William R. Channell

In McCorkle v. State Farm Insurance, homeowners sued their insurer and agent after a fire destroyed their garage, claiming breach of contract and torts including misrepresentation and negligence because the policy did not cover the full cost of rebuilding to comply with updated building codes requiring a concrete floor instead of wood. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the contract claim and judgment on the pleadings on the tort claims. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the policy's loss settlement clause limiting coverage to equivalent construction was unambiguous and did not require payment for code upgrades, consistent with similar provisions in standard fire insurance policies and the purpose of compensating only for actual loss. It further ruled that the tort claims failed for lack of causation, as any alleged failure to disclose an exclusion clause did not cause the uncovered costs. The judgment was affirmed.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In People v. Blevins, the defendant was convicted of multiple counts of assault with a deadly weapon and other offenses after driving a truck under the influence of drugs, firing a gun, stealing vehicles, and ramming into cars, injuring at least 25 people. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser related offenses of driving under the influence and reckless driving, as permitted under People v. Geiger. The court rejected this claim, finding that the lesser offenses were not closely related to the charged assault because evidence of voluntary intoxication was irrelevant to the general intent element of assault with a deadly weapon and thus could not support the requested instructions. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from a small claims unlawful detainer judgment against petitioner Bruno for back rent and possession of an apartment; after appealing for a trial de novo in superior court, Bruno's attorney sought to take depositions and propound form interrogatories, which the opposing party resisted. The superior court denied the discovery requests and imposed $1,100 in sanctions on Bruno's counsel for filing the motion to compel. The Court of Appeal held that formal discovery is unavailable in small claims appeals because the Legislature designed the small claims process, including de novo review under Code of Civil Procedure sections 116 et seq. and California Rules of Court rule 155, to be informal, expeditious, and inexpensive, with no attorneys or pleadings in the original action and limited formality on appeal; it further held that sanctions under section 128.5 were improper because the motion, though meritless, was not shown to have been brought in bad faith. The court therefore issued a writ directing vacation of the sanctions order.

procedureproperty

This case involved a father's appeal of a juvenile court order declaring his 20-month-old son a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b) based on the mother's neglect, including failure to provide adequate care, exposure to drugs and violence, and physical injuries to the child. The father argued that jurisdiction was improper because he was a suitable parent with a stable home and that the department failed to properly assess his ability to care for the child. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dependency order, holding that jurisdiction may be established based on one parent's conduct alone and that the court was not required to investigate or place the child with the other parent when it did not remove physical custody from either parent but instead vested custody in the social services department while continuing shared parenting arrangements with conditions. The decision rested on the statutory framework allowing dependency findings without requiring both parents to be unsuitable and on the absence of any removal triggering additional placement requirements.

family law

In Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, the dispute centered on whether a 1984 sale and leaseback of commercial property in San Francisco triggered a reassessment of the property's value for tax purposes under Proposition 13. The trial court ruled that the transaction constituted a change in ownership, leading to a higher assessed value and increased taxes, and the appellate court affirmed this decision. The court reasoned that the sale met the statutory definition of change in ownership under Revenue and Taxation Code section 60 by transferring a present interest in the property, its beneficial use, and value equivalent to the fee interest. It distinguished the transaction as a true sale and leaseback rather than a financing arrangement, which would not trigger reassessment.

taxesproperty

This case involved a dispute over unpaid child support in a divorced couple's case, where the noncustodial father stopped payments after the custodial mother moved out of state with the children and he could not locate them for several years. The trial court limited the father's arrearages obligation, excluding amounts from 1974 to 1983 due to the mother's alleged concealment of the children and interference with visitation. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1694 and Civil Code section 4382, a custodial parent's interference with visitation does not affect enforcement of child support obligations, as the child's need for support is paramount and concealment provides no defense or estoppel to collection of arrearages.

family law

The case concerned a challenge to a referendum petition circulated by residents to repeal or submit to voters a Hayward City Council resolution amending general plan policies to allow development of Walpert Ridge. The petition lacked the exact title required by Elections Code section 4052 but instead began with a heading that described the protested resolution and requested its repeal or a public vote. The superior court invalidated the petition and ordered it removed from the ballot for noncompliance with the statutory title requirement. The Court of Appeal held that the petition substantially complied with the statute because its heading conveyed the same information briefly and clearly, and the substantial compliance doctrine applies to preserve the referendum power when voter confusion is not threatened.

electionsprocedure

The case involved Barbara Luck, a computer programmer at Southern Pacific Transportation Company, who was terminated after refusing to provide a urine sample for an unannounced drug test. Luck sued for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, winning a jury verdict that included economic damages, emotional distress damages, and punitive damages. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the claims were not preempted by the federal Railway Labor Act and that the California constitutional right to privacy barred the employer from requiring random drug testing for an employee whose role did not involve safety-sensitive duties or other compelling justifications. The court upheld the verdict on valid legal grounds despite finding some of Luck's theories unsupported, while denying her request for attorney fees.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

In People v. Smith, the defendant was charged with robbery of an inhabited dwelling, burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon, along with related enhancements and prior convictions; after a jury trial he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to over 26 years in prison. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of expert testimony regarding electrophoretic analysis of dried bloodstains found on his clothing and other items, arguing that the trial court should have held a full Kelly/Frye hearing to assess the scientific reliability of the multi-system electrophoresis method rather than taking judicial notice of prior Alameda County hearings and out-of-state decisions. The court held that a new full hearing was not required because prior California and other states' rulings had already established general acceptance of electrophoretic typing of bloodstains in the scientific community under the Kelly/Frye standard, and any disputes over specific methodology went to weight rather than admissibility. It therefore found no error in admitting the bloodstain evidence and related statistical testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether parties to an add-on petition in a judicial coordination proceeding could exercise a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to disqualify the assigned coordination trial judge. The court held that no such right exists, because Judicial Council rules 1515 and 1544 limit any challenge to the first 20 days after the initial assignment and contain no provision for add-on parties. The core reasoning was that section 404.7 grants the Judicial Council broad rulemaking power for coordination proceedings "notwithstanding any other provision of law," authorizing the exclusion of later-added parties to ensure a single judge handles multiple related actions efficiently, and that this limitation is reasonable and does not violate constitutional equal-protection principles.

procedure

In this case, Michael Jack was originally sentenced to four years in prison for burglary and awarded 1,010 days of presentence credit, but the sentencing court later reduced that to 723 days after determining the original calculation had improperly included time before his arrest. Jack appealed the amended judgment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him because the error was one of fact or judicial discretion rather than a correctable clerical or legal error. The appellate court held that determining the number of days a defendant spent in presentence custody is a ministerial duty based on information from the probation report, so an erroneous calculation creates an unauthorized sentence that the trial court may correct at any time, even if it reduces the credit. The court distinguished this from true judicial error and declined to follow contrary precedent in People v. Montalvo, affirming the amended judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned Mary Leydon's petition for an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 to prohibit Robert Alexander from harassing her after a single five-minute workplace confrontation in which Alexander made offensive remarks. The trial court issued mutual injunctions barring both parties from contacting or harassing each other. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute defines harassment as a course of conduct consisting of a series of acts over a period of time, which requires more than one incident. The court further reasoned that Alexander's related lawsuit against the city did not qualify as part of any course of conduct because it was protected constitutional activity that the statute expressly excludes from the definition.

procedurefree speech

The case arose from a 1987 car accident in which plaintiff Bill Slagle sued defendants for personal injuries, alleging negligent driving; defendants answered with contributory negligence and filed a cross-complaint for contribution. During discovery, defendants subpoenaed Slagle's medical records from a hospital and physician, relying on notes indicating Slagle had mentioned prior blindness, which they argued was relevant to liability. Slagle moved to quash the subpoenas, asserting the physician-patient privilege under Evidence Code section 994 and that the patient-litigant exception did not apply because he was not claiming eye injuries. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal upheld that ruling, holding that Evidence Code section 999 creates an exception to the privilege for communications relevant to the patient's condition in proceedings involving damages based on the patient's conduct, allowing discovery here with possible in camera review for irrelevant portions. The majority rejected arguments that the motion was untimely and that section 999 was limited to respondeat superior claims.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a challenge to defendant Roberta Teglia's reelection to a third term on the South San Francisco City Council despite a city ordinance limiting councilmembers to two consecutive terms. Plaintiff Warren Steinkamp sought declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the election under the ordinance. The trial court ruled the ordinance invalid as preempted by state law on eligibility for local offices, and the appellate court affirmed that judgment. The core reasoning was that Government Code provisions on qualifications for councilmembers in general law cities demonstrate the Legislature's intent to fully occupy the field or indicate a paramount state concern that preempts local regulation, as such cities are creatures of the state subject to its legal framework.

elections

The case concerned whether petitioner Johnson, born on August 13, 1970, had attained the age of 18 by August 12, 1988, when he allegedly committed robbery, thereby placing him outside juvenile court jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court held that a person reaches age 18 on the first minute of their birthday rather than the preceding day, so Johnson remained a minor at the time of the offense. It based this on the plain language of Civil Code section 26, which calculates minority from the first minute of the birth date to the corresponding minute on the anniversary date, and on the binding precedent of Ganahl v. Soher interpreting that statute. The court rejected contrary interpretations in later cases like People v. Dudley as unsupported by the statute or prior authority. Because no fitness hearing had transferred the matter, the municipal court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the preliminary hearing, requiring dismissal of the information.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Bruce, the defendant was convicted of forcible rape based on an incident in which he picked up a woman, threatened her with a gun, and had nonconsensual intercourse with her at the Berkeley marina. The trial court admitted testimony from a victim of the defendant's 1981 rape conviction, instructing the jury to consider it only on the issue of consent after the defense stipulated to intercourse. The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, ruling that Evidence Code section 1101 barred use of the prior crime to prove lack of consent or reasonable belief in consent once identity was no longer disputed, as such evidence improperly suggested propensity and was prejudicial on the central issue at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Boyle v. Sweeney, the case involved a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on San Francisco real property that was subordinated to a construction loan for developing the site into condominiums; after the senior lender foreclosed and exhausted the security, the holder of the note sued the developers for the unpaid balance. The trial court awarded the full amount plus interest and fees, rejecting the borrowers' claim that Code of Civil Procedure section 580b barred a deficiency judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 580b does not automatically apply to this variation of a standard purchase-money transaction because the subordination and planned change in use made the original property value an unreliable indicator of fair market value. The court reasoned that the statute's purpose of allocating risk based on reliable security valuation would be frustrated if antideficiency protection were extended here, so the developers bore the risk of the project's failure.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned part-time, hourly instructors at the San Francisco Community College District who applied for unemployment benefits during the break between fall and spring semesters. The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board denied their claims, finding they had reasonable assurance of continued employment. The trial court granted writs of mandate to the instructors, and the appeals court affirmed. The court reasoned that under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1253.3, assignments contingent on enrollment, funding, or similar factors do not constitute reasonable assurance of employment, as the instructors' offers were explicitly subject to adequate class enrollment.

labor & employment

This case involved petitioners who attempted to file a timely motion for summary judgment in a civil action but were thwarted by the trial court's refusal to shorten time for hearing or to continue the trial date, preventing the motion from being heard before trial. The appellate court issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to continue the trial and hear the summary judgment motion. The court reasoned that under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, parties may move for summary judgment within specified time limits tied to the current trial date, and local rules or practices cannot prevent the filing and hearing of such timely motions. The petition was not untimely under laches, as the delay was not unreasonable given petitioners' efforts to resolve the issue in the trial court.

procedure

The case concerned a regional center's petition to admit a severely developmentally disabled, nondangerous adult to a state hospital after her care needs exceeded community placements. The trial court granted the petition under authority derived from In re Hop, finding the individual gravely disabled and in need of hospitalization. On appeal, the court held that the regional center lacked statutory authority to file such a petition directly. Instead, the governing statutes require appointment of the Director of Developmental Services as conservator to authorize unconsented admission to a state hospital. The court reasoned that existing procedures for conservatorship provide the appropriate mechanism, and no judicially created alternative was warranted absent demonstrated inadequacy in that process.

civil rightsprocedurehealthcare