Associated Construction Co. v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1992-01-21 · cited 5×
The case involved a dispute between Associated Construction Company and Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc. over a subcontract for building a state criminal court facility in Connecticut, which led to arbitration under the contract's clause and the Federal Arbitration Act. Moliterno received an arbitration award of over $1 million, prompting Associated to seek vacatur of the award in federal court under 9 U.S.C. § 10(d), arguing the arbitrators exceeded their powers by failing to issue written findings of fact as allegedly required by Connecticut General Statutes § 4-126c. Moliterno moved to confirm the award. The court denied the application to vacate and granted confirmation, reasoning that the Federal Arbitration Act provides only narrow grounds for vacatur, arbitrators are not required to explain their awards under federal law or AAA rules, and any failure to provide findings did not constitute manifest disregard of the law or imperfect execution of powers.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Utica Mutual Insurance v. Denwat Corp.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1991-10-07 · cited 13×
This case is a subrogation action by Utica Mutual Insurance Company against Denwat Corporation and Minwax Company after Utica paid over $862,000 to its insured for fire damage allegedly caused by spontaneous combustion of rags used with the defendants' Watco Danish Oil Finish product. Utica asserted claims under Connecticut's Product Liability Act (including for punitive damages), the UCC, and CUTPA. On the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court granted dismissal of the punitive damages claim under the PLA because a subrogee's rights are derivative and limited to actual indemnity for amounts paid to the insured. The court denied dismissal of the UCC claims, finding they are the proper avenue for economic loss and not barred by the PLA, and denied dismissal of the CUTPA claim because it can be pleaded independently of the PLA.
torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Tsokalas v. Purtill
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1991-02-25 · cited 2×
This case involved media plaintiffs challenging a state court judge's order confiscating a courtroom sketch of jurors and barring publication of their likenesses during a high-profile murder trial, seeking a federal preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds. The federal district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, ruling that Younger abstention did not apply because the plaintiffs were not parties to the state prosecution and their claims would not interfere with it. However, the court denied the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the order was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction necessary to protect the jurors from external pressure and ensure the integrity of the ongoing trial.
free speechcriminal lawfederal power
Weber v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1990-11-05 · cited 10×
The case concerns a plaintiff who, after being hired as a manufacturing engineer and undergoing surgery for a kidney tumor with repeated assurances that his job was secure, was terminated shortly after returning to work; he sued under ERISA Section 510 alleging the discharge was intended to interfere with his health benefits, along with a state-law negligent misrepresentation claim. The defendant moved to dismiss the pendent state claim for lack of jurisdiction and to strike the jury demand on grounds that ERISA actions are equitable. The court denied both motions, holding that the federal and state claims share a common nucleus of operative facts warranting pendent jurisdiction and that the requested compensatory relief (back pay and benefits) is legal in nature, preserving the plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
labor & employmentprocedure
Davis v. Weiss
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1990-10-22 · cited 9×
The case involved a lawful resident alien from Jamaica who, after pleading guilty to a state narcotics offense classified as an aggravated felony, was detained by the INS without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) pending a final deportation determination. The petitioner sought habeas corpus relief and a temporary restraining order, arguing that the statute's mandatory detention provision violated procedural and substantive due process by denying any individualized bond hearing. The court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding the statute constitutional on its face. It reasoned that Congress's plenary power over immigration subjects such legislation to limited judicial review, that the government's interest in ensuring the alien's presence at deportation proceedings outweighs the individual's liberty interest, and that existing statutory procedures and habeas remedies provide adequate safeguards against improper application.
immigrationcriminal law
Cheng v. Wheaton
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1990-10-01 · cited 1×
This case involved a U.S. citizen mother who brought a Section 1983 action against the Connecticut Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth Services, alleging that the state agency's seizure of custody over her seven-year-old daughter to authorize surgery for rheumatoid arthritis violated her First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to direct her child's medical care. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Younger abstention doctrine barred federal interference with ongoing state juvenile proceedings. The court denied the motion and assumed jurisdiction, reasoning that abstention did not apply because the plaintiff had not received a full and fair opportunity to present evidence or litigate her constitutional claims in state court, where her proposed expert witness was excluded and only the state's doctor testified. The court further noted that res judicata would not bar the federal action due to the state proceeding's failure to satisfy due process requirements.
civil rightsfamily lawfederal powerhealthcare
Coleman v. Dow Chemical Co.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1990-03-16 · cited 4×
The case involved a black employee at Dow Chemical alleging racial discrimination by the company and his supervisor in the form of denied promotions, harassment, unequal pay and treatment, and retaliation after filing an EEOC complaint, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the § 1981 harassment and equal treatment claims but denied it on the promotion and retaliation claims. The core reasoning was that Patterson v. McLean limits § 1981 to discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts and does not reach post-formation working conditions or harassment, while material factual disputes remained on whether the promotions involved new contractual relations and whether performance evaluations were retaliatory.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1988-08-11 · cited 5×
In United States v. Gerena, defendants moved to suppress over 1,000 tapes of electronic surveillance evidence from an FBI Title III wiretap investigation in Puerto Rico, alleging that agents had intentionally and pervasively listened to communications without recording them in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). After extensive hearings, the district court found that monitoring agents had not engaged in such conduct and that the few instances of listening without recording were either de minimis or occurred when recording was not possible due to equipment issues. The court ruled that the statute requires recording only “if possible,” not in every circumstance, and that the agents’ actions did not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. Accordingly, the motion to suppress was denied.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1988-08-10 · cited 5×
In United States v. Gerena, defendants moved to suppress electronic surveillance evidence obtained in Puerto Rico, arguing that FBI monitors improperly used cassette recorders to create reusable 'work cassettes' of intercepted conversations and that disclosure of this practice was untimely. The court found that the use of work cassettes was a necessary aid for monitors to review and log conversations during parallel reel-to-reel recordings, that the government should have preserved the cassettes and disclosed the practice earlier, but that defendants suffered no prejudice because the original and duplicate recordings were fully preserved, disclosed, and contained virtually all relevant information. Only a minimal amount of additional content appeared on a few of the 39 surviving cassettes, none of which was used as evidence. The court therefore denied the motion to suppress the Puerto Rico surveillance evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1988-07-07 · cited 9×
In United States v. Gerena, defendants charged in connection with a terrorist group's activities, including a rocket attack on an FBI office and a $7.2 million robbery, moved to suppress 1,011 electronic surveillance tapes recorded in Puerto Rico under Title III orders, arguing that the government failed to timely seal the tapes as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). The court, after hearing extensive testimony from FBI agents, supervisors, and experts on tape authenticity, granted the motion in part and denied it in part. It suppressed the Levittown residence and payphone tapes, along with certain Vega Baja telephone tapes from a January 1985 order, solely due to excessive sealing delays, but denied suppression of the remaining tapes. The core reasoning focused on whether judicial sealing occurred promptly after interception ended at each location, with timely sealing preserving the tapes' integrity and admissibility while delays violated the statute's requirements.
criminal lawprocedure
McCarthy v. Bronson
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1988-04-19 · cited 3×
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a Connecticut prisoner serving a 10- to 20-year sentence for first-degree larceny and third-degree burglary convictions. The petitioner claimed that his inculpatory statements should have been suppressed because they resulted from an illegal arrest and unfulfilled promises of drug treatment, and that Hispanics were underrepresented on the jury venire in violation of due process and equal protection. The court denied the petitioner's motions for reappointment of counsel and opposition to a prior dismissal order, and dismissed the petition. It reasoned that state court factual findings are presumed correct, no hearing was required, summary dismissal was appropriate under Rule 4, and the petitioner failed to show substantial underrepresentation of Hispanics on jury panels under applicable standards. The court also found the petition presented no substantial questions for appeal.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-11-16 · cited 11×
In United States v. Gerena, the defendant moved to dismiss a superseding federal indictment and stay proceedings in the District of Connecticut, claiming that the district's jury selection plan under the Jury Selection and Service Act underrepresented Hispanics and Puerto Ricans on grand and petit jury venires in the New Haven and Hartford divisions, in violation of the Act and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion in full. It found that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of impermissible underrepresentation under the absolute disparity standard, as statistical evidence showed only minimal impacts on jury composition that did not meet the legal threshold. The court also rejected the equal protection claim, holding that the defendant presented no evidence that the selection procedures were susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-07-07 · cited 17×
In this federal criminal case arising from a Connecticut bank robbery prosecution, defendants challenged the legality of government electronic surveillance operations conducted primarily in Puerto Rico and Massachusetts under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The court considered the defendants' motion for clarification or reconsideration of an earlier ruling on whether First Circuit or Second Circuit precedent should apply to issues including the validity of surveillance applications, execution methods, and evidence handling and sealing. The court decided that the law of the First Circuit governs the legality of the interceptions because they occurred under the supervision of courts in that circuit, and it rejected the argument that post-interception procedures or exclusionary standards should be controlled exclusively by the law of the trial forum in Connecticut. The core reasoning drew on circuit precedents holding that the law of the place of interception determines legality, noted that Title III's suppression remedy is statutory rather than merely procedural, and emphasized consistency in federal treatment of evidence obtained across districts.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-06-03 · cited 1×
The case concerned defendant Juan Segarra Palmer's motion to suppress evidence seized during an August 1985 search of a third-party apartment in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he had occasionally stayed with an associate. The court held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search's constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. The decision rested on the finding that his intermittent visits, limited financial contributions, and lack of ownership or control did not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, as he was at most an occasional guest with no right to exclude others or unrestricted access.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-06-03 · cited 10×
In United States v. Gerena, multiple defendants charged with conspiracy and related offenses stemming from a 1983 Wells Fargo robbery moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to warrants from three locations in Puerto Rico—an office suite, a commercial condominium suite, and a residential apartment—on Fourth Amendment grounds. The court held that only defendant Filiberto Ojeda Rios established a colorable claim of standing with respect to the Ponce de Leon office, while all defendants (excepting one who made no claim) failed to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in any of the premises and Ojeda Rios likewise failed as to the other two locations. The ruling followed from the requirement that each defendant individually allege facts supporting a reasonable privacy interest rather than relying on collective or corporate theories, combined with the defendants' insufficient particularized showings and waiver of a hearing opportunity under Rule 12.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-02-26 · cited 3×
The case concerned a defendant's motion to dismiss a federal indictment charging involvement in a 1983 Wells Fargo robbery and to suppress wiretap evidence, based on alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) in the handling of electronic surveillance intercepts that revealed connections to the robbery. The court denied the motion in full. It held that the government's applications for surveillance orders and extensions, along with progress reports submitted to the same authorizing judge, adequately disclosed the other-crimes evidence and supplied the judge with sufficient information to determine that the intercepts complied with statutory requirements.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1986-12-09 · cited 1×
The case involved defendants in a federal criminal prosecution who moved to suppress evidence obtained through electronic surveillance conducted in Puerto Rico, claiming violations of the Puerto Rico Constitution, the United Nations Charter, and principles of international law. The court denied the motion, ruling that neither international law nor the Puerto Rico Constitution governs the legality of the surveillance. The core reasoning was that Puerto Rico is a U.S. Commonwealth rather than an independent nation, Congress retains authority under 48 U.S.C. § 734 to extend federal legislation to non-purely local matters, and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act explicitly includes Puerto Rico in its definition of "state" and sets procedures for such interceptions.
criminal lawfederal powerprocedure
United States v. Gerena
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1986-12-05 · cited 3×
The case concerned a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment on grounds that the government violated the Posse Comitatus Act by using Navy helicopters and personnel, as well as military airfields, to transport him after arrest in Puerto Rico to New York. The court denied the motion. It reasoned that statutes like 10 U.S.C. § 372 and Department of Defense regulations authorized the use of military equipment and facilities for law enforcement purposes, provided the assistance was not regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, which it was not here. Additionally, the court found no constitutional violations from the limited military involvement.
criminal lawprocedurefederal power
Lovelace v. Lopes
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1986-03-18 · cited 1×
Clifford Lovelace, an inmate convicted of murder in Connecticut state court, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that a mid-trial psychiatric examination ordered by the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and against self-incrimination. The U.S. Magistrate recommended granting the petition on due process grounds, but the District Court reversed that decision and denied the writ. The court found no due process violation because the examination was ordered due to the unexpected unavailability of the state's original psychiatric witness, the petitioner had a full opportunity to cross-examine the replacement expert, and the order did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The self-incrimination claim was rejected on the ground that the petitioner had placed his mental state at the time of the offense in issue, entitling the prosecution to obtain responsive psychiatric evidence. The District Court therefore sustained the conviction and confinement.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Arden House, Inc. v. Heintz
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1985-06-13 · cited 12×
The case involved Arden House, a long-term care facility, suing Connecticut's Commissioner of Income Maintenance and the Department of Income Maintenance over the state's Medicaid reimbursement rates for skilled nursing facilities from 1979 to 1982, alleging that the rates failed to cover reasonable costs in violation of the federal Medicaid Act and a state statute. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds including lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit against the state defendants, that the plaintiff lacked standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it was not an intended beneficiary of the Medicaid Act, and that no substantial federal question supported jurisdiction. The court also noted the availability of state administrative remedies that the plaintiff had not pursued and found abstention appropriate in this cooperative federal-state program.
healthcarefederal powerprocedure