John J. Ford

The case involved a minor, Jesse F., appealing a San Joaquin County Juvenile Court order committing him to the California Youth Authority with a maximum confinement of 14 years, following sustained petitions in Los Angeles County Juvenile Court for multiple counts including attempted robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, and attempted murder, all involving weapons and some with great bodily injury. The court addressed whether the juvenile court must state reasons for imposing consecutive terms when calculating the maximum term of confinement under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 and whether certain counts constituted an indivisible transaction requiring a stay under Penal Code section 654. It held that the juvenile court has discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent terms rather than being required to aggregate them automatically, that Penal Code section 1170's requirement to state reasons for sentence choices does not apply in the juvenile context, and that some but not all counts required staying. The case was remanded to allow the court to exercise its discretion on consecutive terms, to strike erroneous enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.3, and to stay terms on counts II and IV, with the judgment otherwise affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a taxpayer filed suit against the presiding and supervising judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court and the County of Los Angeles seeking to enjoin the use of public funds to implement a standardized petition form that criminal defendants were required to complete in order to exercise their right to self-representation, on the ground that the form's terms and lack of adequate advisements infringed defendants' constitutional and statutory rights. The trial court sustained the defendants' general demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a taxpayer suit under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a is not a proper vehicle to challenge judicial policies or functions because criminal defendants directly affected by the policy already have standing and immediate recourse within the judicial system, and that using county funding as a basis for suit would improperly undermine judicial independence.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a challenge by Grace E. Simons, on behalf of a citizens' committee, to the City of Los Angeles's approval of plans for a firearms training simulator building at the Police Academy in Elysian Park. Simons sought a writ of mandate to require a new conditional use permit application and preparation of an environmental impact report under CEQA, after the City Planning Commission and City Council determined the site was a deemed-approved conditional use and the project was exempt. The trial court denied the petition after applying the substantial evidence standard of review, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the addition was a minor accessory structure to an existing facility and thus categorically exempt from CEQA, with no fundamental vested right affected by the decision.

environmentprocedureproperty

In Ward v. Superior Court, petitioners including a Los Angeles County Supervisor and county employees sought a writ of mandate to overturn a superior court order disqualifying the county counsel from representing them in a federal civil rights lawsuit (42 U.S.C. § 1983) filed by real party Philip E. Watson, the county assessor. Watson had moved to disqualify the counsel under State Bar Rule 4-101, asserting that the counsel's prior representation of him in official and some personal matters created a conflict due to confidential information obtained. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in granting disqualification, reasoning that county counsel's role is to represent county officers in their official duties, that communications with the assessor are not privileged against the board of supervisors who oversee the office, and that no relevant confidential information relating to the lawsuit's subject matter had been received that would bar representation. The court directed the superior court to vacate its order and deny the motion.

procedurecivil rights

In Arauz v. Gerhardt, plaintiff Amelia Arauz sued the driver and owner of a car for negligent infliction of emotional harm after she arrived at the scene of her son's accident within five minutes and suffered severe shock upon discovering his injuries. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on that cause of action, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court reasoned that declarations showed Arauz did not arrive until after the collision and lacked any sensory and contemporaneous perception of the impact itself. Under the standard set in Dillon v. Legg, this meant her emotional distress resulted from learning of the accident afterward rather than from directly observing it, so no triable issue of fact existed and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether Government Code section 34507's two-thirds vote requirement for changing the name of a general law city (unlike chartered cities, which may change names by simple majority) violated equal protection under the California Constitution. Petitioners, residents of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes, sought a writ of mandate after a 1974 special election produced a simple majority in favor of renaming the city, but state and county officials refused to file the results because the threshold was not met. The trial court ruled the statute unconstitutional and ordered relief based on a simple majority, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the classification between general law and chartered cities is valid and that the Legislature has broad discretion to set uniform voting rules for general law cities; the two-thirds requirement bears a rational relationship to the legitimate purpose of ensuring stability given the significant consequences of a name change.

electionscivil rights