Christopher C. Cottle

This case involves a father's petition challenging a juvenile court's order bypassing reunification services for his newborn daughter Esmeralda under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5(b)(10)(B), based on the prior termination of his parental rights to three siblings. The father argued that the bypass statute did not apply because he had not been a presumed father in the earlier proceedings, was not the custodial parent of the siblings, and had made reasonable efforts to address the issues leading to the prior removals. The court held that the bypass provision applies regardless of whether the parent held presumed father status or was custodial in the prior cases, and that substantial evidence supported the findings that the father had not made reasonable efforts to resolve the problems (primarily substance abuse and domestic violence) and that services would not be in the child's best interest. Accordingly, the petition for extraordinary writ was denied.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned a mother's petition for an extraordinary writ challenging a juvenile court's order granting a section 388 petition to bypass reunification services for her three children and setting a section 366.26 hearing. The underlying proceedings arose from allegations that the mother had exposed the children to risks of sexual abuse by allowing contact with a registered sex offender grandfather and others with criminal histories, along with prior referrals and the mother's own history of abuse. The juvenile court had initially ordered reunification services at disposition but later modified that order after receiving psychological evaluations diagnosing the mother with conditions like PTSD, bipolar disorder, and personality disorders that rendered her unable to benefit from services. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that a section 388 petition is a proper vehicle for modifying a dispositional order to bypass services and that substantial evidence supported the findings that bypass was in the children's best interests.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two factions within a California Orthodox church parish over ownership of church property and an affiliated religious publishing company. After the local priests and a majority of parishioners sought to leave the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church (Antioch), Antioch filed suit claiming it was the rightful owner despite the local corporation holding title. The trial court ruled for Antioch after a bench trial, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that determining which faction represents the true church entitled to the property is an ecclesiastical question that civil courts must defer to church authorities on, in light of First Amendment protections.

religious libertyproperty

The case involved property owners in the Santa Cruz Mountains who sued to block a logging company from using a private road section on their land for commercial operations, after the company filed a counter-suit seeking to prevent interference; the actions were consolidated. The trial court found the road had been impliedly dedicated to public use based on recreational activities in the 1950s and 1960s, granting the company an injunction while denying the owners' request for relief. On appeal, the court affirmed that the road is public and that the owners could not use self-help to limit usage, but it reversed the denial of injunctive relief to the owners and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the scope of the implied dedication permitted commercial logging. The court reasoned that the company had no duty to update its earlier admission of no pre-1972 evidence once such evidence was found, that substantial evidence supported a dedication from public use, and that the trial court had improperly resolved the scope issue without full consideration.

propertyprocedure

Robert G. Burden sued the County of Santa Clara after his brief employment as an attorney was terminated, alleging that the County had fraudulently misrepresented the position as permanent to induce him to relocate his residence, in violation of common law fraud and Labor Code section 970. The trial court struck requests for punitive and double damages and granted the County's motion for summary judgment, holding that Government Code section 818.8 immunized the public entity from liability for misrepresentations by its employees. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment after independent review, concluding that section 818.8 applies to both claims because it bars recovery for injuries caused by any negligent or intentional misrepresentation without exception for routine hiring decisions. The court further noted that related damages provisions under Labor Code section 972 were unavailable due to the immunity ruling.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, Ranger Insurance Company appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to set aside a summary judgment on a bail bond forfeiture after the defendant failed to appear for sentencing. The company argued that a 1999 amendment to Penal Code section 1305, requiring bail forfeitures to be declared in open court, should apply retroactively to their case, which was decided before the amendment took effect. The court decided that the amendment applies only prospectively, as it imposes an additional procedural requirement rather than reducing or eliminating the power of forfeiture, and there was no legislative intent for retroactive application. Therefore, the trial court's order was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Babu Singh Mann challenging the DMV's revocation of his vehicle salesperson license, which was based on his providing false information in his license application, convictions for approximately 23 felonies involving moral turpitude, and a prior license revocation. The administrative law judge recommended a probationary license due to mitigating factors, but the DMV director rejected that and ordered revocation. The trial court denied Mann's petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the DMV's determination that Mann's rehabilitation was incomplete and that revocation was appropriate.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute under California's Public Records Act over whether the City of San Jose had to release the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of individuals who filed complaints about noise from San Jose International Airport in January 1998. The San Jose Mercury News sought the identifying information after the City provided aggregated monthly noise reports and other complaint data but withheld personal details, citing privacy concerns. The trial court ordered disclosure with limited redactions, but the Court of Appeal reversed, directing that the personal information be withheld. The court reasoned that the City's existing reports already supplied substantial information about the number, timing, location, and nature of complaints, making the public interest in the complainants' identities minimal, while the interest in protecting privacy and avoiding a chilling effect on future complaints was stronger under the balancing test of Government Code section 6255.

procedureenvironment

After being attacked multiple times by her live-in boyfriend in a 24-hour period in December 1993, Adela Benavidez and her son sued the City of San Jose, its police department, the police chief, and a responding officer for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, claiming the officers failed to protect them by not arranging alternate shelter or taking other precautions. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the police owed no duty to the plaintiffs because no special relationship had been created that would give rise to liability beyond the general public duty, and the evidence did not raise a triable issue of fact on that point.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involved defendant Mario Nolasco Fernandez's appeal from an order extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender under Penal Code section 2970 after his parole termination date. Defendant argued that violations of statutory time limits, including the requirement for a medical director's letter at least 180 days before parole ended and for trial to commence at least 30 days before that date, rendered the extension invalid. The court affirmed the extension order, ruling that the time limits are directory rather than mandatory. It found no due process violation from the delays and determined that good cause excused the failure to meet the 30-day trial commencement rule given the late receipt of the evaluation from mental health officials.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by the mother and siblings of a child murdered while in foster care, alleging that Santa Cruz County negligently placed the child and failed to adequately supervise the foster home or remove her despite reports of inadequate oversight. The trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment on claims of negligence and breach of mandatory duties, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that foster placement and supervision decisions by social workers were discretionary acts protected by governmental immunity under the Government Code, that no specific mandatory duties were violated, and that the evidence did not establish a causal link between county actions and the child's death. The opinion emphasized that social workers exercised professional judgment in assessing risk and selecting the home to support family reunification goals.

family lawtorts & liability

This case involved a dispute between Sergio Construction, Inc. (SCI) and West Valley Mission Community College District over a contract to build a gymnasium on a college campus, which the District terminated for alleged delays, defects, and failures to perform after the one-year deadline passed. SCI sued the District for breach of contract, and the District filed a cross-complaint; the cross-complaint was later settled by SCI's insurer and bonding company, leading to a dismissal with prejudice. At trial, SCI moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the dismissal acted as a retraxit barring the District from contesting SCI's allegations, but the trial court denied the motion, the jury returned a verdict for the District, and the court awarded the District attorney fees. On appeal, SCI challenged the denial of its motion, the fee award, and the denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the dismissal of the cross-complaint after settlement by third-party insurers did not preclude the District from litigating the issues raised in SCI's complaint.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved two students molested by a teacher employed by the Pajaro Valley Unified School District in 1986 and 1988-1989; the students did not file government claims until 1993, years after the incidents. A jury found the District equitably estopped from raising late-claim and statute-of-limitations defenses and held it 100 percent at fault for the plaintiffs' $4.3 million in damages. The appellate court reversed as to the Manley plaintiffs because the record contained no evidence that the District engaged in affirmative acts inducing them to delay filing, but found the evidence supported estoppel for the Ortega plaintiffs while remanding for a new trial on fault allocation because the District could not be held entirely responsible.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved two students who were sexually molested by a teacher employed by the Pajaro Valley Unified School District in the late 1980s; the students and their parents filed government claims and a lawsuit against the district years later, alleging negligent hiring and supervision. The trial court submitted the timeliness defenses to the jury on an equitable estoppel theory, and the jury found the district 100 percent at fault with damages totaling $4,312,500. On appeal, the court concluded there was no evidence that the district took affirmative steps to induce the Manley plaintiffs to delay filing their claims or suit, so it reversed judgment in their favor and directed entry of judgment for the district. As to the Ortega plaintiffs, the court found sufficient evidence to support equitable estoppel but insufficient evidence to support allocating all fault to the district, and therefore remanded for a new trial limited to allocation of fault.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a challenge to the Monterey County Registrar of Voters' certification that a referendum petition protesting a rezoning ordinance had insufficient valid signatures (short by 313 after initial review) to qualify for the ballot under Elections Code section 9144. The trial court ruled that additional signatures should have been counted as valid, making the petition sufficient, and awarded attorney fees. On appeal, the court held that the Registrar correctly determined the petition lacked enough valid signatures after reviewing disputed categories such as mismatched addresses, dates, and verifications. However, the controversy was deemed moot due to an intervening election, leading the court to dismiss the appeal from the judgment while reversing the attorney fees order.

electionsprocedure

In Barton v. Elexsys International, Inc., a former senior vice-president sued his employer for breach of contract and fraud after the company refused to allow him to exercise stock options approximately one year following his termination as part of a financial restructuring. The plaintiff had received twelve months of salary continuance under an executive severance plan but claimed this arrangement or oral statements extended his stock option rights beyond the terms stated in the three written option agreements, which provided that options would terminate upon employment end and could be exercised only within thirty days for any vested shares. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the unambiguous written agreements controlled, the severance plan made no reference to stock options, the plaintiff had acknowledged understanding the termination provisions, and no admissible evidence created a triable issue that the options continued to vest or were otherwise modified.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In Torrez v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, an employee sued his employer for alleged racial discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, claiming he was suspended and terminated for conduct that non-Hispanic employees were not disciplined for, despite prior reinstatements through union grievances. The employer petitioned to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters union that required arbitration of all employment disputes, including those involving statutory discrimination claims. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of arbitration for the statutory claims, holding that Supreme Court precedent in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. establishes that a union cannot waive an individual employee's right to litigate independent statutory rights in court, and it rejected contrary reasoning from Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. The court reversed the denial of arbitration for the employee's nonstatutory claims and remanded for a determination on whether to stay those claims pending litigation.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, the People petitioned for a writ of mandate after the trial court denied their motion to discover the peace officer personnel records of defendant Robert Gremminger, who faced murder charges following a 1996 shooting at a mall while employed as a fire captain rather than a peace officer. Gremminger had previously worked as a police officer and arson investigator, and the People argued they were exempt under Penal Code section 832.7 from the procedural requirements of Evidence Code section 1043 for obtaining such records. The appellate court denied the petition, ruling that the section 832.7 exemption applies only to investigations of conduct by a person employed as a police officer at the time of the events under review, which did not apply here since Gremminger was not a peace officer when the shooting occurred. As a result, the People were required to comply with Evidence Code sections 1043 et seq. to obtain the records.

criminal lawprocedure

In Valley Title Co. v. San Jose Water Co., a fire service pipeline outside Valley Title's building ruptured in 1992, causing flooding and property damage; Valley sued San Jose Water Company (SJWC), an investor-owned utility, for negligence and trespass, alleging inadequate inspection and maintenance of the line. A jury found SJWC liable and awarded Valley approximately $3 million in damages. SJWC appealed, arguing immunity under Public Utilities Code section 774. The court reversed the judgment, holding that SJWC was immune from the claims because section 774 shields public utilities from liability for any damage resulting from a failure to provide or maintain fire protection equipment or service, consistent with the statute's text and legislative history referencing similar governmental immunities.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved defendant Timothy Sean O'Neil, who was convicted by a jury of carjacking under Penal Code section 215 after he started and drove away in William Campbell's unlocked pickup truck from Campbell's driveway early one morning. Campbell confronted the defendant, got into the truck bed, and argued with him during a drive on the highway before the defendant eventually returned Campbell to the starting point, fled with the truck, and was later apprehended. On appeal, the defendant argued that insufficient evidence supported the conviction because any force or fear occurred after he had taken possession of the vehicle and that his counsel was ineffective for not limiting impeachment with prior convictions. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that section 215 does not require the use of force or fear to be contemporaneous with initially gaining possession of the vehicle and that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of a carjacking.

criminal law