and noted that the employer's performance-based justification could be viewed as pretextual but concluded any pretext was likely linked to separate whistleblowing complaints rather than age. On the ERISA claim, the court determined there was no evidence of specific intent to interfere with benefits, only incidental loss from termination. The court therefore granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case is an action by the United States seeking civil penalties against Allegheny Ludlum Corporation for violations of the Clean Water Act at five steel plants in western Pennsylvania. After summary judgment on some reported violations and a jury trial on liability for the remaining claims, the court found ALC liable for 1,122 days of violations involving permit exceedances at its Vandergrift, Brackenridge, and West Leechburg facilities. The court then held a non-jury penalty hearing and applied the statutory factors in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), including the seriousness of the violations, economic benefit to the company from noncompliance, history of violations, and good-faith compliance efforts, to conclude that a substantial penalty was justified by the evidence of repeated discharges and inadequate wastewater treatment.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned defendant Gary Small, who was indicted on charges of making a false statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer and possessing firearms and ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 922(g)(1), based on a 1994 Japanese conviction for violations of firearms, gunpowder, and customs laws. Small moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the statutory phrase 'any court' in Section 922 does not encompass foreign convictions and that his Japanese conviction failed to afford fundamental U.S. constitutional protections. The court rejected these arguments, holding that the plain language of the statute covers convictions from foreign courts, consistent with decisions from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits emphasizing Congress's intent to bar firearm possession by individuals with serious criminal records regardless of where the offenses occurred.

gunscriminal law

This case involves a lawsuit seeking damages from a residential fire started by the plaintiffs' three-year-old child using a butane utility lighter manufactured by the defendants. The court addressed the defendants' motion for reconsideration of prior rulings on the negligence claim, clarifying that it had found a duty and breach as a matter of law based on precedents like Griggs v. BIC Corp. but left issues of causation and damages for trial rather than granting summary judgment. On the strict products liability claim, the court granted reconsideration due to intervening developments in Pennsylvania law such as Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, applying a risk-utility analysis to allow the claim to proceed, including the potential for punitive damages. The court denied the motion for reconsideration overall and declined to certify the matter for interlocutory appeal, finding no substantial ground for difference of opinion on the negligence duty element but acknowledging unsettled aspects of the strict liability claim.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the United States seeking civil penalties from LTV Steel Company for alleged violations of Allegheny County air emission rules governing coke oven batteries, which were part of Pennsylvania's federally enforceable State Implementation Plan under the Clean Air Act. After LTV filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, the creditors' committee moved to intervene, and LTV argued that the bankruptcy automatic stay applied to bar the enforcement action. The court denied intervention, holding that the environmental enforcement suit was not a case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and ruled that the automatic stay did not preclude the government's claim for civil penalties because such actions fall within the police and regulatory powers exception.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a lawsuit for damages from a house fire allegedly started by the plaintiffs' three-year-old child using a butane utility lighter made by the defendants. The court had previously dismissed all claims except negligence. On the pending motions, the court denied the defendants' summary judgment request on the negligent design claim, holding that the manufacturer had a duty under Pennsylvania law to design a childproof lighter because the risk of child use was foreseeable and the risk-utility factors supported that duty, citing Griggs v. BIC Corp.; the court found breach as a matter of law but left causation and damages for the jury. The court also denied summary judgment on the negligent failure-to-warn claim, determining that factual disputes over the adequacy and obviousness of the warning required jury resolution. The products liability claims remained dismissed, and other motions were not addressed in this order.

torts & liability

The United States sued LTV Steel Company for civil penalties under the Clean Air Act, alleging that LTV violated Allegheny County Health Department rules on air emissions from coke oven batteries at its Pittsburgh plant between 1994 and 1998, as those rules formed part of Pennsylvania's federally enforceable State Implementation Plan. LTV moved to dismiss, arguing among other things that continuous emissions monitoring (CEM) data could not support penalty claims because it was not an approved compliance method under the regulations. The court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that Section 113(e)(1) of the Clean Air Act expressly permits courts to consider any credible evidence of violation duration, including evidence other than the applicable test method, when assessing penalties. The court also denied LTV's request to file an oversized supplemental brief and addressed related procedural motions concerning affidavits and discovery.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involves the United States suing Allegheny Ludlum Corporation under the Clean Water Act to address thousands of alleged violations from wastewater discharges at its steel plants into rivers and a public treatment authority. The opinion resolves multiple pending motions for partial summary judgment on liability, incorporating a stipulation in which the government withdrew some claims and the defendant admitted liability to others. The court granted summary judgment on certain reported violations based on the company's discharge monitoring reports showing exceedances of permit limits for metals, pH, oil, and other pollutants, while rejecting the 'upset' defense as unavailable because it was not included in the permits and reserving issues like bypass defenses for trial due to factual disputes. It denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and various motions to dismiss or strike evidence.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns John Doe’s challenge to the application of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law (both the Original and Amended Acts) to his out-of-state conviction, seeking injunctive relief against community notification requirements. Doe asserted claims under the Equal Protection Clause, Privileges and Immunities Clause, Due Process Clause, and Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment after an intervening state supreme court decision and legislative amendments, focusing on whether the Amended Act resolved the issues and interpreting related provisions such as the Interstate Parole Compact. The court applied principles of constitutional avoidance in resolving the motions.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involves a civil rights lawsuit by Bennett against state trooper Murphy for the fatal shooting of Bennett's son David, who was distraught and threatening suicide with a shotgun during a standoff with police. After granting a new trial, the court addressed Murphy's motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity, which would shield him from further proceedings. The court denied the motion, holding that the facts viewed most favorably to Bennett did not establish as a matter of law that the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable, given the distance, poor visibility, the decedent's non-threatening posture, and the presence of other officers who did not fire. It emphasized that disputed material facts and the lack of a definitive reasonableness standard made the issue appropriate for jury resolution rather than summary disposition.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involves trustees of the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan suing coal companies King Knob Coal Co., Anker Energy, and Reliable Coal for unpaid per-beneficiary premiums under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 and ERISA. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the Northern District of West Virginia. The court ruled that the statutes' nationwide service-of-process provisions allow personal jurisdiction based on the defendants' national contacts with the United States rather than minimum contacts with the forum state, consistent with the majority of federal courts addressing similar ERISA and Coal Act provisions. It further noted that venue is proper where the plan is administered and that any fairness concerns could be addressed via a transfer motion after jurisdiction is established.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved DQE, Inc.'s termination on October 5, 1998, of a merger agreement with Allegheny Energy, Inc. that had been approved by shareholders in 1997, after Pennsylvania's deregulation of electric utilities led to restructuring proceedings affecting Allegheny's West Penn subsidiary. Allegheny sued seeking specific performance, claiming DQE breached the agreement. The court ruled that DQE properly terminated under Section 8.2(a) of the agreement because the restructuring orders created a Material Adverse Effect on Allegheny. The reasoning centered on contract interpretation principles under Pennsylvania law, the definition and measurement of a materially adverse effect in the merger agreement, and evidence showing the significant negative impact on Allegheny's assets and revenues as of the termination date.

business & regulatoryprocedure