This case arose from a libel and conspiracy lawsuit filed by unsuccessful San Diego City Council candidate Jamie Brierton against winning candidate Susan Golding and her campaign aide George Gorton, based on a last-minute election brochure that highlighted allegations of "violations of trust" and "improprieties" from prior conservatorship proceedings involving Brierton's firm. The trial court granted summary judgment to Golding and Gorton, dismissed the complaint, and awarded attorney fees. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal because Brierton, as a public figure, failed to present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice in the publication. It reversed the attorney fee award. The core reasoning applied the actual malice standard to statements made in the context of an election campaign.
In this marital dissolution case, Harold and Bonnie Graves divorced in 1970 without dividing Harold's military pension, a community asset, in their decrees; sixteen years later, Bonnie moved in family court under Civil Code section 4800.4 to divide it as tenants in common. The trial court granted her a share of future payments, allowing Harold to raise defenses from Henn v. Henn. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section 4800.4 grants jurisdiction only to divide separate property interests alongside community property division and does not authorize post-decree division of omitted community assets in the original proceeding. Instead, per Henn, such claims require a separate civil action where equitable defenses like laches may be litigated.
This case concerned a dispute over a co-obligor's right to contribution from the estate of a deceased joint debtor on a promissory note. After Borba obtained a judgment against multiple parties including Acheson and the estate of Richard Klawa, Acheson paid a large share of the judgment and sought contribution from the estate. The trial court denied the claim, ruling that it was barred because it had not been presented to the estate within the four-month creditor claim period under Probate Code section 707(a). The appellate court reversed, holding that a claim for contribution arises from equitable principles and operation of law upon actual payment rather than from the underlying contract, and that it was not required to be filed during the statutory period because the right did not exist until after the decedent's death.
The case involved a dispute over insurance coverage for a car accident caused by a Spartan Realty employee driving a rented vehicle, where the business liability policy issued by Hartford Fire Insurance explicitly excluded non-owned auto or hired car coverage at the time of the incident. Spartan later added the optional coverage via endorsement three months after the accident, and Hartford initially defended the claims under a reservation of rights before filing for declaratory relief to confirm the lack of coverage. The trial court ruled in Hartford's favor on summary adjudication, finding no waiver or estoppel, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the policy terms plainly excluded the risk at the time of the accident, the insureds showed no detrimental reliance, and the parties had agreed on the coverage limitations without fraud or misrepresentation.
The case concerned a geothermal lease on land owned by the Imperial Irrigation District, under which ITP held the leasehold and assigned steam production rights to Southern, Mono, and later Union, who became co-owners of interests in the steam. When regulatory orders required costly brine waste disposal, the assignees attempted to surrender their interests back to ITP under clauses in the assignment and lease; after a federal court held ITP solely liable for the costs, the assignees sought to retract the surrender and reassert their claims, prompting Kennecott (ITP's successor) to sue to quiet title. The trial court granted Kennecott summary judgment, ruling the surrender effective and eliminating the defendants' interests, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the lease and assignment permitted unilateral surrender by the lessees upon notice, with no requirement for ITP's acceptance or consent, so the surrender terminated the interests as a matter of law regardless of later events or ITP's initial position.
The case involved Carlos Lepe appealing his four-year prison sentence for grand theft person with a prior prison term enhancement, which the trial court ordered to run concurrently with an earlier four-year sentence for assault with a deadly weapon from a separate case. The sentencing court exercised its discretion to impose concurrent rather than consecutive terms specifically to maximize Lepe's total incarceration time, given how enhancements and credits operated under the determinate sentencing law. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that Penal Code section 669 grants trial courts discretion to choose concurrent or consecutive sentences without any requirement to impose consecutive terms when criteria for aggravation are present, and that the court's reasoned decision to achieve the longest possible term for a repeat offender did not exceed the bounds of reason.