Rodney Davis

In People v. Ugalino, a jury convicted defendant Del Jay Ugalino of multiple offenses arising from an August 2005 incident in which he and an accomplice entered an apartment under the pretense of buying marijuana from resident Joshua Johnson, then brandished guns and attempted to steal the drugs, leading to charges including first-degree residential burglary, two counts of attempted robbery (of Johnson and roommate Jessie Rider), drug possession for sale, and felon in possession of ammunition. The trial court sentenced Ugalino to 14 years and six months in prison. On appeal, the court reversed only the attempted robbery conviction as to Rider, holding that insufficient evidence showed Rider had any ownership, possession, access, or protective obligation regarding Johnson's marijuana, as the two were merely roommates with no special relationship and Johnson was present to safeguard his own property. The court otherwise affirmed the convictions and remanded for resentencing.

criminal law

In People v. Robertson, the defendant pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale with firearm and prior conviction enhancements and was sentenced to 13 years in prison, including a $1,200 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4 with an attached 10 percent administrative fee. On appeal, the defendant challenged the administrative fee as unauthorized, relying on the earlier decision in People v. Eddards. The Court of Appeal rejected the challenge, holding that section 1202.4, subdivision (l) expressly permits the 10 percent fee on the restitution fine ordered under that statute, and distinguished Eddards because it involved a different statute (section 1203.1) limiting fees to restitution paid directly to victims rather than the Restitution Fund. The court affirmed the fee and directed the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect presentence custody credits and a court security fee.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Chico Romero Watts, who was convicted in separate trials of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, as well as multiple offenses including battery, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, assault, false imprisonment, and related enhancements, with recidivist allegations sustained. On appeal, the defendant challenged the denial of his request to represent himself under Faretta v. California, along with other issues such as physical restraints and jury instructions. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences in full, directing only a correction to the abstract of judgment. It held that the trial court properly denied self-representation because the defendant's prior conduct in court demonstrated an inability to follow procedural rules and legal protocol, rendering him unable to exercise the right competently.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Randy Dean Pierce, convicted by a jury of second-degree murder after he ran over his friend with a truck and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court's response to an objection during closing arguments and the prosecutor's rebuttal remarks misled the jury about the meaning of "an abiding conviction that the charge is true" in the standard reasonable doubt instruction (CALCRIM No. 220), specifically by downplaying any requirement of permanence or lasting belief. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding there was no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled because the trial court properly directed counsel to restate the law from the jury instructions, those instructions adequately stated the prosecution's burden without need for further elaboration on the term "abiding," and the prosecutor's comments did not misstate the law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a property owner's claim of inverse condemnation against the County of Butte, alleging that the County's implementation of a master storm drainage plan and related activities—such as accepting drainage from nearby subdivisions into Keefer Slough, building a bridge, and sponsoring a creek bed restoration project—increased flooding on his almond orchard property. Following a bench trial, the trial court found no inverse condemnation liability, determining that the County's actions satisfied the rule of reasonable conduct applicable to public flood control efforts. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court had properly resolved all material issues under the reasonableness standard and that the plaintiff had not established a compensable taking.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved podiatrist Pete G. Thomas, who sought a writ of mandate to compel the director of the California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) to reconsider his 2007 application for reenrollment as a Medi-Cal provider without regard to a 1999 audit determination that he owed $790,000 in overpayments. The trial court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court reasoned that even if the 2002 Sacramento County judgment entered under Welfare and Institutions Code section 14172 was unenforceable due to the DHCS's failure to file a certificate in Orange County, the underlying 1999 overpayment determination remained a valid outstanding debt that the DHCS could properly consider under its regulations and the parties' 2003 settlement agreement when evaluating the reenrollment application. The court further noted that the DHCS's discretionary decision on the application could not be compelled by mandate absent an impermissible factor, which was not shown here.

healthcareprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a reporter's request under the California Public Records Act for coroner and autopsy reports on a 1971 homicide victim whose case led to a 2008 murder conviction. The superior court denied the petition for disclosure after in camera review, finding the records exempt. The Court of Appeal upheld that ruling, holding that such reports qualify as investigatory files compiled by a local agency for law enforcement purposes under Government Code section 6254(f) when they concern a suspected homicide with a concrete prospect of criminal proceedings. The court reasoned that the exemption's language covers these reports in the factual context of a violent death inquiry tied to potential prosecution, and it rejected arguments that coroners fall outside the statute's scope or that the exemption conflicts with constitutional access provisions. The court did not reach alternative grounds for nondisclosure or press freedom claims.

criminal lawprocedure

In Delucchi v. Franchise Tax Board, plaintiffs sought a refund of state income taxes paid on 1995 installment payments from their 1986 sale of small business stock, claiming the zero-percent exclusion for long-term capital gains under former Revenue and Taxation Code section 18162.5 should apply even after its 1989 repeal. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Franchise Tax Board on stipulated facts, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court reasoned that the installment-sale method under Internal Revenue Code section 453 governs only the timing of gain recognition, not the characterization or exclusion percentage, which is determined under the law in effect in the year each payment is received; it rejected plaintiffs' argument that the 1986 exclusion fixed the gross-profit percentage permanently. The decision relied on federal precedent treating changes in capital-gain treatment as applying to post-change installments and found no contrary authority or statutory directive for ongoing sales.

taxes

This case involved a class action lawsuit by credit card customers of Bank of America, a national bank, alleging that the bank violated California and Arizona holiday statutes by charging late fees and interest on payments posted the next business day after a holiday due date. The trial court sustained the bank's demurrer without leave to amend, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the state holiday statutes, which permit acts required on a holiday to be performed on the next business day, are preempted by federal regulations under the National Bank Act. Specifically, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(2)(iv) allows national banks to establish the schedule for repayment of principal and interest on non-real-estate loans without regard to state law limitations on those terms. The reasoning centered on federal preemption principles, finding that the state laws directly conflicted with the banks' federally authorized powers over credit terms.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a 17-year-old minor, Walter P., whom the juvenile court found had violated Health and Safety Code section 11357(b) by possessing no more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $100. The court placed him on six months of probation and, over his objection, imposed conditions requiring 45 days of home supervision and eight days in a Juvenile Work Project program. Walter appealed, arguing that these conditions exceeded the maximum penalty for the offense and were therefore invalid. The Court of Appeal affirmed the probation order, holding that Welfare and Institutions Code sections 725 and 729.2 set only minimum requirements for juvenile probation and that the juvenile court has broad discretion to impose additional conditions aimed at rehabilitation and preserving family ties, even for offenses punishable only by a fine. The court reasoned that such conditions do not constitute physical confinement and are authorized under the statutory scheme governing juvenile sanctions.

criminal law

The case involved Wayne Lewis, who suffered a back injury in August 2004 while working for Beutler Heating and Air Conditioning, and the dispute over whether the 1997 or 2005 Permanent Disability Rating Schedule applied to calculate his permanent disability benefits under Labor Code section 4660(d). The court held that a pre-January 1, 2005, treating physician's report need not state that the worker's condition is permanent and stationary to indicate the existence of permanent disability and thereby trigger application of the older 1997 schedule. It sided with the interpretations in Genlyte and Zenith over Vera, reasoning that the statutory language is broad and does not require that specific terminology. The court annulled the WCAB's decision and remanded for a determination, based on the entire record, of whether Dr. Mann's December 2004 report sufficiently indicated permanent disability related to the 2004 injury.

labor & employment

In People v. Belton, defendant Willie Belton was convicted by a jury of corporal injury to a former cohabitant with a great bodily injury enhancement and felony battery with serious bodily injury, based on an assault against his ex-girlfriend Christine B. after their relationship ended. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the convictions, an erroneous jury instruction on a lesser included offense, and prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The Court of Appeal rejected these claims, finding sufficient evidence that the victim qualified as a former cohabitant and that the assault caused serious injury, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the prosecutor's remarks did not constitute misconduct or prejudice the defendant. The judgment was therefore affirmed.

criminal law

In People v. Slattery, the defendant pleaded no contest to inflicting injury on her dependent elderly mother under Penal Code section 368(b)(1) and was sentenced to prison; the trial court also ordered her to pay $876 in restitution to the hospital that treated the mother. The Court of Appeal held that the restitution order must be stricken because the hospital was not a direct victim entitled to restitution under section 1202.4(f) and (k)(2). The court reasoned that the statute limits restitution to entities that are the immediate objects of the crime, and a hospital providing medical services to the actual victim qualifies only as an indirect recipient; any unpaid debt can instead be pursued through a civil claim against the victim's estate. The claim was preserved on appeal under the unauthorized-sentence exception because it presented a purely legal question of statutory authority.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Love, a jury convicted defendant Sumaria Love of 15 counts of identity theft, false personation, fraudulent use of access cards, embezzlement, and related offenses based on her misuse of patients' credit card information and office property while working as a dental receptionist. On appeal, the court addressed claims regarding whether one count was only an attempted offense, whether dual convictions for theft and receipt of the same property were barred, whether certain felonies should be reduced to misdemeanors due to lack of jury findings on property value, and sentencing issues. The court struck the conviction for receiving stolen property, reduced four felony convictions to misdemeanors because the jury made no findings that the value exceeded $400, and remanded for resentencing, while rejecting the claim that one offense was merely attempted and affirming the upper term sentence. These outcomes rested on interpretations of Penal Code sections defining the offenses, the requirement for jury determinations of value for felony status, and the prohibition on dual convictions for the same property.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether debt settlement companies Nationwide Asset Services and Universal Nationwide were operating as unlicensed proraters under the Financial Code by receiving customer funds for distribution to creditors. The Commissioner of Corporations issued an order barring the companies from continuing their activities without a license, finding that the companies exercised sufficient control over customer bank accounts through authorizations and directions to Global to constitute constructive receipt of money. The companies petitioned for a writ of administrative mandamus, conceding the factual findings but arguing that their activities did not meet the statutory definition of prorating. The trial court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that constructive receipt through control over disbursements qualifies as receiving money for prorating purposes and requires licensure.

business & regulatory

This case involved a child dependency proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, where the juvenile court denied reunification services to a father whose three-month-old child had been removed from his custody. The father had been convicted of raping and murdering a 13-year-old girl when he was 15 years old. The court interpreted section 361.5(b)(4) to apply because the father had caused the death of another child through abuse, with the phrases "parent or guardian of the child" referring to the parent's current status and "death of another child" meaning any other child, not limited to the parent's own. The court also found under section 361.5(c) that reunification would not be in the child's best interest, based on evidence of the father's ongoing antisocial behavior, failed treatment, and lack of insight. The appellate court upheld these findings and denied the father's petition for writ of mandate.

family lawcriminal law

The case involved a dispute between the two sole members of an LLC in which plaintiff Richard Dickson sought judicial dissolution on grounds of deadlock and ouster from management. Defendant Roger Rehmke elected under Corporations Code section 17351 to purchase Dickson's interest at fair market value, leading the trial court to appoint appraisers and issue an alternative decree in May 2006 that set the value and gave Rehmke 90 days to tender payment or allow dissolution to proceed. Rehmke timely paid, the court entered judgment in June 2006, and Dickson appealed from that judgment, claiming error in the valuation process. The Court of Appeal held that section 17351 permits an appeal only from the alternative decree itself, making the notice of appeal filed after the later judgment untimely, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this consolidated wrongful death action, the California Highway Patrol sought a writ of mandate after the trial court denied its motion for summary judgment, finding that Vehicle Code section 14602.6(a)(1) imposed a mandatory duty to impound a vehicle for 30 days following an arrest for driving with a suspended license under section 14601.1. The underlying facts involved CHP officers who arrested a driver for DUI and driving with a suspended license after a noninjury accident but marked the vehicle as "stored" rather than impounded; the driver later caused a fatal collision the same day after retrieving the car. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 14602.6(a)(1) uses permissive language ("may") granting officers discretion to arrest and impound or to impound without arrest, rather than creating a mandatory duty enforceable under Government Code section 815.6. As a result, the CHP could not be held liable for breach of mandatory duty, and the court directed the trial court to grant summary judgment in the CHP's favor.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a 17-year-old minor, Walter P., found by the juvenile court to have violated Health and Safety Code section 11357(b) by possessing no more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, a misdemeanor. The court placed him on six months' probation and imposed additional conditions requiring 45 days of home supervision detention and eight days in the Juvenile Work Project program. Walter appealed, arguing these conditions exceeded the statute's authorization, and the People conceded the point. The Court of Appeal agreed that the statute permits only a fine of up to $100 and contains no authority for confinement, rendering the probation conditions invalid under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730(b). The judgment was modified to strike those conditions and affirmed as modified.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a juvenile dependency proceeding in which the Lassen County Department of Health and Human Services sought a permanent plan of adoption for two minors (ages 12 and 13) who had been removed from their mother's custody after findings of sexual abuse by a relative and failure to protect. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found the minors had a probability of adoption but were difficult to place, identified adoption as the goal, and continued the hearing for 180 days to allow further efforts to locate adoptive families without terminating parental rights. The mother appealed, contending the evidence was insufficient to support the probability-of-adoption finding. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as premature, reasoning that an interim probability finding is not appealable because the permanency hearing has not concluded and the finding has no preclusive effect on later adoptability determinations.

family lawprocedure